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Abstract 
 
This thesis develops a new understanding of evangelical Christian growth in the 
contemporary world. Existing explanations of growth are well rehearsed within the 
social sciences, and draw clear distinctions between the characteristics of evangelical 
organisations, and the structural contexts in which they operate. Notwithstanding, a 
number of theoretical and empirical assumptions render such explanations applicable 
in some countries, but not others. Drawing on qualitative data collected in Buddhist-
majority Sri Lanka throughout 2010-11, I argue that closer examination of the 
recursive relationship between organisation (agency) and context (structure) will lead 
to recognition of the fact that growth is a spatially defined process, with evangelical 
organisations being tied to localities in complex and multifarious ways. Four 
empirical chapters develop this argument further. The first examines how, in 
structurally hostile environments, evangelical groups grow in ways that are more 
relational than otherwise recognised, and become adept at spreading their evangelical 
influence through the appropriation and use of non-religious spaces. The second 
focuses on the spatial variability of evangelical praxis, showing how it varies between 
urban and rural, and public and private spaces and, more specifically, how strategic 
engagement in and through space is a defining feature of youth evangelism. The third 
critically draws upon the findings of the first two chapters by exploring the politics of 
evangelical Christian growth – specifically the politics of the house church, and the 
allegations of “unethical” activity that foreground the politics of converting both 
people, and space. The fourth empirical chapter explores how Buddhist hegemony 
develops as a response to evangelical Christian growth, and how Buddhist insecurity 
in the face of Christian globalism can translate into extreme forms of religious 
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protectionism and violence. To conclude, I show how the findings not only contribute 
to the continued evolution of the geographies of religion, but also highlight the value 
of a more extrospective sub-discipline that engages with, challenges and develops 
more wide-ranging debates that exist outside our putative disciplinary boundaries.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Religion in postcolonial Asia 
 
Evangelical Christianity is one of the fastest growing and most widely dispersed 
religious groups in the world today. The evangelical remit, pursued to varying degrees 
by all Christian groups, is a biblical mandate1, yet the processes of evangelisation that 
lead to growth are fraught with politics that are under-researched, and often 
misunderstood. This thesis fills the lacuna by exploring the politics of evangelical 
Christian growth. It focuses specifically on how evangelism catalyses inter- (and 
intra-) religious competition for resources, such as ‘people, territory, wealth, positions 
of power, and economic advantage… dignity, prestige, and all manner of symbolic 
capita’ (Lincoln 2003: 74), and how religious conflict is often a by-product of the 
competitive desire to ‘overcome, eliminate, or convert the other to extinction’ (Bouma 
2007: 190). In doing so the thesis adopts a systemic approach to understanding 
Christian growth; one that positions evangelical groups not as autonomous agents, but 
as situated stakeholders that are both sensitive, and responsive to the structural 
conditions of a locality. I do this using a detailed analysis of the religious context of 
Sri Lanka, where I also explore how religious competition can legitimate the political 
aspirations of anti-Christian religious groups, and can lead to a number of paradoxical 
outcomes that contribute to, whilst simultaneously compromise, Christian growth.  
 
Such a dynamic is not unique to Sri Lanka, but is particularly pronounced in 
postcolonial Asia, where growth often reveals an irreconcilable tension between the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In particular, the Great Commission is the instruction of the resurrected Jesus Christ to his disciples, 
telling them to ‘go and make disciples of all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of 
the Son and of the Holy Spirit’ (Matthew 28: 19). 
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globalist ambitions of evangelical Christianity, and the localist ambitions of 
primordial, non-Christian religious groups. In Malaysia, for example, police recently 
sanctioned a mass gathering of Muslims in the capital city, Kuala Lumpur, seeking to 
‘defend Islam against Christian proselytisation’ (The Straits Times 20.10.2011). The 
so-called ‘anti-proselytisation rally’ had been organised to bolster proposals put forth 
by a confederacy of Muslim organisations for a new law to punish those who try to 
convert Muslims. This example reflects similar anti-conversion legislation proposed 
(and implemented) in Bhutan, India2 and Sri Lanka, and contributes to an emerging 
trend amongst postcolonial nation-states seeking to defend their religious sovereignty 
against the destabilising threat of unchecked Christian proselytism. Strategies of 
“religious protectionism” (see Robbins 2004) typically involve the strengthening of 
dominant religious groups along nationalist and/or ethnic lines, as ‘the cause of 
“nationalism” has [often]… turned a religiously plural society into one defined by 
religious hegemony’ (Ammerman 2010: 164). This contributes to a dual occurrence 
of hegemony: the aspirations of Christian globalism and the assertions of religious 
nationalism, both of which have a role to play in catalysing competition and conflict.  
 
In Sri Lanka, more specifically, recent decades have witnessed the emergence of a 
Buddhist political elite; one that is intolerant to difference, chauvinistic, and seeks to 
contain the spread and influence of evangelical groups via increasingly punitive 
means. In 2005 newly elected Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse remarked that ‘the 
religious unrest currently felt in Sri Lanka is even more serious than racial or ethnic 
unrest’ (cited in Matthews 2007: 456); sentiment that is amplified by the decades-long 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In India, anti-conversion legislation (ironically entitled the “Freedom of Religion Act”) has been 
implemented in the states of Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu 
and Gujarat. In Arunachal Pradesh and Rajasthan, similar laws have been passed, but await 
implementation.  
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civil war being fought at the time. Influenced by the colonial legacy of Christian 
administrations, education systems, buildings and missionaries, Buddhist groups have 
long sought to (re)establish their religious primacy. A growing Christian presence 
since the 1980s has galvanised anti-Christian rhetoric and action from the Buddhist 
right. Containment strategies range from informal acts of violence to more formal 
processes of structural resistance that serve to restrict the actions and autonomy of 
Christian groups. Indeed, the ontological incongruence between Buddhism and 
violence has only recently been labelled a ‘misconception’ (Jerryson 2010: 3), 
presenting a relationship that is worthy of closer interrogation (see Jerryson and 
Juergensmeyer 2010; in particular, Kent 2010). Given that academic studies have 
‘rarely cited [Buddhism] as a political force’ (Jenkins 2007: 217), the politics of 
evangelical growth in a Buddhist context is an understudied problem that, for a 
variety of reasons, commands attention. 
 
The moral impetus for this thesis is my belief in the freedom of religious choice. As 
an atheist, I feel that religious belief should be guided by individual volition, and that 
religious choice is something that should not be forced or denied. In the Sri Lankan 
context, such volition is challenged by allegations of “unethical” conversion to 
Christianity on the one hand, and the difficulty of converting out of Buddhism on the 
other. Such allegations and difficulties fuel the politics of evangelical Christian 
growth in Sri Lanka and are, to a large extent, a function of the idiosyncrasies of the 
“geo-religious” context within which they occur (see Allievo and Dassetto 1999). 
Throughout postcolonial Asia, centuries of Christian missionisation and conversion 
have led to the creation of “geo-religious” spaces that are highly sensitive to 
contemporary conversion, and can easily trigger residual feelings of colonial 
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resentment and domestic insecurity. As Agnew (2006: 185) recognises, the fact that 
‘much nationalism and imperialism have found purpose and justification in religious 
differences and in proselytising’ affirms the reality that discourses of contemporary 
Christian growth are not just a matter of religious concern, but engage with other, 
assumedly “non-religious” issues as well. Attempts to better situate Christian growth 
in different religious, socio-cultural and political contexts around the world will see 
discourse engage with the challenges posed by the groups involved, which more often 
than not prefer to be in a position of religious control than a part of the compromising 
jigsaw of religious pluralism.  
 
1.2 Towards a geographical understanding of religious growth 
 
The geographies of religion have been described as a ‘burgeoning subfield’ (Wilford 
2009: 328) within human geography, yet there is a continual need to realise their 
wide(r)-ranging potential by pushing the boundaries of how they can engage with 
other subfields from within, and without, the discipline. The value of studying 
religious growth is that it is often a symptom of underlying, and more broad-based 
political, economic, social and cultural processes within which geographers, and 
geography, are centrally implicated. Existing explanations of growth originating from 
the broader social sciences do not, for example, account for how Christian groups are 
able grow in hostile environments like that of Sri Lanka. This is partly due to a lack of 
clarity and nuance when defining what actually constitutes “religious growth”. In 
places like Sri Lanka, religious growth is reflected in many different ways, some of 
which are more easily quantified than others. I posit that an understanding of growth 
should be multivalent, and cover not just tangible/numerical indicators, such as 
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conversions and the planting of churches, but also more intangible markers, such as 
public debates surrounding Christianity, and growing awareness of Christian actions 
in the public conscience. The privileging of the quantifiable over the unquantifiable 
has caused discourse to focus on numerical increases in Christian populations rather 
than the discursive effects of a strengthening religious cohort. Whilst the former is 
undeniably important, it is self-restricting and lacks universal application.  
 
The thesis also reflects a growing trend amongst geographers seeking to carve out 
their own niche in the social scientific study of religion by ‘bring[ing] forward 
approaches that will enable us to engage in larger, related debates that are animating 
other disciplines’ (Brace et al., 2006: 29). In light of this, Kong’s (2010: 763) recent 
call for geographers to ‘go beyond insightful analyses of the micropolitics of religious 
spatial expressions to contribute to an understanding of larger social and political 
events confronting the contemporary world, including religious conflict and religious 
change’ provides the impetus for the thesis, not least because the processes of 
Christian growth – notably evangelisation and proselytisation – drive change and 
conflict, and can influence perceptions of, and behaviours towards other religions at 
both the micro- and macro-scales. In addition, such processes are often a symptom, 
and function of the public resurgence of religion, with religion having become as 
much a matter of public expression as it is private belief (see Habermas 2006). Such 
resurgence reifies the latent, yet under-appreciated role of religion in matters of 
geographical enquiry, and underwrites the continual need to realise a more “relevant” 
geography of religion sub-discipline (see Pacione 1999; Henkel 2005; Brace et al. 
2006; Kong 2010).  
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1.3 Research aims and thesis structure 
 
By taking steps towards realising a more “relevant” geography of religion, the 
overarching aim of the research is to develop an understanding of evangelical 
Christian growth that goes beyond the confines of putative disciplinary boundaries. In 
doing so I integrate sociological theorisations with geographical perspectives in a 
mutually enriching way. To this end, the first aim is to identify and explain 
organisational strategies of evangelism – how Christian groups engage with and 
influence society and, in turn, how such strategies of engagement are influenced by 
the structural conditions of a locality. Ancillary to this is a detailed exploration of the 
spaces through which Christian growth is enacted, which results in a recurrent focus 
on the formation and disbandment of the Sri Lankan house church. A second aim is to 
develop a clearer understanding of the types, motivations and outcomes of Buddhist 
resistance to evangelical Christian growth. I examine not just the physical persecution 
of Christians by Buddhists, but explore more symbolic (e.g. spatial) forms of 
resistance as well. The third aim is to evaluate the relative success (and often 
unexpected outcomes) of Christian growth and Buddhist resistance, which in turn will 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of religious growth. The rationale for, 
and application of these aims is expounded in the chapter summaries that follow.  
 
Chapter 2, the literature review and conceptual framework, seeks to integrate existing 
approaches to theorising evangelical Christian growth with new opportunities that 
emerge when such approaches are critiqued through the lens of geographical 
understanding. More specifically, I argue that existing approaches have developed 
from an understanding of Christian growth in places in which it is most pronounced, 
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and hold little relevance when applied to a large swathe of territory that covers much 
of Asia (including Sri Lanka), the Middle East and Northern Africa, and is 
collectively referred to as the 10/40 Window (see page 29). By articulating the need 
for theory to begin recognising, exploring and developing the recursive relationship 
between structure and agency within such contexts, I argue that the structural mosaic 
– a heuristic device that recognises the heterogeneity of structure – can generate a 
clearer understanding of Christian growth in hostile environments. By recognising the 
heterogeneity of structure, the structural mosaic sensitises discourse to how religious 
agents can infiltrate (seemingly hostile) religious structures via non-religious 
structural influencing. I also focus on the important role of space in mediating and 
determining strategies of evangelical Christian growth, and explore in detail the use of 
the house church as both articulation of the structural mosaic in practice, and one of 
the most globally pervasive, yet often undetected locations of evangelical activity.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the empirical context and methodology, and starts with a 
description of Sri Lanka’s religious marketplace. The discussion is couched in 
religious economy parlance (first introduced in Chapter 2), and shows how the case of 
Sri Lanka requires new understandings of the workings of an “oligopolistic” religious 
marketplace. Guided by my multivalent understanding of religious growth, in the 
second part of the chapter I highlight the need for more qualitative understandings of 
religious change – something that presents a significant departure from the existing, 
quantitative methodologies that currently dominate. A critical ethnographic approach 
is outlined, and the sampling strategies and methods of data collection discussed. 
Finally, I introduce the research sites in order to capture the contextual determinants 
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of evangelism at the micro-scale, and to account for locational nuances in data 
collection around the country.  
 
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter, and provides an overarching backdrop for the 
subsequent three chapters. It attempts to explain how evangelical Christian groups 
remain competitive and grow, despite being subjected to various forms of structural 
resistance in Sri Lanka. I argue that such groups compete in ways that are more 
relational than otherwise thought (or recognised), and in doing so they remain largely 
innocuous to surveillance by anti-Christian groups. Specifically, I explore how the 
actions of evangelical groups reflect patterns of secrecy and subterfuge that enable 
them to overcome boundaries and barriers to growth, and how foreign catalysts and 
the development of strategic extra- and intra-group networks of influence help 
stimulate growth. I also apply my concept of the structural mosaic, using empirical 
examples to show how Christian groups often conflate secular practices (termed 
“social ministries”, such as Montessori’s, relief provision and long-term development 
programmes) with their evangelical objectives in order to co-opt or influence others.    
 
Chapter 5 explores the locations and determinants of evangelical praxis in Sri Lanka. 
Through a focus on two dichotomous pairings – urban-rural and public-private – 
Chapter 5 starts by examining some of the locational paradoxes that are an inherent 
part of evangelical praxis in Sri Lanka. Specifically, I explain why, in urban areas, the 
supply of Christianity outstrips demand, yet in rural areas the situation is reversed 
(demand outstrips supply). I also explain why the privatised nature of evangelical 
praxis provokes suspicion, even while evangelical groups are marginalised from the 
public domain. Following that, I focus on three spaces of youth evangelism – the 
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youth club, the youth camp and the university campus – that represent some of the 
most contested sites of evangelical activity. Finally, I explore the spatial modalities of 
the structural mosaic, with a particular focus on how the structural mosaic enables the 
obfuscation of evangelical space and, as a result, contributes to an understanding of 
the (often aggressive) expansion of evangelical groups in and through different 
spaces.  
 
Chapter 6 is divided into three sections, each of which focuses on a different facet of 
the politics of evangelical Christian growth. The first section examines the place-
bound politics of growth that prevents many evangelical groups from establishing a 
formal religious presence. I examine how spatial buffering – through the use of Bodhi 
(“Bo”) trees and Buddhist statues – is used to contain Christian expansion, and how 
the politics of permission prevents many evangelical groups from registering churches 
and operating more within the public domain. In the second section I examine the 
politics of converting space, with particular reference to the house church. More 
specifically, because the house church is essentially a space of subversion, I argue that 
it is replete with politics that encourage church fission and dualistic religious 
behaviours amongst congregations. In the third section I examine the politics of 
converting people, with particular reference to the market mentality of evangelicals, 
the spatial modalities (with particular regard to the public-private paradox, previously 
discussed in Chapter 5) of the “unethical” conversion debate, and the value of the 
structural mosaic in helping to contribute new perspectives to the debate. The chapter 
ends with an exploration of what “unethical” conversion means to the Christian 
groups implicated in the discourse, the aim being to expand the frame of debate 
beyond the parameters defined by Sri Lanka’s Buddhist right.  
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Chapter 7 is the final empirical chapter, and explores how evangelical Christianity 
contributes to the development of, and provides justification for Buddhist hegemony 
in Sri Lanka. I show how evangelism destabilises primordial power structures and 
how such destabilisation warrants the construction of a Christian “threat” by right-
wing Buddhist groups. Constructing the Christian “threat” involves implicating 
Christian groups in broader allegations of Western imperialism that are perpetrated by 
churches and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which in turn reveals the 
compromising effect of globalisation on the Buddhist right. The chapter ends by 
exploring the linkages between Buddhist protectionism and hegemony. I argue that 
strategies of protection are often based on a self-Orientalising assumption of 
vulnerability, which serves to restrict the religious mobility and freedom of the 
Buddhist masses, and contributes to a number of violent outcomes perpetrated against 
the Buddhist self, and Christian other. I conclude by highlighting the key 
contributions and limitations of the thesis, and the possibilities that present 
themselves for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE GROWTH OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY IN 




Over two decades have passed since Poloma and Pendleton’s (1989) criticism of the 
lack of research explaining the explosive growth of evangelical Christian groups in 
modernity; a phenomenon that is widely recognised as being ‘one of the most 
important religious developments globally of our time’ (Freston 1991: 4). Subsequent 
years have witnessed notable advances in identifying and explaining these 
developments (e.g. Martin 1990, 2002; Hefner 1993; Cox 1996; Hollenweger 1997; 
Jenkins 2007), yet important areas are left wanting. The fact remains that growth is 
not consistent throughout the world, with large territories apparently untempered by 
the proselytising activity of evangelical groups. Limited Christian growth throughout 
North Africa, the Middle East, and much of Asia highlights the blinkered nature of 
existing explanations, which is compounded by the fact that ‘Northerners rarely give 
the South anything like the attention it deserves, but when they do notice it, they tend 
to project onto it their own familiar realities and desires’ (Jenkins 2007: 15). Such 
projections have paralysed discourse, preventing critical interrogation of the caveats 
and differences that problematise and dilute existing theorisations. Moreover, 
geographical perspectives are currently lacking, despite being able to contribute much 
to the development of new theoretical approaches and more robust understandings of 
evangelical Christian growth around the world. Through an empirical focus on the 
restricted religious marketplace of Sri Lanka, I suggest how such new approaches and 
understandings can develop.  
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This chapter begins with an overview of existing theoretical approaches to evangelical 
Christian growth. I start by examining both the structural determinants of religious 
change, and human agency perspectives on religious conversion, focussing 
specifically on religious economy theorisations and the organisation as an arbiter of 
change. I go on to explore the variegated patterns of evangelical Christian growth 
around the world, before introducing the possibilities that arise from using a spatial 
framework to study religious growth and change, giving close consideration to 
existing approaches to theorising sacred space in particular. Finally, I introduce the 
conceptual framework, which is used to guide the four empirical chapters that follow. 
I first emphasise the role of the structural mosaic as an enabler of religious growth, 
with particular regard to the spatial modalities of the structural mosaic. I go on to 
discuss how the house church is a spatial modality of evangelical presence and growth 
that is both common throughout the world, and a cogent example of networked space.  
 
2.2 Theorising evangelical Christian growth in modernity 
 
Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic shift in the character and growth of 
Christianity. Increasingly associated with the Southern, rather than Northern 
Hemisphere, revivalism has seen large mainline denominations decline, smaller, more 
independent churches grow, and ecstatic forms of worship replace their more 
routinised, liturgical counterparts (Freston 2001; Jenkins 2007; Miller and Yamamori 
2007). Such shifts are commonly, but not exclusively, associated with 
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Pentecostalism3. Identified as the third wave of Protestant cultural revolution 
(superseding Puritanism and Methodism), there are an estimated 500 million 
Pentecostals worldwide, registering a 700 percent increase since the early 1980s 
(Anderson et al. 2010). The rapidity of such growth and spread is ‘unprecedented in 
the history of religions’ (Anderson 2005a: 1), having reconfigured the religious 
topographies of much of Africa, Latin America, and some parts of Asia (Martin 1990; 
Stoll 1990; Chesnut 2003; Heuser 2009). Moreover, the relative recency of such 
reconfigurations underscores the fact that evangelical growth is often a function of 
large-scale conversion to Christianity (Freston 2001, 2009), rather than more organic 
demographic changes, and has accordingly been described as one of the greatest 
“success” stories in the current era of cultural globalisation (Robbins 2004; Anderson 
and Tang 2005). Attempts have been made to explain how and why growth occurs, 
and are often based on empirical examination of the territories in which it is most 
pronounced.  
 
Below I explore existing attempts to understand religious change, with a particular 
focus on evangelical Christian growth. Such attempts typically reflect Durkheim’s 
(1938) dualistic approach to the study of institutions by expounding either the 
structural conditions that facilitate conversion to Christianity, or the agency of 
evangelical organisations and Christian converts. I explore the macro-scale, structural 
determinants of religious change first (with a particular focus on religious economy 
theorisations), followed by the micro-scale human agency approaches to 
understanding religious conversion (often a key driver of evangelical growth). I end 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Throughout the thesis, the term “evangelical Christian” refers primarily to Pentecostal groups that 
follow a doctrine of evangelism. Other, more historically entrenched, Christian denominations – 
Anglican, Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian for example – are an important, but secondary concern, 
given that they are typically less independent, and evangelically aggressive, than their Pentecostal 
counterparts. See Table 1 for clarification in the Sri Lankan context.  
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the section by examining the evangelical organisation as an arbiter of religious 
change, a critique of which problematises the prevalent treatment of structure and 
agency in binary terms, and leads into the subsequent section that explores the 
variegated patterns of evangelical Christian growth around the world.  
 
2.2.1 Structural determinants of religious change 
 
Macro-scale approaches emphasise the structural factors that facilitate conversion to 
Christianity, and that are common amongst places of strong Christian growth. For 
more than a century, modernisation – which according to Weber (1956) equates to the 
rationalisation of society – has been seen as the key structural driver of conversion 
(see Hefner 1993; van der Veer 1996a; Jenkins, 2007). Conversion as a result of 
modernisation is based on two premises: that the advancement of society involves a 
continual reorientation towards more rational thought and action; and that a key 
distinction between world religions (e.g. Christianity, Buddhism, Islam) and their 
traditional counterparts (e.g. animism, ancestral worship) is the superior 
rationalisation of the former4. Asad (1996: 263, original emphasis) provides a relevant 
metaphor to explain the process of modernisation and, in doing so, evokes the 
structural transition of society from traditional to world religion:  
 
Most individuals enter modernity rather as converts enter a new religion – as a 
consequence of forces beyond their control. Modernity, like the convert’s 
religion, defines new choices; it is rarely the result of an entirely “free choice”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Although it should also be noted that processes of rationalisation also instigate conversion between 
world religions. 	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And like the convert’s religion, it annihilates old possibilities and puts others 
in their place.   
 
Over time the mundane instrumentalism of traditional religion (Asad’s “old 
possibilities” e.g. conforming to social conventions, superstition) is replaced by world 
religion (the “new choices”). Replacement occurs as rationalisation involves 
searching for answers to the ethical, emotional and intellectual challenges of everyday 
life – a need that is met by world religions’ proclamation of ‘the existence of a 
transcendental realm vastly superior to that of everyday reality’ (Hefner, 1993: 8). 
Indeed Christianity has, in many instances, proven to be relatively more successful 
than its counterparts in attracting new converts. Tong (2007: 4), for example, argues 
that Singapore’s science-oriented education system and associated 
“intellectualization” of the population has facilitated a growing number of 
conversions to Christianity. Moving away from traditional Chinese ritual practices 
towards the more “rational” bible teachings of Christianity reflects a shift ‘from an 
unthinking and passive acceptance of religion’ to a religion that is believed to be more 
‘systematic, logical, and relevant’. Changes in the structure of society, perhaps 
unknown to converts themselves, therefore play a key role in determining religious 
choice.  
 
Alternative theories point to the consequences of modernisation in initiating processes 
of religious conversion. As economies develop, traditional values, lifestyles, and 
systems of support become increasingly redundant. Large-scale urbanisation causes 
individuals to undergo physical dislocation, to experience anomie, and to respond by 
embracing new religious alternatives. Conversion has therefore been theorised as a 
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neo-Marxist response to social or economic deprivation (often termed “relative 
deprivation” – see D’Epinay, 1969; Marshall, 1991; Parker, 1996; Jenkins, 2007), 
social disorganisation (Talmon, 1962), psychological vulnerability (Alland 1961), or 
changing socio-cultural contexts (Yang, 1997; Chen, 2002; Smilde, 2007). The 
relative deprivation thesis, for example, suggests that processes of modernisation 
create situations of socio-economic deprivation and anomie that foster the growth of 
small, independent religious groups that are adept at meeting the felt needs of a 
population. This has commonly been used to explain the phenomenal growth of 
evangelical and charismatic forms of Christianity throughout Latin America and 
Africa in the latter half of the twentieth century (e.g. Martin, 1990, 2002; Chesnut, 
1997, 2003). In Latin America, Protestant churches appeal to migrants and the 
marginalised, especially those found in the region’s sprawling megacities; whereas in 
Africa, Pentecostal churches are strongest where ‘neoliberal forces have eroded the 
capacity of liberal democratic states to provide education, health, and welfare’ 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 2003: 121). Being able to provide welfare and support, such 
churches have managed to establish a foothold from which conversion takes place, 
and religious alternatives flourish.  
 
Religious economy theorisations offer a more systemic approach to understanding the 
structural determinants of religious change. Central to such theorisations is the role of 
regulatory structures (e.g. legislation designed to restrict or enforce pluralism, local 
religious hierarchies, religio-cultural norms) in determining the growth and decline of 
religious groups. Thus whilst processes of modernisation create the conditions that 
facilitate conversion to Christianity (demand-side), religious economy perspectives 
emphasise the role of religious organisations in competing against each other to 
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attract converts (supply-side). Such perspectives are invaluable as they help sensitise 
discourses of religious change to the fact that structure can both enable, and restrict, 
religious growth.  
 
2.2.2 Existing approaches to religious economy theorisation 
 
Situated within the sociology of religion (see Warner 1993), religious economy 
perspectives offer another explanation for religious conversion other than the 
demand-side bias of the modernisation and relative deprivation theses. Religious 
economy perspectives emphasise the role of religious groups as indicators of religious 
vitality: vigorous religious groups are more competitive than their counterparts, 
attracting new converts and stronger commitment from existing believers. Locating 
such groups within inter-related systems of competition among religious groups and 
control by regulators, religious economy theorists argue that the (in)efficacy of supply 
drives religious growth or decline, which is determined by the degree to which an 
economy is regulated, and competition allowed to flourish (Stark 1985; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1993; Stark and Finke 2000; Chesnut 2003). Structural processes of 
regulation and deregulation play fundamental roles in determining market dynamics, 
as proven by the surge in religious activity in North America in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries following the deregulation of religion brought about by the First 
Amendment (Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Finke and Stark 1992). Existing 
understandings of religious economy therefore draw a clear distinction between 
deregulated and regulated religious marketplaces, suggesting that the former allows 
more room for inter-religious competition than the latter. Put differently, a religious 
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economy is either regulated (and monopolistic), or competitive (and pluralistic): it 
cannot be both. 
 
On the one hand, in a free (i.e. deregulated) market the presence of multiple religious 
alternatives stimulates supply-side competition, creating a laissez-faire, competition-
driven religious economy. The Allied occupation of post-war Japan exemplifies this 
well. Since 1945, the revocation of all laws regulating the majority Shinto religion 
caused kamigami no rasshu awa [the “rush hour of the gods”], and a concomitant 
surge in new Shinto, Buddhist and Christian denominations (see Finke 1997: 48-9). 
Moreover, Stark (1985; see also Stark and Finke 2000) asserts that greater plurality 
leads to greater competition for consumers, which results in religious organisations 
being more vigorous in recruiting and retaining believers. Competition therefore has 
two outcomes: greater levels of religiosity (measured as participation amongst 
existing believers), and more aggressive recruitment of new believers. Here it should 
be noted that whilst the former outcome has received adequate application and 
interrogation in different empirical contexts (e.g. Voas et al. 2002; Norris and 
Inglehart 2004; Fox and Tabory 2008; Hill and Olson 2009; Stolz 2010), the latter has 
not (cf. Gill 1994, 1999).  
 
On the other hand, regulated economies lead to monopolistic marketplaces where 
competition is restricted as regulated religious groups face high entry and operating 
costs. Regulation is seen to ‘restrict competition by changing the incentives and 
opportunities for religious producers… and the viable options for religious 
consumers’ (Finke 1997: 50). Subsidy or suppression are common means of 
regulation, and respectively involve rewards for “in-groups” and penalties for “out-
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groups”. Throughout much of Western Europe, for example, the preponderance of 
official state churches, supported by taxes, subsidies, and other privileges, and 
maintaining a cultural monopoly over the nation-state, has led to a widespread decline 
in individual religiosity and the limited proliferation of religious alternatives (Stark 
and Finke 2000; see also Woodhead 2009). As a result, regulated religions operating 
within a monopolistic context are put at a competitive disadvantage (due to high entry 
and operating costs); competition is restricted, and growth controlled. Importantly, 
therefore, it is argued that regulation suppresses competition, and that both religious 
organisations and the state stand to benefit from respectively seeking monopoly 
standing, or by supporting a monopoly (Stark and Bainbridge 1987).  
 
2.2.3 Problematising the structural determinants of change 
 
Structural perspectives hold a lot of deductive value in explaining large-scale 
movements between religions, yet they often fail to account for variance and nuance 
in conversion processes and outcomes. The modernist assumption that a religious 
economy is either regulated (and monopolistic) or competitive (and pluralistic), but 
not both, has received criticism for being simplistic in many contexts. Despite 
vaunted claims to being a “general theory” of religion (or a ‘theory of everything’ 
according to Bruce 1999: 40), its usefulness or even relevance is limited in the non-
Western, non-Christian (and often postcolonial) world(s). Existing understandings of 
religious economy have been conceptualised, developed and debated in the context of 
the modern industrial societies of the West (specifically the United States) that use the 
Christian tradition as a point of academic departure (e.g. Finke and Stark 1992; Gill 
1994; Warner 1997; Froese 2001). Indeed, Stark and Finke (2000: 194; cf. Yang 
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2006, 2007; Lu 2008) unabashedly ‘ignore economies consisting of nonexclusive [i.e. 
Buddhist, Hindu] firms’. This brings to light the geographical limitations, and 
exclusive effect, of religious economy theorising to date, and in doing so 
compromises its explanatory potential when applied to religious marketplaces like 
that of Sri Lanka, for example.  
 
Beyond the West, therefore, the utility of religious economy approaches is limited by 
the (supposedly universal) presupposition that regulation leads to religious decline, 
and deregulation to religious vigour. Yang’s (2006) work on China’s religious 
markets have helped to keep such dichotomous thinking in check by asserting that 
regulation leads to religious complication, rather than demise. By problematising 
normative understandings of religious economy in this way, an opportunity presents 
itself to develop new understandings of the market dynamics of religious oligopolies. 
Whilst oligopolistic marketplaces present the most prevalent state-religion 
relationship globally, they ‘remain understudied because of the lack of 
conceptualization’ (Yang 2010: 201). By drawing a clear distinction between the 
“formal” and “informal” religious economies that emerge as a result of an 
oligopolistic marketplace (see Chapter 3), this thesis develops alternative strains of 
religious economy theorisation, whilst simultaneously assisting with Yang’s ongoing 
conceptualisation. In doing so it also helps to decentralise the theory away from its 
Western core, instead helping to better situate it within different local contexts, 
religious traditions, and systems of power located around the world.   
 
In a similar vein, the relative deprivation thesis (in particular, and the modernisation 
thesis more generally) fails to account for why Christianity has struggled to achieve 
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similar rates of growth in Northern Africa, the Middle East, and much of Asia where 
situations of deprivation and anomie also prevail (Martin 2005). Criticism of the 
tautological ways in which scholars deploy the relative deprivation thesis (i.e. that 
conversion is proof of prior deprivation – see Robbins 2004) underscores the value of 
more inductive approaches to religious conversion. Postcolonial theorists in particular 
have made important developments in this regard. Expressing sensitivity to the 
complex, and often dialectical relationship between submission and resistance that 
arose from mass conversion to Christianity during, and after, colonial rule, they show 
that rather than passively accepting the consequences of modernisation, converts often 
pursued resistant and innovative strategies of emancipation (Viswanathan 1998; 
Rambo 1999). In light of this, it is evident that structural determinism must be 
balanced with a degree of individual voluntarism in order to explain patterns of 
acceptance and dissent amongst potential converts (Hefner 1993). This shows the 
important role played by human agency in affecting conversion processes and 
outcomes. Moreover, the need to account for variable rates of conversion amongst 
individuals of similar social, economic or cultural status further highlights the value 
of more micro-scale, human agency approaches. 
 
2.2.4 Human agency and religious conversion  
 
Human agency approaches emphasise the subtleties of individual demand that may 
facilitate, or compromise, the process of religious conversion. The growing influence 
of psychologism in the latter decades of the twentieth century has led to the 
recognition of an acting and conscious human agent that exercises volition in deciding 
to convert to a new religion (Straus 1979; Richardson 1985). Such approaches have 
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been theorised as a ‘sequential “funnelling” process’ (Snow and Phillips 1980: 430) 
that track, monitor and seek to explain the conversion trajectories of individuals from 
different socio-economic and psychological backgrounds, and life-stages. In doing so, 
there has been a tendency to focus overwhelmingly on changes over time, especially 
in terms of the transition from “pre-convert” to “convert” (e.g. Lofland and Stark 
1965; Gerlach and Hine 1970; Beckford 1978; Lofland and Skonovd 1981; Rambo 
1989, 1993). Studying this transition has engendered a psychological bias that 
remains central to conversion discourses to the present day5. Such bias is evident in 
the exploration of conversion “motifs” – intellectual, mystical, experimental, 
affectional, revivalist or coercive (Lofland and Skonovd 1981), the effects of 
brainwashing (Schein et al. 1961; Singer 1979), the fulfilment of unmet emotional or 
cognitive need, the provision of self-expansion and fulfilment (Buxant 2009), and the 
relationship between changing religious belief and psychosis (Penzner et al. 2009). 
Whilst the inductive value of psychology is evident, there is a tendency for such 
approaches to be myopic, overly descriptive and treat converts as autonomous 
operators that are divorced from the social fields within which they exist.  
 
Social network approaches have proved to be relatively more enduring than a unitary 
focus on the individual convert (e.g. Long and Hadden 1983). Networks of religious 
influence at the micro-level, such as friends, family, colleagues and other social 
relations, have long been recognised as playing an integral role in influencing 
conversion patterns and behaviours. Two studies in particular are seminal in this 
regard. One, Lofland and Stark’s (1965: 871) study of conversion to a millennial cult 
in America, shows how members of the cult formed strong affective bonds with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Gillespie (1991: 13) terms this the ‘psychologizing of the religious conversion phenomenon’. 
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potential converts, leading to the maxim that ‘conversion [i]s coming to accept the 
opinions of one’s friends’. Two, Gerlach and Hine’s (1968) examination of the 
growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America shows how pre-existing social 
relationships provide the “catalytic agent” needed to trigger religious conversion. 
What these two studies show is that individuals seldom change religion without first 
being influenced by their social relations (whether new or existing), meaning human 
agents have as much of a role to play in conversion processes as the economic and 
political structures within which they are embedded. Evangelical groups in particular 
are adept at developing conversion networks that enable Christian teachings to be 
multiplied and disseminated amongst the congregations’ friends, family and 
colleagues.  
 
That being said, attempts have also been made to reconcile the structural determinants 
of change and human agency perspectives. This has involved situating the micro-level 
networks of religious influence within the macro- (i.e. dominant political, economic, 
and religious systems), and meso- (i.e. the intersection of the micro- and macro-
contexts, such as local governance and religious institutions) contexts (Rambo 1993; 
Rambo and Farhadian 1999). For example, to explain the phenomenal growth of 
Christianity in Korea, Kane and Park (2009: 366) argue that the macro- influences the 
micro- by showing how ‘geopolitical networks provoke nationalist rituals that alter 
the stakes of conversion at the microlevel’. In other words, Korean Christians played 
an integral role in orchestrating nationalist sentiment against Japan through the use of 
ritual, and in doing so increased the number and strength of social networks that lead 
to conversion to Christianity. Whilst realisation of the need to situate micro-level 
understandings is not as new as some may think (cf. Gerlach and Hine’s 1968 
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aforementioned study, which is clearly situated within, and engages with, the 
hegemonic Catholic context of Latin America), such awareness is a good reminder of 
the need to properly situate religious conversion within various scales of 
contextualisation.  
 
Irrespective of the relative strength of human agency or structural determinism in 
driving and influencing religious change, it is the idiosyncrasies of the evangelical 
organisation that has enabled Christianity to grow with relentless vigour in some 
places, and to withstand restrictions to growth in others. In other words, the 
evangelical organisation has evolved so that it can exacerbate, manipulate and 
sometimes subvert structural determinants of change, and to create demand where it 
may otherwise be lacking. It is in this sense that the evangelical organisation has been 
viewed as an important arbiter of religious change, and the primary architect of 
Christian growth.  
 
2.2.5 The evangelical organisation as an arbiter of religious change 
 
As suggested by the demand-side bias of the religious economy theorisations outlined 
above, the religious organisation plays an important role in determining the ebb and 
flow of different religious groups. More specifically, organisational perspectives 
emphasise how the functional agency of evangelical groups drives their rapid growth 
and global spread (e.g. Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Finke and Stark 1992; Iannaccone 
1994; Chesnut 2003; Robbins 2004). Returning to Gerlach and Hine’s (1968: 28) 
previously mentioned study of Pentecostals in North America, it is argued that the 
cellular, amorphous structure and operations of such organisations enable them to 
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adapt and grow within a wide range of social, cultural and political contexts – or 
“ecological niches” – making regulation and suppression difficult. Characteristically 
they are also highly networked, with external linkages providing the ‘core 
infrastructure of the Pentecostal movement’ and affording its constituent members 
‘considerable world power’. Facilitating the exchange or provision of ideas, people, 
resources and capital that can lead to the importation and growth of churches and 
denominations, international evangelical networks play an important role in 
legitimising the globalist ambitions – or “transnational vistas” (Martin 2002: 25-7) – 
of evangelical organisations. Combined, these characteristics provide a significant 
source of organisational agency, enabling a ‘self-governing, self-supporting, and self-
propagating’ (Lechner and Boli 2003: 390) form of religious practice that lends 
credence to the belief that evangelical organisations are autonomous, and effective 
agents of religious change.  
 
As with the need to situate religious conversion discourses within various scales of 
contextualisation, over the years the development of organisation perspectives has 
been limited by the treatment of the organisation as the active determinant of 
evangelical Christian growth, and the context within which they operate as passive, or 
extraneous. Many studies emphasise the fact that evangelical organisations are 
‘inherently flexible in different cultural and social contexts’ (Anderson 2004: 236, 
2005; Kaplan 1995; Cox 1996; Robbins 2004) by showing how local forms of cultural 
symbolism are often adopted through processes of inculturation, whilst those that 
‘inhibit their mobility, freedom and advancement’ (Martin 2002: 133; see also Keyes 
1993: 273) are purposefully rejected. Indeed Peterson et al (2001: 40) liken 
Pentecostalism to the homogeneity of global capitalism, insofar as ‘particularity [is] 
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only a strategy or stepping stone toward the production of globality’. Strategies of 
inculturation are top-down, elite sponsored attempts to control the synthesis of 
religion and local culture, and retain organisational sovereignty (e.g. Meyer 1999). As 
a result, evangelical organisations are seen as architects of growth, and are believed to 
operate in similar ways around the world: 
 
Churches in Asia, Africa, and Latin America share so many common 
experiences. They are passing through such similar phases of growth, and are, 
independently, developing such very similar social and theological 
worldviews. All, also, face similar issues, of race, of inculturation, and, still, 
of how to deal with their respective colonial heritages (Jenkins 2007: 13). 
 
This statement clearly reflects some of the assumptions that blinker the development 
of more theoretically robust, empirically inclusive explanations of evangelical 
Christian growth. Similitude (expressed here in terms of “phases of growth”, 
“worldview” and “issues”) may help identify the characteristics of Jenkins’ particular 
vision of “Global Christendom”, yet is in equal measure reductive, anachronistic and 
misplaced in many contexts. As Gerlach and Hine (1968) criticise relative deprivation 
models for failing to account for variable rates of conversion amongst people of a 
similar socio-economic standing, the same logic can be applied to organisational 
agency approaches, which do little to account for the variable success of evangelical 
organisations in different contexts around the world. In order to understand such 
variability, research needs to recognise the fact that whilst organisations may be 
‘autonomous’ (Freston 2001: 197), they are ‘not in control of their broader 
surroundings’ (Stump 2000: 87; e.g. McGregor 2010), and begin contextualising 
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expressions of organisational agency. In particular, consideration of the spatial 
environment has been concessionary at best, and overlooks the reality that evangelical 
organisations operate in and through space, and that spatial presence is structurally 
embedded. Such embeddedness affects organisational strategies and outcomes of 
evangelism, and causes rates of Christian growth to vary throughout the world.  
 
2.3 Variegated patterns of evangelical Christian growth  
 
Religious growth is an uncontestably geographical phenomenon, as the occupation 
and management of space – from bodies to territories – is ‘inseparable’ from an 
organisations ‘ability to impose [its] presence on a given territory’ (Hervieu-Leger 
2002: 101). In Europe, for example, it has been explicitly recognised that ‘Islam is 
anchored in a social and symbolic milieu, a concrete geographical, geopolitical and 
“geo-religious” space which was not at first very favourable to it’ (Allievi and 
Dassetto, 1999: 244). Like Islam, Christian presence is unevenly distributed around 
the world, and often symptomatic of the contexts within which evangelism is 
expressed. Centuries of Christian missionisation and conversion have led to the 
creation of “geo-religious” spaces throughout the postcolonial world that are highly 
sensitive to contemporary conversion, and can easily trigger residual feelings of 
colonial resentment and domestic insecurity. Attempts to better situate conversion 
discourses will see them engage with the challenges posed by the groups involved, 
which more often than not prefer to be in a position of religious control than a part of 
the compromising jigsaw of religious pluralism. Evangelical organisations are not, 
therefore, autonomous agents, but are responsive to, and often constrained by, various 
contextual drivers. Whilst the Americas, some parts of Asia (i.e. the Philippines, 
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South Korea, and to a lesser extent Hong Kong and Singapore), and much of Africa 
have experienced rapid Christian growth throughout the twentieth century, many 
European countries have registered stagnation or decline. In addition there is a belt of 
territory that has received recognition for resisting the encroachment of evangelical 
groups, and restricting the growth of Christianity. Spanning Northern Africa, the 
Middle East, and much of Asia, such territories are collectively referred to as the 
“10/40 Window” (as they span the latitudes ten to forty degrees north – see Gerhardt 
2008: 917-9), and challenge the geo-centricity upon which existing explanations of 
evangelical growth are based.  
 
Within the 10/40 Window (see Figure 1, below) hegemonic Islamic, Hindu and 
Buddhist structural contexts mediate and suppress the agency, autonomy and efficacy 
of evangelical groups, creating situations whereby Christianity ‘find[s] it difficult to 
secure a base and avoid moves to contain and isolate it’ (Martin 2005: 28). 
Notwithstanding, recent years have witnessed a growing concentration of evangelical 
activity within such territories, which are viewed as ‘spiritually impoverished’ (Stump 
2000: 224) and ripe for salvation. Paradoxically, therefore, the 10/40 Window 
provides at once the most attractive and contested grounds of evangelical activity. It 
encompasses territories in which evangelical organisations want to exert agency, but 
are (to varying degrees) rendered impotent by local structures of resistance and 
control. Moreover, territories of the 10/40 Window are typically postcolonial, and 
imbued with a tension ‘between the official end of direct colonial rule and its 
presence and regeneration through hegemonizing neo-colonialism’ (Shohat 1992: 
106). Being an inextricable part of the European colonial project, Christian groups are 
often implicated in such neo-colonial discourses. New strategies of evangelism and 
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new modes of organisational structure have arisen in order to mitigate the effects of 
resistance and control, underscoring the need for new perspectives on evangelical 
Christian growth.  
 
	  
Figure 1: Map showing the territorial delineations of the 10/40 Window 
(Source: http://takelsertit.pbworks.com/Imsinjilen-ed-Lislam-sdeffir-n-11-Ctember') 
 
By looking at Figure 1 through the lenses of existing scholarly understandings of the 
countries situated within, two observations can be made. First, the boundaries that 
demarcate the 10/40 Window should not be seen as exclusionary, but a metaphor used 
to describe a heterogeneous collection of territories that possess a number of 
structural characteristics that, whether intentionally or not, curtail the spread of 
Christianity. Other countries that share such characteristics may be located outside the 
latitudes used to denote the Window (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka), whilst 
countries that may be deemed anomalies are located within (e.g. the Philippines and 
South Korea). It is important to recognise, therefore, that the countries within are by 
no means homogeneous, or necessarily distinct from some of the countries without.  
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Second, given the heterogeneity of the 10/40 Window, it is possible to conceptualise 
the evangelical terrain in terms of three distinct categories. First are countries like the 
Philippines and South Korea (and, to a lesser extent, Hong Kong and Singapore) 
where structural resistance to evangelism is minimal, and the Christian population 
significant. Receptive to evangelism, Martin (2002, 2005) argues that these countries 
are conceptually similar to those of Latin America, and are therefore anomalous to 
most others within the 10/40 Window. Second are countries like China and India, 
which have numerically significant numbers of evangelicals (ranked third and fifth in 
a global survey of Pentecostals, according to Anderson 2005a) yet, given their 
territorial size, also have clear pockets of strong resistance (see Freston 2001: 85-92, 
101-105). In this sense they are amalgams of the first and third categories. Third are 
the remaining countries of North Africa, the Middle East, Central, South, and 
Southeast Asia, which form a majority of the 10/40 Window and, for the purposes of 
the thesis, can generally be defined by the multifarious forms of structural resistance 
that inhibit the autonomy and growth of minorities. Struggling to come to terms with 
modernity and globalisation, it is within these countries that the marginalisation of 
evangelical groups is most pervasive. Through an examination of the countries that 
fall within the third category (such as Sri Lanka), existing understandings of 
evangelical growth are problematised, highlighting the need for redress.   
 
2.4 Evangelical Christian growth within a spatial framework 
 
Having established the incompatibility between existing approaches to Christian 
growth and the structurally resistant empirical contexts of the 10/40 Window, of 
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which Sri Lanka provides a representative example, I now explore how geographers 
can add value to the discourse. In particular, a more nuanced understanding of the 
dialectical relationship between organisational agency and structural determinism is 
needed in order to help navigate the complex terrain of evangelical growth and 
resistance in the 10/40 Window. Directly addressing David Yonggi Cho’s6 maxim – 
“find need and meet need” – Martin (2005: 30) asks how the local structures of Japan 
constricted the space available for Cho’s mission, as compared to Korea. Such 
questioning reveals a more pervasive problem that seeks redress. That is, the hitherto 
peripheral consideration of how the structural determinism of the context within 
which an organisation operates mediates the functional agency of the organisation in 
producing particular outcomes. Such a relationship is grounded in the spatial context: 
space mediates the ongoing tension between dominant religious structures and 
expressions of evangelical agency, and both reflect and enable evangelical 
organisations to be tied to localities in complex and multifarious ways. In order to 
understand how evangelical organisations negotiate and overcome constraints on 
growth, it is therefore necessary for geographers to begin paying greater attention to 
the spatially embedded practices and processes of Christian evangelism in order to 
help move the discourse forward.  
 
Space is a medium within, and through, which both structure and agency are 
expressed, meaning a spatial framework has the potential to provide recourse to 
existing understandings of evangelical Christian growth. The practice of religion is 
fundamentally spatial in nature, and is irrevocably concerned with the expression and 
contestation of power. Power and symbolism are invested in the codification of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Cho is founder of South Korea’s Yoido Full Gospel Church, which purportedly has the world’s 
largest Pentecostal congregation.  
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physical space, meaning that ‘whoever retains the resources behind material 
codification also has the power to produce social categories and to maintain ‘Other’ in 
these categories’ (Chivallon, 2001: 476). That being said, McAlister (2005: 249) 
argues that the active role of space needs to be restored to the study of religion by 
focussing attention on ‘the ways that power works through the various levels, realms 
and conceptions of space, in and through religious processes’. Building on the 
criticism that, until relatively recently, there has been a tendency for geographers to 
address religion with a ‘pre-Lefebvrian incarnation, concerned with areal patterns 
within a passive space rather than treating space as an active part of social action’ 
(MacDonald 2002: 63), such assertions have contributed to a theoretical turn in the 
geographies of religion; one in which Lefebvre’s (1991) work on the production of 
space features prominently. Lefebvre’s conceptual distinction between representations 
of space and spaces of representation provides a useful starting point for enquiry, as it 
reflects two distinct productions of space that represent both structure, and agency, 
respectively.  
 
On the one hand marginal groups contend with representations of space; hegemonic, 
ideological spaces that are (re)produced by dominant structures trying to exert power 
and control over a given territory. Such representations reflect the structures that 
restrict evangelical growth within the 10/40 Window. The control dominant groups 
have over secular spaces and landscapes are typically widespread, and often 
formalised through social and political institutions, or naturalised as part of the 
prevailing socio-cultural habitus. Characteristics like these dictate the ongoing 
production of society, space, and culture, creating an ongoing form of spatial politics 
that marginal groups must contend with. In light of this, it appears simplistic to 
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assume that structural representations of space do not influence to varying degrees the 
strategies, operations and spaces of evangelical groups. Taken to the extreme, 
structural determinants may overwhelm evangelical organisations, nullifying their 
agency and facilitate the razing, closure or relocation of churches. In the Indian state 
of Gujarat, for example, Jenkins (2007) shows how evangelical churches have been 
unable to contend with the structural determinants of the locality, being overcome by 
nationalist groups and converted into Hindu places of worship.  
 
On the other hand, minority growth is performed through space. Church planting, 
prayer meetings and crusade rallies occur within space, as does the location of 
Christianity relative to other religions. In this sense marginal groups occupy a “space 
of representation” – one that ‘makes imaginative and symbolic use of physical space 
in order to realise the possibility of resisting the power of a dominant order, regime or 
discourse’ (Knott 2005a: 165). Such spaces reflect the creativity of agents in 
overcoming structures of resistance that restrict the exercise of autonomous action. 
Evangelical groups work to create a space that enables them to establish a presence 
within a given territory, as has been done so successfully in Latin America where 
Pentecostalism has ‘single-handedly created religious and social space where Latin 
Americans from the popular classes are free not to be Catholic’ (Chesnut 2003: 39). 
Innovative strategies of evangelism are often employed to maximise volitional agency 
whilst minimising concession to a structural context that is shaped by a dominant 
religious group. Turning to Nigeria, Pentecostalism has long provided 
 
A powerful metaphor for new types of practice, as well as a symbolic and 
material resource for the ‘elaboration of a conceptual challenge to the power 
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monopolies’, for the creation of ‘autonomous spaces’ of practice which defy 
the oppressive logic of current ‘power monopolies’… and for the articulation 
of strategies to create, exercise and legitimate new power relations and new 
opportunities for survival (Marshall 1991: 21).  
 
In seeking new perspectives on evangelical growth it is, however, important that 
evangelical spaces of representation – articulated here as “autonomous spaces” – go 
beyond the undisputed demarcation of bounded space. As I argue above in relation to 
existing theorisations of evangelical Christian growth, agency does not predicate 
autonomy, nor does it guarantee spatial sovereignty. Instead it must be recognised that 
spaces of representation are embedded within, influenced by and responsive to the 
broader spatial representations of a given locality, as shown by Metcalf’s (1996: 12) 
work on the construction of Muslim space in North America and Europe which shows 
how Muslims ‘strain at being thus constrained’, with majority resistance playing a 
central role in shaping minority behaviour. Indeed, sensitivity to the production of 
evangelical space – and how it is, in many respects, a space of religious liminality that 
expresses agency and yet concedes to structure – foregrounds the need to understand 
existing theorisations of sacred space, and how the study of evangelical space in 
particular can help develop such theorisations further.    
 
2.4.1 Theorising sacred space 
 
Sacred space provides the conceptual bedrock from which the geographies of religion 
have emerged. Theorisations of sacred space have developed along two distinct axes: 
the “insider” or “substantial” standpoint propounded by Eliade (1959; see also Lane 
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1988), and the “outsider” or “situational” standpoint propounded by social 
constructionists (see Smith 1978). In the first instance, Eliade’s axioms of sacred and 
profane space are based on the premise that the sacred erupts in certain places, called 
hierophanies. Being sites of interaction between the human and superhuman realms of 
the cosmos, hierophanies provide believers with direct proof of the divine, and are 
distinct from the natural, profane world. The most paradigmatic hierophanies are 
termed axis mundi which, by providing a point of existential orientation for religious 
adherents, are ‘a place that is sacred above all’ (Eliade 1991: 39). The sacred and 
profane thus represent two distinct modalities of experience; each is qualitatively 
different from the other, creating a clear, yet artificial conceptual distinction between 
the two. Criticism of the essentialism upon which such a standpoint is based makes 
way for the social constructionist paradigm, and the associated shift from an 
ontological conception of sacred space to a ‘critical interrogation of the human 
processes involved in making space “sacred”’ (Knott 2005a: 169). Such a shift has 
caused the sacred and the profane to become conceptually entwined: space is not a 
homogeneous articulation of the sacred, but a blend of both sacred and profane forces.  
 
Contra to Eliade’s axis mundi, social constructionist thought stipulates that ‘nothing is 
inherently sacred’ (Chidester and Linenthal 1995: 6). Instead, place is imbued with 
meaning through various processes of sacralisation – selection, demarcation, design, 
orientation, ritualisation, and so on (Hecht 1994) – which contribute to the 
construction and management of a place-bound form of sacredness. Such processes 
are needed to maintain a distinction between sacred and profane space, a ‘purification 
involving practices of sacralization and desacralization, with various supporting 
mechanisms and ongoing maintenance to keep this separation [from the secular 
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world] in place’ (Ivakhiv 2006: 172). Without such processes of sacralisation, place is 
meaningless, and the sacred becomes an empty signifier. For example, Mazumdar and 
Mazumdar (1993: 236) show how religious identity and attachment to sacred space 
are strengthened through processes of ritual and the ongoing sanctification of the 
Hindu house. They show how the sanctification of the house includes the purification 
of the outside (e.g. harmonising the house with the outside environment), sacralisation 
of the inside (e.g. poojas, lighting of sacred fire, anointing), and sacred learning in 
space (e.g. imparting norms of appropriate behaviour upon children). Studies like this 
show how sacred space is often a result of extrinsic constructions of sacredness, rather 
than the intrinsic revelations originally propounded by Eliade.  
 
The value of social constructionist perspectives is that they bring to light the close, 
seemingly inextricable, relationship between space and place. Such a dynamic has 
been systematically expounded over the past decade, since Kong’s (2001) well-
heeded call for research to go beyond the “officially” sacred (for an overview of the 
proliferation of work on the “unofficially” sacred sites of religious activity, see Kong 
2010: 756-7). Whilst the officially sacred comprises ‘churches, temples, synagogues, 
mosques and such places of worship that are commonly identified as ‘religious 
places’’, the unofficially sacred comprises ‘other [ostensibly secular] types of place 
which reinforce religious identity and facilitate religious practice’ (Kong 2002: 1573). 
The corpus of work on the unofficially sacred draws heavily on the constructionist 
paradigm to show how sacred place is mapped onto profane space, resulting in the 
ongoing construction and metamorphosis of both. For example, Vincent and Warf’s 
(2002) study of eruvim in the United States and United Kingdom shows how 
Orthodox Jews privatise public space via the demarcation of territory. Within such 
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spaces, Jewish identity and practice are freely expressed (e.g. enabling people to leave 
their homes during the Sabbath); yet also involve a conceptual redefinition of what 
constitutes a “doorway” that segregates the eruv from the outside world.  
 
Given that space reflects and (re)produces the goals and achievements of religious 
organisations, it should therefore be seen as a medium, a methodology and an 
outcome of evangelism (Knott 2005a). It also provides an analytical focus for new 
perspectives on religious growth. In addition, interpreting space in such a way will 
help temper broader criticisms surrounding the under-theorised discursive formations 
of religion in/and space that have become a source of contention for geographers of 
religion (e.g. MacDonald 2002; McAlister 2005; Brace et al. 2006; Kong 2010). 
Alternative theorisations of religion in/and space are needed in order to disrupt those 
of the “normative” West (see Kong 2001, 2010; Freston 2001; Hervieu-Leger 2002; 
McAlister 2005), and to enable a study of Christian growth that is at once more 
situated and nuanced than its predecessors. Indeed, such disruption is fitting with 
broader moves to “decentralise” Anglo-American modes of knowledge production 
(e.g. Pollard and Samers 2007; see also Sidaway 2000; Jazeel and McFarlane 2010), 
and to contribute to a more inclusivist sub-discipline of geography of religion. 
 
2.5 Conceptual framework 
 
Having reviewed some of the extant literature surrounding contemporary Christian 
growth, and how a spatial frame of analysis can contribute a more nuanced 
understanding of such growth, I now introduce the conceptual framework that will 
help to frame the empirical data. An overriding principle of the framework is that, 
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whilst geographers of religion are responsible for introducing geographical 
conceptions and understandings of religious phenomena to the broader social 
sciences, in order to do so effectively and credibly, they must also engage fully with 
non-geographical theorisations of religion. This is what I have done below, first 
through a conceptualisation and understanding of the structural mosaic as an enabler 
of evangelical Christian growth, followed by the spatial modalities of the structural 
mosaic, and culminating in the introduction of one of the most pervasive and 
contentious examples of the structural mosaic in practice: the house church. 
 
2.5.1 The structural mosaic as an enabler of religious growth 
 
Existing approaches to evangelical growth, outlined above, often focus on either the 
structural drivers of religious change, or the agency of evangelical organisations and 
Christian converts. Such foci often fail to take into adequate consideration the 
recursive relationship between evangelical agency and structural context. Thus, in 
order to reconcile the existing “unidirectional explanations” (Droogers 2001) of 
Christian growth, it is important that structure and agency are recognised as being co-
constitutive, with both determining religious outcomes. Such a relationship is brought 
to life by the poststructuralist sensibilities of structuration theory. Rather than viewing 
structures and agents as mutually distinct, Giddens (1984: 6) instead highlights the 
recursive relationship between them – what he terms the “duality of structure” – 
which causes each to inflect, yet be simultaneously constrained by, the other. 
Structure shapes agency, whilst agency seeks to transform structure, a dynamic that 
results in the ‘reflexive monitoring and rationalization of action’ and heightened 
responsiveness to the changing social and physical conditions of the contexts within 
	   39	  
which each operates. This presents an ongoing cycle that reflects and reproduces the 
(im)balance between minority emancipation and majority control; religious growth 
and/or repression. Such understanding calls into question the organisational agency 
approaches outlined above, whilst helping to explain why such approaches work in 
some structural contexts, but not others. Applying structuration theory to discourses 
of Christian growth provides more accurate, and inclusive, understandings; but it also 
needs to be developed in order to further its explanatory potential.  
 
Specifically, embracing the duality of structure should not be at the expense of 
recognising inter-structural dualities. Focussing on the structuration of religious 
systems, it is important that structure is not reduced to a single category that collapses 
diverse (and sometimes conflictual) elements of society, religion and economics into 
a single “whole”. Instead, research must begin exploring the heterogeneity of 
“structure”. Indeed, Giddens’ emphasis on contextuality foregrounds his ‘vision of 
society as a partly structured mosaic of contexts which interact only in particular ways 
at particular times in particular locations’ (Thrift 1985: 611, emphasis added). Such a 
specific reading of contextuality is, I feel, at the expense of recognising the mosaic of 
structure – the “structural mosaic” – that, when unsynchronised, create spaces for 
agents to exploit. To recognise the structural mosaic is to recognise the heterogeneity 
of structure, and to recognise the heterogeneity of structure is to problematise the 
view that structure has an overbearing and deterministic influence upon the 
efficacious actions and outcomes of agents. Put differently, the structural mosaic 
sensitises discourse to the opportunities for engagement and subversion that present 
themselves when agents infiltrate and change the conditions of structure, especially 
those structures that may be deemed “hostile” or seek to restrict the autonomous 
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actions of agents. Strategies of evangelical infiltration provide a core focus of the 
thesis, and are typically concerned with how evangelical groups engage with, and 
operate within the non-religious aspects of structure.   
 
More specifically, groups operating within the framework of the structural mosaic are 
able to simultaneously traverse categories of structure and structural understanding. 
When I talk of the structural mosaic, therefore, I refer not just to one category of 
engagement – the religious, the social, the cultural or the economic, for example – but 
to the possibilities and opportunities that emerge when groups traverse categories, 
engaging all or some at the same time in order to achieve an overriding objective (e.g. 
evangelism, church growth). It is how evangelical groups use a house to establish a 
church, for example, or how they distribute aid in order to create a space of 
engagement through which they can evangelise as well. In this vein, the structural 
mosaic sensitises discourse to how categories of structure may be heterogeneous, but 
that does not mean they are not interlinked, nor does it mean that one category cannot 
disguise, influence or otherwise subvert another.   
 
As a more specific example, in many contexts, poverty (and associated symptoms, 
such as lack of education, nutrition, healthcare, or social justice) is a problem that is 
not adequately addressed or alleviated by the prevailing religious structure7. 
Addressing the symptoms of poverty requires immediate, non-religious solutions, and 
provides a channel through which Christian groups can subtly express different forms 
of evangelical agency, and begin realising the opportunities for growth that are 
available when engaging with the structural mosaic by providing what has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Indeed the reverse is also true, with some religious structures imparting a form of religio-cultural 
intransigence that stifles measures to alleviate poverty. 
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termed ‘secular advantages’ (Henkel and Sakaja 2009: 51). Thus whilst the religious 
structure of society may restrict evangelical praxis, a focus of evangelical groups on 
social ministry provides a considerable source of social agency. In religious terms, 
evangelical Christian groups may be marginalised, but in social terms they may be 
embraced, even needed. The social therefore provides an entry point from which they 
can begin to exert religious influence via apparently benign (i.e. non-religious, or 
secular) engagement with society. Through exploitation of the structural mosaic, 
evangelical groups are able to gain a foothold from which religious agency can be 
expressed, and religious alternatives can flourish. Altogether, the heterogeneity of the 
structural mosaic enables a more discreet form of religious influencing, and creates 
opportunities for minority groups to engage with society in non-religious ways.  
 
Such opportunities have started to be identified and expounded in recent work on the 
“postsecular” city – a burgeoning field of research within urban studies. Yet whilst 
Davis (2006; see also Beaumont 2008) shows how (often evangelical) faith-motivated 
organisations clamour to replace the retreat of secular social movements and the state, 
there is little critical understanding of what “faith-motivation” means, and how it 
intersects with proselytism, conversion and religious plurality (especially in the non-
Christian world). Understanding the three-way relationship between welfare 
provision, the state and faith-motivated organisations (see Molendijk et al. 2010) 
appears to be naïvely altruistic, under-theorised and ignores the predatorial (or, at 
least, self-motivated) aspect of faith-motivated groups providing secular services to 
the underprivileged segments of society. Moreover, a focus on the urban spaces of the 
city should not be at the expense of the rural spaces of the village – a locational 
determinant that has been largely ignored by geographers of religion to date. Indeed, 
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the urban-rural dichotomy provides a focus for the subsequent analyses, sensitising 
discourse to the spatial drivers of action (and inaction) within the structural mosaic. 
Such drivers range from macro-scale differentiations between urban and rural, or 
public and private, to more micro-scale nuances, such as the use of the spaces of the 
house, the temple, or the Montessori as enablers of evangelical growth. Altogether, 
this highlights the value of, and the need to explore the spatial modalities of the 
structural mosaic.  
 
2.5.2 The spatial modalities of the structural mosaic 
 
As argued above, space plays an active role in influencing the processes and 
outcomes of Christian growth. Religious organisations need to be studied in relation 
to the spatial contexts in which they operate, as ‘underlying codes have to be inferred 
from surface manifestations’ and space ‘has to be considered in terms of its 
involvement in the construction of systems of interaction’ (Giddens 1984: 16, 368; 
see also Stump’s 2000; 2008 reading of contextuality). Thus whilst structural contexts 
and organisational agencies determine the rate of Christian growth, space mediates 
growth and, in doing so, reveals otherwise hidden patterns of religious activity 
(Giddens’ “systems of interaction”). More specifically, closer empirical examination 
of evangelical space is needed to show how it both reflects and reproduces the 
systems of interaction that arise from structuration. In line with Massey’s (2005: 9) 
reading of space as ‘the sphere… of coexisting heterogeneity’, exploring the spatial 
modalities of the structural mosaic will reveal the geographical extent of how and 
why evangelical groups are able to grow, in spite of resistance. Indeed, by interpreting 
evangelical space as a response to the structural constraints on growth will enable 
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discourses of religion in/and space to develop along lines that are more relational than 
otherwise thought.  
 
The spatial modalities of the structural mosaic exist along two distinct axes: the 
appropriation of religious, and non-religious, spaces for “other” religious purposes 
(e.g. evangelism). As Kong (2010: 757) recognises, ‘there are many ways in which 
everyday spaces can be implicated in religious meaning-making, legitimating, 
maintaining and enhancing, but also challenging religious life, beliefs, practices and 
identities’. A focus on “everyday spaces”, such as the house, school or street, will 
sensitise discourse to the ‘spatialities of religion that lie beyond the church and the 
chapel’ (Brace et al. 2006: 38; Sheringham 2010), and in doing so will disrupt the 
hitherto prevalent focus on the realm of formal, more institutionalised religious 
practice. In many structurally hostile contexts, starting a pre-school or Montessori is 
often a precursor to planting a church as it enables non-religious engagement with 
society, and for Christianity to be expressed in subtle, non-religious terms. Thus a 
space of education is incorporated, and provides a channel through which evangelical 
groups can begin processes of religious influencing. It is for this reason that they have 
attracted a lot of suspicion from anti-Christian groups, presenting a problem that is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. In addition, a focus on how Christian groups 
engage with non-Christian spaces of religion (such as the Buddhist temple – a 
mainstay of village life in Sri Lanka) is also necessary as such engagement is often 
even more conflictual, and subversive.   
 
The house church presents one spatial modality of the structural mosaic that is 
pervasive throughout Sri Lanka, and the world. Sri Lanka’s house churches are 
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unique insofar as they reflect the often ephemeral, and highly strategic, conversion of 
space that enables Christian groups to penetrate new areas, and to grow whilst 
minimising the risk of surveillance. The process of converting the private space of the 
home into a public site of religious expression (although the extent to which it is 
“public” is debatable – see Chapters 5 and 6) is replete with politics and provides a 
recurrent focus throughout the thesis. Of particular interest is how the spatial 
production of the house diverges from existing understandings of sacred space, 
providing an opportunity to develop new understandings of the house church as 
networked space.  
 
2.5.3 The house church as networked space  
 
Amidst the spectrum of evangelical worship patterns, the megachurch has recently 
begun to pique the attention of geographers (e.g. Connell 2005; Warf and Winsberg 
2010; see also Goh 2008), whilst its antipode – the house church – remains neglected. 
Such neglect deserves to be rectified, given the subversive logic of the house church 
in catalysing Christian agency in contexts where growth, even presence, is otherwise 
restricted. Flourishing in areas where Christianity is repressed, the house church 
provides a spatial interface that camouflages the sacred other in the form of the 
secular. As such, it has proven to be instrumental in affording more evangelical 
groups a degree of self-empowerment, autonomy and religious leverage. In China, for 
example, the house church movement has gained widespread recognition for 
fomenting Christianity during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and after. Existing 
discourses are correspondingly Sino-centric, with an overwhelming focus on how the 
house church intersects with domestic Chinese politics and theology (e.g. Kao 2009; 
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Liu 2009; Wielander 2009; see also Yang and Lang 2011). Such a contextual bias has 
been at the expense of interrogating the similarly repressed Christian communities 
that operate in a variety of different religious contexts, like Sri Lanka, and have (often 
uncritically) aped the house church model.  
 
The value of the house church is that it is often a symbol of defiance, and is an 
accurate reflection of how context ‘determines the conditions for different 
communities to become established on the soil of a given society’, with their presence 
‘weaving new patterns of religion in space’ (Hervieu-Leger 2002: 99, 104). Adopting 
the deliberately secular veneer of the house enables the church to sidestep the often 
‘intense contestation’ that arises from outward signs of religious alterity (or threat) 
(Kong 2010: 757, e.g. Kong 2002; Naylor and Ryan 2003; Luz 2008), with such “new 
patterns” foregrounding new understandings of religion, space and place. Drawing on 
Augé’s (1995) conceptualisation of “non-place” (re-articulated as “placelessness”), 
the thesis explores how the house church is a mobile church that is one of the most 
common expressions of evangelical agency in Sri Lanka, yet also reflects a 
concession to a restrictive regulatory (i.e. structural) context that renders the formal 
regulation of church buildings difficult. In this vein the house church is both an 
important enabler of evangelical Christian growth, and a source of intense inter- and 
intra-religious contestation. 
 
More specifically, in order to engage with existing discourses surrounding sacred 
space and religious growth, new ideas pertaining to the production of evangelical 
space are needed. I argue that the house church is a form of networked space that 
enables it to form and disband with ease, and thus remain innocuous to surveillance. 
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Whilst I take place to be a physical anchor – something real and tangible, such as a 
building – space has no physical footing, and is therefore anchored by its association 
with place. Space becomes tangible once such associations with place are readily 
made, and accepted by individuals and groups. Without such associations, space 
exists in freeform. Such an understanding is not dissimilar from that of Tuan (1977: 6, 
emphasis added), when he states that:  
 
What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it 
better and endow it with value… If we think of space as that which allows 
movement, then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for 
location to be transformed into place.  
 
The logic espoused by Tuan, combined with my own conceptualisation, runs contra to 
existing treatments of sacred space. I argue that such treatments have conceptualised 
space and place as existing in a state of synchrony, suggesting that place constrains 
space by disabling its natural rhythm and movement. Antecedent treatments of sacred 
space as place-bound entities foreground its conceptualisation as an immutable, static, 
container of religion (numerous examples can be found in volumes edited by Scott 
and Simpson-Housley 1991; Carmichael et al. 1994; Holm and Bowker 1994; 
Chidester and Linenthal 1995; Kedar and Werblowsky 1998; and also Smith 1987). 
Indeed, whilst the treatment of sacred place has been multivalent and capable of being 
invested with both sacred and secular meaning in one site, discourse has tended to 
take for granted the assumption that ‘sacralization [is] highly place-dependent’ 
(Proctor 2006: 167) and has limited exploration of the possibilities afforded by 
placeless religious expression (whether existent or desired). In particular, the 
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possibility that sacred space ‘can be made without regard to geographical place or 
space’ (Hume 1998: 311; see also Lane 1988; Kong 1993, 2002), and can therefore 
‘float free of any physical mooring’ (Knott 2005a: 159) has, with only a few 
exceptions, gone unnoticed. Going beyond the confines of place-bound analyses, it is 
through exploring the (apparently) placeless valences of religious worship that new 
understandings of sacred space can be forged.  
 
There is therefore a need to decouple space from place in order to leverage the value 
gained from articulating the sacred within a framework of mobility, rather than stasis. 
Evidence of such a transition is emergent, and based on attempts to ‘account for the 
insecure, temporary and continually restructured forms of contemporary religious 
spatialization’ (Hervieu-Leger 2002: 104). Drawing on Sheller and Urry’s (2006: 209) 
new mobilities paradigm, for example, Della Dora (2009: 225) calls for more 
dynamic, and fluid approaches to the treatment of sacred space. Her work on the 
movement of sacred icons from Mount Sinai in Egypt to The Getty Center in Los 
Angeles seeks to ‘destabilize traditional notions of sacred space as a territorially fixed 
entity defined through a binary opposition to the profane’. Arguing that the movement 
of sacred icons symbolises the physical movement of holy places, and leads to the 
reconfiguration of sacred space, she shows how space is a product of global and local 
flows, and can be transposed upon different places through the movement of material 
objects (see also Bajc et al. 2007). It should be noted, however, that whilst the new 
mobilities paradigm provides leverage for new conceptualisations of sacred space, it 
talks primarily of movement through space – the ‘ways in which places and things 
move around’ (Della Dora 2009: 227, original emphasis) – and not the mobility that 
arises from understanding spatial production in more networked terms. Within the 
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context of Sri Lanka, such a framework requires new spatial metaphors: ones that go 
beyond existing, place-bound moulds of religious understanding, and engage with the 
house churches’ potential for spatial transience instead.  
 
Through an empirical focus on Sri Lanka’s house churches, therefore, I argue that 
rather than being constructed in relation to place, sacred space is instead a space of 
flows that is constructed in relation to sacred networks. In other words, it is sacred 
networks that give meaning and direction to evangelical Christian space, with ‘‘space’ 
being nothing more than a network ‘effect’’ (Murdoch 2006: 73; see also Castells 
1996). In turn, place becomes “non-place” – a ‘non-symbolized space’ (Augé 1995: 
82) that performs a non-circumscribed and non-specific position in the (re)production 
of evangelical Christianity. As a result, house churches are granted a seemingly 
irrepressible, and important, degree of mobility that enables them to grow rapidly, 
avoid surveillance and circumvent restrictions on growth. This provides a departure 
from existing theorisations of sacred space that favour vertical approaches to 
sacralisation (i.e. either top-down, hegemonic constructions of the sacred; or ground-
up, everyday interpretations of the sacred), in favour of more lateral, relation-based 
interpretations.  
 
Indeed, suggesting that sacred networks are the foundations upon which the house 
church movement is built can contribute to an understanding of religion that is 
considerably more fluid and malleable than its predecessors (see Tweed 2006). By 
“locating” (see Knott 2005a, 2005b) religion within sacred networks, I follow the lead 
of researchers who examine ‘the relational forms of communalization of religion ‘into 
networks’’ (Hervieu-Leger 2002: 103). In doing so, however, I seek to expand the 
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discourse beyond migration and the associated production of transnational religious 
space (e.g. Bowen 2004; Ebaugh 2004; Silvey 2005). Rather than connecting groups 
of territorially dispersed religious believers, I argue instead that sacred networks are 
constructed and performed by groups of territorially proximate believers as a 
substitute for more place-bound expressions of religiosity. Moreover, I argue that in 
the repressive Christian context of Sri Lanka, sacred networks play an integral role in 
the house church movement’s proliferation (in terms of the number of churches), if 




This chapter has reviewed the extant literature surrounding religious growth, and 
proposed a conceptual framework that informs the subsequent chapters and analyses. 
In the first section of the chapter, I introduced theories of evangelical Christian 
growth in modernity. In line with the dualistic treatment of structure and agency 
reflected by such theories, I first explored the structural determinants of religious 
change, focussing on the relationship between modernisation and religious 
conversion, the relative deprivation thesis and existing understandings of religious 
economy. Specifically, I explained how religious economy approaches recognise the 
inter-relationship between religious supply and demand, and are based on the 
assumption that as religious regulation increases, levels of inter-religious competition 
decrease. After problematising the structural determinants of change, I went on to 
explore the role of human agency in affecting conversion processes and outcomes, 
and showed how the evangelical organisation is an important arbiter of religious 
change. Finally, I argued that theories of evangelical Christian growth are plentiful, 
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but restricted by a number of assumptions and biases that render them more 
applicable in some contexts than they are others.    
 
In the second section, I advanced an understanding of how geography intersects with 
religious growth. First, I highlighted the variegated patterns of evangelical Christian 
growth around the world, drawing particular attention to the general suppression of 
evangelical Christianity inside the 10/40 Window. Second, I argued that because 
space is a medium through which both structure and agency are expressed (as shown 
by Lefebvre’s representations of space and spaces of representation), it reflects how 
evangelical organisations are often tied to localities in complex and multifarious 
ways. Finally, I explored the development of sacred space theorisations, from Eliade’s 
axioms of sacred and profane space, to the social constructionist thought that 
currently predominates. Such understandings pave the way for the conceptual 
framework, which addresses the issues raised in the first and second sections.  
 
The conceptual framework advances along three axes. First, I suggested that Giddens’ 
theory of structuration helps attune scholars to the recursive relationship between 
structure and agency, and identify the structural mosaic as being an enabler of 
religious growth. The structural mosaic recognises the hetereogeneity of structure, 
which suggests that otherwise marginalised religious groups are able to grow by 
pursuing strategies of non-religious influencing and by exerting religious agency in 
more subtle ways. Second, the spatial modalities of the structural mosaic were 
identified as being able to sensitise discourse to strategies of influencing, such as the 
use of non-religious spaces for religious purposes. Finally, the house church was 
recognised as one of the most pervasive modalities of the structural mosaic. I argued 
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that the sacred space of the house church is constructed using network principles, 
which allow for movement, ephemerality and subversion.   
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Studying the growth of evangelical Christian groups in hostile environments requires 
data that reveal the complex relationships, interactions and outcomes that exist at the 
intersection of evangelical agency and structural resistance. Indeed, the need for new 
understandings of evangelical Christian growth (previously outlined in Chapter 2) 
foregrounds the need for new (or, at least, alternative) methodological approaches, 
and consideration of the multiple stakeholders that represent both structures and 
agents. Such approaches and considerations can help deter the development of 
universal claims in favour of more context-sensitive, and situated theorisations 
instead. By locating this research in Sri Lanka, and by generating qualitative data 
from a variety of sources, stakeholders and research sites, I aim to disrupt existing 
methodological approaches to the study of religious growth. Doing so means that this 
thesis not only contributes new theoretical perspectives, but new methodological ones 
as well.  
 
As the title suggests, the chapter is divided into two main sections: empirical context 
and methodology. I start by introducing the empirical context within which the study 
is situated, focussing specifically on Sri Lanka’s oligopolistic religious marketplace, 
and the informal economy of evangelical Christian praxis. In the second part of the 
chapter I outline the critical ethnographic approach that was used to guide all stages 
of the research process, from conceptualisation to data collection, analysis and writing 
up. This is followed by consideration of the various ethical issues that were raised and 
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dealt with throughout the research process. Finally, sampling techniques and methods 
are outlined. This is followed by a detailed introduction to each of the sites wherein 
research was conducted. Such introductions help to provide a contextual backdrop for 
each of the four empirical chapters that follow. 
 
3.2 Sri Lanka’s contested religious marketplace 
 
Fieldwork was conducted in Sri Lanka, a country that is representative of repressed 
Christian growth in the 10/40 Window. The 1978 Constitution of the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka confers Buddhism the “foremost place” with the state 
being duty-bound to “protect and foster the Buddha Sasana [the teaching of the 
Buddha]” (Article 9). Nonetheless, every person is accorded “freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief 
of his [sic] choice” (Article 10), and “the freedom, either by himself or in association 
with others, and either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice or teaching” (Article 14.1.e). In reality such ideals are, 
however, questionable. Whilst constitutionally and numerically8 pluralistic, the 
country’s majority Buddhist population wields considerable power and control over 
domestic politics, society and culture. As Goonatilake (2006: 10) recognises, in Sri 
Lanka there is a ‘tradition of locally grown civic organisations in the form of 
Buddhist monk organisations, which had provided some associational space outside 
rigid government structures for over 2,000 years’. Indeed, taking Goonatilake’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Sri Lanka’s Theravada Buddhist population accounts for approximately 68% of the population 
according to The Association of Religion Data Archives (2011). It is the majority religion, followed by 
Hinduism (13%), Islam (9.5%) and Christianity (both Catholic and Protestant denominations – 8.8%). 
Whilst the accuracy of such statistics is questionable (see Jenkins 2007: 191; also Nanayakkara 2006), 
they provide an indication of the relative size of each religious group. 
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assertions a step further, I posit that the legal structure is often at odds with invidious 
assertions of Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony at the local level. This is corroborated by a 
range of indices from The Association of Religion Data Archives (2011) reports 
(2003-8) for Sri Lanka, with Government Regulation of Religion scoring 6/10, Social 
Regulation of Religion 9.4/10, and Religious Persecution 9/10 (where 10 is the 
highest rate of regulation/persecution). Civil society is often, therefore, more assertive 
in regulating religious groups than the government, and minority religious groups are 
highly persecuted. Such assertiveness can, in many respects, be viewed as an ongoing 
reaction to the legacy of European colonisation.   
 
3.2.1 Christianity, Sinhalatva, and the rise of Buddhist protectionism in Sri
 Lanka  
 
Starting in the 1500s, successive Portuguese, Dutch and British colonial 
administrations and associated missionary activity introduced Catholicism and 
mainline Christianity to Sri Lanka (see Table 1, below, for mainline denominations). 
During this time Buddhist groups were forced to contend not only with the loss of 
political and religious authority associated with colonialism, but also had to tolerate a 
Christian mission marked by ‘triumphalism… dogmatism and Orientalism’ 
(Matthews 2007: 258-9). By the mid-nineteenth century – the zenith of British 
colonial rule – processes of Buddhist revivalism had begun to take root, and a number 
of influential Buddhist leaders9 gained prominence for imbuing political rhetoric with 
exclusivist religious and ethnic sentiment (see Tambiah 1992: 5; cf. Deegalle 2004). 
Such sentiment reflects what Ammerman (2010: 155) terms the “narrative of loss”, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Notable Buddhist reformists include Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933) and Gangodawila Soma 
Thero (1948-2003), whose death marked the beginnings of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU).  
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which encapsulates a ‘loss of privilege, loss of authority, perhaps loss of vitality and 
influence’ in the face of religious plurality and, in this case, colonialism. 
Compounding the lingering effects of the “narrative of loss”, in more recent decades 
the secessionist war waged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has 
contributed to the development of an exclusivist political ideology called Sinhalatva.  
 
Promoting the notion of a unitary state based on (allegedly) Buddhist values, 
Sinhalatva synthesises a number of “strategic essentialisms” (Briggs 1996) – 
Buddhism, territory, language and race – that are largely incongruous with a multi-
ethnic society, religious pluralism, or political power sharing10. Within the Sinhalatva 
movement – of which Schalk (2007: 141) claims to have counted more than one 
hundred organisations in the 1980s – a number of right-wing Buddhist groups have 
emerged, often adopting anti-democratic and totalitarian means to defend the integrity 
and sovereignty of the Bauddha Rajya (“Buddhist state”). One of the more prominent 
organisations is the ultranationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU – also known as 
“National Heritage Party”). Winning nine Parliamentary seats and 6% of the national 
vote in the 2004 elections, all of JHU’s MPs are Buddhist monks. The formation and 
political success of the JHU reveals the ‘loss of hope and frustration’ (Deegalle 
2005a: 245) felt by some Buddhists, and gives weight to the view that ‘lay politicians 
have been unjust and corrupt and failed to address religious and national issues 
concerning Buddhists and Sinhalese’ (Deegalle 2006b: 10). Groups like the JHU seek 
to mobilise communities against “alien” elements that are believed to pose a threat to 
traditional society and culture, and have resulted in attempts to suppress the growth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In this vein Sinhalatva offers many parallels with Hindutva in India: the ‘ultranationalist ideology… 
which presents India as under siege from foreign invaders, and makes religion inseparable from 
national identity and culture’ (Jenkins 2007: 216) 
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and autonomy of minority groups via increasingly punitive means (see Tambiah 1986; 
Obeyesekere 1991; Bartholomeusz and de Silva 1998; Holt 1998; Deegalle 2006b). 
 
Within the context of mounting religious protectionism, the growth of evangelical 
Christian11 groups has become a source of concern for the Buddhist right. Since the 
1980s a ‘rapid and relatively large influx of new Christian denominations12’ (Perera 
1999: 1) are alleged to have entered the country, compounded in more recent years by 
the arrival of ‘Christian missionary organizations… surreptitiously under the 
camouflage of new business ventures’ (Tilakaratne 2006: 222). Correctly reflecting 
the trend of Christian growth in recent decades, the view that such growth is a result 
of “influxes” and “missionary organizations” – a foreign invasion of the neo-
colonising West (see Matthews 2007) – appears to underestimate the competitiveness 
of domestic players who have become effective at overcoming the restrictions 
imposed upon them. Defined by charismatic preachers and worship services, 
evangelical zeal and a rejection of traditional Christian symbolism, many view 
evangelical churches as ‘theologically quite bizarre and aggressive’ (Matthews 2007: 
462). Notwithstanding, it should be noted that whilst such groups have increased in 
size and number since the 1980s, they have struggled to keep pace with their 
counterparts operating in less structurally repressive contexts. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The label “evangelical” is something of a misnomer as it can be applied to any Christian church. In 
Sri Lanka there is a clear-cut distinction between mainline and non-mainline churches (see Table 1 
below); whilst the “evangelical” label primarily speaks to the latter category, it is not to the exclusion 
of the former.  12	  Numerical data to substantiate the claim of evangelical Christian growth is lacking. At the country 
level, census data were collected in 1981 and 2001, although the 2001 census omitted seven out of a 
total twenty-five districts in the north and east of the island due to the civil war. In the district with the 
largest Protestant Christian population, Colombo, there has been an increase in real terms of 10,736 (or 
26.4%) between 1981-2001. 
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In response to the threat posed by evangelical Christianity, the Buddhist right has 
made various attempts to restrict the autonomous actions of Christian groups. As a 
result, Christian groups have focussed on alternative strategies of evangelisation, and 
‘clandestine proselytizing’ (Gerhardt 2008: 920), often by substituting (or conflating) 
religious goals for those of a more secular nature. Such actions have provoked outrage 
amongst the Buddhist right, who accuse evangelical groups of engaging in 
“unethical” conversion activities. One of the most publically recognised, and debated, 
responses to evangelism and proselytism is the desire to implement a legislative 
solution to the problem of “unethical” conversion to Christianity. Drafted by the JHU 
in 2004, the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill seeks to outlaw inter-religious 
conversion by force, fraud, or allurement. 
 
3.2.2 The Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill 
 
A growing trend within the non-Christian world is the desire to restrict religious 
mobility and expressions of religious agency. The corresponding legislative solutions 
primarily implicate proselytising (usually Christian) groups, and potential converts. 
Indeed, in 2002 77 states around the world restricted proselytising activity (especially 
that of foreign missionaries), 29 of which prevented conversion away from the 
dominant religion (Fox 2009). Proposed by the JHU in July 2004 and Ministry of 
Buddha Sasana Affairs in June 2005, the respectively entitled ‘Prohibition of Forcible 
Conversion (Private Member’s Bill)’ and ‘Freedom of Religion Bill’ seek to contain 
the perceived threat to Buddhism posed by minority religions. The Prohibition of 
Forcible Conversion Bill (see Appendix 1) seeks to criminalise the conversion of 
Buddhists to other faiths by force, fraud or allurement, and reflects the fact that 
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conversion is a key driver of religious tension in Sri Lanka (Owens 2007). Whilst 
testament to the belligerent strategies of proselytisation practiced by some groups in 
recent years (notably in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami – see Matthews 2007), it 
also provides a good example of how religious hegemons ‘harness the power of the 
State to impose sanctions on religious expression that does not fall within that 
institution’s definition of orthodoxy’ (Ammerman 2010: 161). If passed, anyone 
caught aiding or abetting such activity will be liable for imprisonment of between five 
and seven years and a fine of between Rs. 150,00013 and Rs. 500,000. Significantly, 
the higher sentence and fine are for those accused of converting ‘samurdhi [welfare] 
beneficiaries, prison, rehabilitation and detention centre inmates, physically and 
mentally handicapped persons, members of the armed forces, the police, students, the 
inmates of refugee camps and minors’ (The Sunday Times 08.02.09). Dependents 
(such as students, minors and inmates of refugee camps) are often a focus of 
evangelism, and highlight the problematic nature of evangelical strategies of outreach 
that specifically target “vulnerable” groups.  
 
Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court has challenged sections of the Bill that are deemed 
“unconstitutional14”, especially those requiring all conversions (or conversion 
“ceremonies”, e.g. baptisms) to be reported to the Divisional Secretariat (Matthews 
2007). After being referred to a special Consultative Committee of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, the Bill was presented for a third reading in February 2009. Whilst 
the Chief Opposition Whip stated that ‘we are not against the principles of the Bill’ he 
acknowledged that ‘there should be more clarity on what constitutes a crime under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Rs. 100 is roughly equivalent to USD 1, rendering these amounts USD 1,500 and 5,000 respectively.  
14 Although the JHU did attempt to amend the Constitution, proclaiming Buddhism as the state religion 
and prohibiting all conversion out of Buddhism. The Supreme Court also ruled this unconstitutional 
(see Owens 2007: 325).   
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this piece of legislation’ (cited in The Sunday Times 08.02.09). To add ballast to the 
Bill, in 2008 the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) – a lay Buddhist 
organisation that serves and provides for the betterment of Buddhism in society – 
conducted an inquiry into the conversion activities of evangelical organisations 
operating in Sri Lanka. Entitled the ‘Commission on Unethical Conversions’, the final 
report was presented to the ACBC in early 200915. The Commission report presents 
evidence to support claims of unethical conversion, based on data collected from 
around the country (although, significantly, Christian perspectives were excluded). In 
doing so it contributes to a growing body of literature, rhetoric and debate that 
irrefutably supports the “unethical” conversion case. A counterbalance is needed: one 
that offers the perspectives of the Christians implicated in such a discourse, and which 
provides a more impartial analysis of the claims made by both sides.  
  
If (or when) such legislation is passed in Sri Lanka, the religious freedom of both the 
organisation, and individual will be severely undermined. Owens (2007: 351; see also 
Deegalle 2004) argues that ‘the introduction of legislation to curb unethical 
conversion will increase, rather than eliminate, religious divisions in Sri Lanka’, and 
that ‘it will only result in further violations of the very rights to religious freedom it is 
attempting to protect in the first place’. In addition, despite being outwardly aimed at 
evangelical organisations, Matthews (2007) predicts mainline churches will suffer the 
consequences much more than their evangelical counterparts, largely because 
evangelical denominations operate outside of legislative frameworks (see below), 
meaning such proposals are imbued with problems of both a theoretical (in terms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Unfortunately, during the period of fieldwork the Commission report was only available in Sinhala, 
and had not yet been translated into English. Nonetheless, three interviews were conducted with 
representatives of the ACBC, with respondents regularly citing examples from the Commission report 
to support their claims.  
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how they are conceptualised), and practical (in terms of who they stand to implicate) 
nature. As a result, it is necessary to explore and develop alternative approaches to 
understanding how evangelical organisations grow, regulate and position themselves 
within Sri Lanka’s religious marketplace. 
 
3.2.3 Oligopoly dynamics and Sri Lanka’s informal religious economy 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, religious economy presents a useful theoretical approach 
that provides a relatively holistic understanding of religious change. It situates 
religious groups within broader systems of inter-religious competition and state 
control, but it needs to be adapted in order to explain why evangelical groups 
operating in places like Sri Lanka remain competitive, despite being heavily 
regulated. In response to the binary thinking of normative approaches to religious 
economy theorisation, Yang (2006, 2007, 2010) has recently proposed that four types 
of state-religion relations exist. In order of increasing religious regulation, these are: 
pluralism (all religions treated the same), oligopoly (one or more religions favoured 
by the state), monopoly (one official religion), and total ban (all religions outlawed). 
Importantly for the purposes of the thesis, Yang asserts that oligopolistic religious 
economies can be both regulated and competitive, thus overcoming the impasse 
enforced by normative understandings. Furthermore, Yang proposes a tripartite 
structuring of religious markets based on his understanding of religion in China: a red 
market of officially sanctioned religions, a black market of officially banned religions, 
and an ambiguous grey market that is characterised by both officially sanctioned and 
banned religious groups. Such theorising presents a much-needed break from existing 
religious economy moulds, and provides a solid conceptual frame for exploring the 
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competitiveness and growth of evangelical groups in Sri Lanka’s oligopolistic 
religious marketplace (i.e. one that privileges Buddhism, yet ensures fairness across 
all recognised religions).  
 
According to Yang’s (2006) tripartite market structure, in Sri Lanka, the “red” market 
would comprise those religions that are officially recognised at the ministerial level: 
Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamic groups, the Catholic Church, and “mainline” Protestant 
denominations. The place of evangelical groups (commonly identified as “free” or 
Pentecostal churches) is not so easily defined; they are not represented by, nor are 
they accountable to, the Ministry of Christian Affairs, which represents the Roman 
Catholic and mainline Protestant denominations only (see Table 1, below). Their 
position within Sri Lanka’s religious economy is unclear; because they are not 
formally recognised at the ministerial level they are neither legal nor illegal, but 
politically taboo instead (i.e. they have no legal status). The recognition that comes 
with being either a “legal” or “illegal” religious group suggests a degree of formality 
in the religious economy: groups are categorised, labelled and are treated (and 
operate) in accordance with their legal position. Problems arise when non-legal 
groups, or those with no legal status, are included within religious economy 
theorisations, as they are not subject to the same regulatory controls as those that are 
legally recognised. This paves the way for new understandings of the working of an 
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In addition to the information presented by Table 1, the registration of churches also 
differs between mainline and evangelical denominations. Because religious groups 
are not required to register with the government in Sri Lanka, many evangelical 
groups are registered under the Companies Act (unlike the Catholic, Anglican and 
other mainline churches, for example, which have long been incorporated under acts 
of parliament), serving to further obfuscate their political position (see U.S. 
Department of State 2010). Thus whilst Yang differentiates between the red, black, 
and grey markets, he ultimately conceptualises them as part of the same economic 
system that recognises all religious groups, whether legal or illegal, or existing in the 
red, grey or black markets. Delineating the economy along these lines is misleading in 
the Sri Lankan context, as evangelical groups are unrecognised and therefore create 
their own informal religious economy that exists in parallel with the formal economic 
system of state-sanctioned religions. The relationship between the two systems is 
replete with tension, and is not adequately addressed by existing studies.  
 
Yang also treats the state as the sole regulatory body. Civil society is largely 
controlled by the Buddhist hierarchy, and has insurmountable influence over the state 
and state apparatus at the local level in Sri Lanka. The regulatory affect of such 
‘religious cartels’ (Grim and Finke 2010: 8) is often overlooked; undeservedly so, 
given their role in blurring the boundary between what constitutes “legal” and 
“illegal” religious activity in practice, and in law. Distinguishing between “formal” 
and “informal” religious economies therefore presupposes a more relativised view of 
regulation that goes beyond the legal power(lessness) of the state, by taking into 
consideration the regulatory actions of non-state actors as well. Thus by disrupting the 
systems of positive feedback between regulation and competition, Sri Lanka’s 
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informal economy challenges a core premise of more formal religious economy 
theorisations; in doing so it calls for new understandings of competitiveness. 
Evangelical vigour is not diminished or nullified by regulation, but the methods used 
to promote competition take on different forms that are sensitive to, and therefore 
reflective of, the broader workings of the religious economy. Such methods render 
direct, and causal, relationships between levels of regulation and levels of competition 
simplistic in the Sri Lankan context, and form the theoretical basis of what I term the 
relational model of competitiveness (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the fact that evangelical 
groups are notoriously discreet, difficult to control, and pose a ‘constant challenge to 
regulators and researchers’ (Yang 2010: 202) does not diminish the necessity of 
understanding how they operate and remain competitive within the informal religious 
economy: it adds to it.  
 
Having explored the empirical context in which fieldwork was conducted, I now 
introduce the methodological approach. Specifically, I explain the value of a critical 
ethnographic approach when conducting cross-cultural fieldwork, and discuss in 
detail the ethics that I negotiated throughout the duration of the research process. 
Following that I describe and justify the methods used for data collection. I end the 
chapter by introducing each of the research sites in which data were collected.  
 
3.3 Critical ethnography in a cross-cultural context 
 
Ethnography is a mainstay of qualitative research. As a methodological approach it 
involves the collection of data in naturally occurring settings, which are used to 
describe and interpret the social expressions, actions, meanings and realities between 
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people and groups. Put differently, it is the “writing of culture” (Clifford and Marcus 
1986) that leads to a greater understanding of people and places. It becomes “critical” 
when issues of representation, the legitimation of knowledge and the ‘exercise of 
power in culturally specific yet socially reproductive processes’ (Lather 2001: 479) 
move to the fore. Breaking from the detachment of conventional ethnography, a 
critical approach assumes an ‘activist collaboration with oppressed groups’ (Lather 
2001: 479; see also Kobayashi’s 2002 notion of “activist” scholarship). In terms of 
application, such collaboration enables the production of knowledge that is co-
fabricated between researchers and researched. More importantly, however, 
collaboration also ‘takes us beneath surface appearances, disrupts the status quo, and 
unsettles both neutrality and taken-for-granted assumptions by bringing to light 
underlying and obscure operations of power and control’ (Madison 2005: 5, original 
emphasis). Simultaneously hermeneutic and emancipatory, such knowledge is 
popularly used to invoke social consciousness, criticism or change (Carspecken 
1996).  
 
By following a critical ethnographic approach, the data collection and analysis aim to 
unsettle normative academic discourses surrounding religious growth, and critically 
explore the expressions of Buddhist hegemony and Christian agency that lead to the 
contested practice of evangelism in Sri Lanka. Rather than perpetuating postcolonial, 
Western, or academic authority, the research is explicit in its aim to ‘create spaces and 
discourses of progressive politics’ (Skelton 2009: 401), alternatively referred to as a 
“space of engagement”, wherein ‘the world speaks back’ (Massey 2004: 80). Such a 
space is a ‘complex structure which one transforms’ (ibid.) throughout the research 
process, meaning from conceptualisation to the presentation of findings, I have 
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continually questioned why knowledge is being produced, whom is it being produced 
for, and how can it best be presented in order to avoid misrepresentation (Skelton 
2009). This is important given the marginal position of evangelical groups operating 
in Sri Lanka vis a vis the structural dominance of Buddhism, as well as the normative 
power of Anglo-American academic discourse when explaining religious growth. 
Indeed, at various levels, pursuing a critical ethnographic approach helped necessitate 
criticism of, and resistance to, such normative assumptions. As Lather (2001) 
suggests above, a critical approach facilitates identification of how power is exercised 
in relation to cultural specificities and processes of social reproduction, and in doing 
so helped me to interrogate and problematise the location and determinants of agency 
in terms of religious determination, academic discourse and researcher positionality.  
 
With any form of qualitative data collection or analysis, social reality is constructed 
and presented from the interpretive standpoint of the researcher. Such constructions 
are ‘more or less affected not only by subjective understandings (previous 
experiences, values, assumptions, hopes, fears and expectations), but also by the 
social position from which the social reality is perceived’ (Barker 2003: 23; see also 
Massey 2004: 77). Positionality is a key consideration for the critical ethnographer. 
Indeed, there is an apparent tendency for cross-cultural researchers to rely on latent 
colonial discourses and power relations in order to gain access to research subjects, 
data and legitimation. Problematising the validity of cross-cultural knowledge 
production, Raju (2002: 173) condemns the monolithic categories to which society 
and culture is reduced, with the “Third World” inherently underprivileged and 
oppressed and “the West” the ‘primary referent in theory and praxis’ (Twyman et al. 
1999: 314; Mohammad 2002). The risk of reproducing existing transcultural power 
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relationships poses a significant challenge to empowered cross-cultural research. Raju 
goes on to suggest that a degree of scepticism is required in order to avoid the 
‘privileged and self-indulgent focus on the self’ (Kobayashi 2003: 348) that can stem 
from analytical disclosures regarding the positionality of the researcher alone; 
practices viewed as an ‘academic luxury that we from the “Third World” cannot 
afford16’ (Raju 2002: 173). In light of this, Raju posits that because identities are 
simultaneously plural and homogeneous, none can be constituted as the “other” ‘in 
terms of ‘being marginal to the text of dominant discourses or researchers’ privileged 
gaze’ (ibid. 175). In other words, the construction of difference upon which cross-
cultural research is based is increasingly redundant in a postcolonial, postmodern 
world of nonfixity and cultural hybridity.  
 
Taking the argument a step further, it has been suggested that the critical becomes the 
postcritical once positionality moves from being a descriptive variable, to one that is 
actively critiqued. In such cases objectivity is eschewed in place of ‘critical 
interpretation that exists beyond the intentions of the author to deobjectify, dereify, or 
demystify that studied’ (Noblit 2004: 198). A postcritical understanding of the 
researchers’ position should unearth (or, at the least, contextualise) their power, 
privileges and biases; inviting a critique of how the self studies, interprets and 
represents the other. It encourages reflexivity and accountability throughout the 
research process. In some instances the researcher may be proven wrong, inviting an 
“ethics of accountability” based on a self that is ‘accessible, transparent, and 
vulnerable to judgment and evaluation’ (Madison 2005: 8; Thomas 1993; Whatmore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 More specifically, she argues that research in the Third World deals with more primal, sensory issues 
of hunger, poverty, inequality, population growth and so on, and therefore ‘necessitate[s] alliance for 
collective bargaining across the board despite the involvement of actors polarized along caste, class, 
gender, linguistic, ethnic and regional lines’ (Raju 2002: 176).  
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2004). Drawing on these ideas, I now go on to explore some of the research ethics 
associated with conducting cross-cultural research, examining institutional ethics and 
the more position-dependent “ethics of accountability” in turn. 
 
3.4 Cross-cultural research ethics 
 
For the duration of the fieldwork I was a Visiting Scholar at the Department of 
Sociology, University of Colombo. This not only assured me a residence visa and re-
entry permit to Sri Lanka for a twelve-month period, but my affiliation with the 
University of Colombo (for which a research proposal was submitted) granted me a 
degree of legitimacy once in-country. This legitimacy was important, as a number of 
interviewees initially questioned the purpose and backing of my research (especially 
those that were cold called, although for others it was the affiliation that was the 
source of questioning), and the affiliation gave me the confidence to sample and 
request for interviews. In addition to the University of Colombo affiliation, research 
only commenced once NUS Institutional Review Board (Ethics) approval had been 
sought and obtained. Obtaining such approval necessitated the establishment of a 
number of regulatory checks and balances that were designed to ensure that no direct 
or indirect harm would arise from respondents participating in the research. 
 
Evangelical Christians face persecution at the ideological, organisational and 
individual levels in Sri Lanka. In itself this provides the research imperative to better 
understand how and why such persecution occurs, yet simultaneously poses a number 
of problems in terms of trust, the recruitment of informants and the management of 
information. If mishandled, the information or opinions divulged during the 
	   69	  
interviews could have a deleterious impact upon the individuals, organisations and 
communities involved in this study, and informants may have felt compelled to censor 
their comments in order to prevent reprisals on themselves or their organisation. In 
order to address this concern all informants were guaranteed anonymity and, where 
necessary, confidentiality at each stage of the research process (Berg 2007: 79). 
Various layers of abstraction are used to obscure the names, identities and locations of 
organisations when presenting interview findings (see below). Moreover, because this 
research is committed to the emotional and physical wellbeing of all informants, it 
was made clear that withdrawal from the research process was permissible at any 
time, and in doing so all record of participation in the study would be destroyed 
immediately. All respondents were given my contact details (Sri Lanka and Singapore 
telephone numbers and two email addresses), meaning I was, and remain, accessible. 
Finally as the building of trust and rapport directly impinged the quality of data 
produced, there was an emphasis throughout on relationship building, including 
various attempts to socialise with informants before, during and after the data 
collection process. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of such ethical checks and balances, there are a 
number of (often unquantifiable) ethical questions that any ethnographer ‘engaging 
the worlds and meanings of Others’ must address (Madison 2005: 4). Below I raise 
and discuss some of the problems associated with such institutional ethical guidelines, 
and how sensitivity towards my positionality as a researcher and the ensuing “ethics 
of accountability” helped to circumvent some of the potential risks associated with the 
research.  
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3.4.1 Problematising institutional ethics 
 
The ethics associated with obtaining Institutional Review Board approval serve to 
define and instil ethical best practices and, in doing so, reduce the risk that 
respondents are caused harm by participating in the research. That being said, the 
ethical guidelines imposed by institutions often exist in a state of tension with the 
‘practical application of ethical principles in real-world research situations and 
decision making’ (Manzo and Brightbill 2007: 33). Put differently, institutions seek to 
establish ethical best practices, which often overlook, or even contradict, ethical 
problems that only surface once fieldwork commences and ethics begin to be 
“practiced”. This has been variously referred to as the “institutionalisation”, 
“bureaucratisation” or “corporatisation” of academic practice, and stems from the 
view that ‘researchers seem increasingly subject to a restrictive, inflexible and top-
down view of what ‘ethics’ should be, via the codes of human subject panels which 
we are expected to adhere to’ (Cahill et al. 2007: 307, original emphasis; Elwood 
2007; Manzo and Brightbill 2007). In this sense, therefore, institutional ethics are 
enforced from above, according to a one-size-fits-all framework. 
 
Recognising and embracing the positionality/ies of the researcher can enable, inhibit 
or simply change the preconditions for what constitutes “ethical” research practice. 
For example, Hopkins (2007) examines how multiple positionalities and different 
understandings of what constitutes ethical practice has affected his research with 
young Muslim men. Focussing on the ‘politics of position’ (Smith 1993: 305), he 
shows how a consideration of the similarities and differences between the researcher 
and participants can lead to an understanding of the ‘multiple, interweaving and 
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intersecting ways in which our various positionalities and identities are revealed, 
negotiated and managed in research encounters’ (Hopkins 2007: 388). Despite 
differences in religion and ethnicity, the similarities Hopkins shared with his 
participants were numerous (e.g. speaking with a Scottish accent, being raised in an 
urban setting, and attending one of Scotland’s largest multi-racial secondary schools), 
and facilitated ‘alliance formation’ (Harvey 1996: 360) and the establishment of 
rapport. In turn such rapport eroded the cultural boundaries assumed by the positional 
divide that separated researcher from participant, making the negotiation of ethical 
issues less problematic than may otherwise be expected during cross-cultural 
research. 
 
Developing the idea that positionality can have an important bearing upon research 
ethics, Sultana (2007) suggests that in order to undertake ethical research, greater 
attention must be paid to issues of reflexivity and power relations in the field. 
Reflexivity in particular is necessary to situate research and knowledge production in 
order to ensure the maintenance of ethical commitments and the serving of the 
‘democratic, practical ethos of action research’ (Reason and Bradbury 2006: 7). More 
often than not, in order to remain reflexive, researchers must realise a commitment to 
research relationships based on mutual respect, rather than the strict codes defined by 
the institution. Sultana describes how, as an “elite”/urban Bangladeshi woman 
conducting research in rural villages in Bangladesh whilst representing an American 
university (and thus susceptible to Western institutional ethical codes), in the field she 
had to grapple with a range of ethical concerns on a daily basis. Whether it was the 
negotiation of insider/outsider status in the village, ‘othering’ by male policy makers 
or the socio-cultural transgressions associated with her embodied presence (e.g. 
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wearing trainers and having short hair), she found herself adopting multiple 
positionalities and having to negotiate her ethical “best” practices continually. Thus 
‘positionality and subjectivity are tempered both spatially and temporally, and are 
unstable and not fixed… dynamics change with context, and the insider-outsider 
boundary gets blurred’ (Sultana 2007: 382). Below I examine in more detail three 
different facets of researcher reflexivity: positionality, personality and performativity.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
3.4.2 Positionality, personality, performativity: a triumvirate of researcher
 reflexivity 
 
Being a young white male professing no religious belief, I had to interact with, and 
represent the views of people that are of a different ethnicity (i.e. Sinhalese and 
Tamils), religion (i.e. Christians, Buddhists and Hindus) and age. Whilst any position 
will influence ‘what variables [a]re included or excluded in the collection or 
categorization of data’ (Basch et al. 1994: 15), the fact that my position could have 
affected access to churches and interview subjects, the building of rapport, censoring 
of comments, or augment the perceived cultural difference between researcher and 
researched (Sidaway 1992) means it warrants closer attention. As I discuss in more 
detail below, given the contested nature of Christianity in Sri Lanka, alongside the 
critical ethnographers’ aversion to “domestication” (which can compromise the 
validity of “critical” research – see Madison 2005: 6), I believe my reflexivity is no 
less problematic than that of a Christian- or Buddhist-affiliated researcher.  
  
In the first instance, the fact that I am a white researcher from the UK granted me 
unfettered access to a range of stakeholders. This could be for a number of reasons, 
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not least the genuine willingness to assist in an “outsider’s” research project that 
directly implicates their country (Sri Lanka) and community (Christian/Buddhist), 
subservience to foreigners (referred to on pages 257-8 as the “colonial mentality”), or 
the perception that I could connect them with overseas evangelicals (especially, 
donors). In light of this, access was often granted without a formal introduction 
(provided by snowball sampling, for example), enabling me to exert a greater degree 
of control over who was contacted and how the research progressed. Indeed, as the 
head of one of the country’s mainline churches told me: “I have no problem that this 
[interview] is being recorded because you are from UK; if you are from Asia I would 
be a little more concerned because there is already a little religious tension in Sri 
Lanka… me being the head of the church, if I am misquoted in any way, the whole 
church will be affected” (Mainline Church, Colombo – see page 86 for legend). 
Although it is not explained why he would be a “little more concerned” if I were from 
an Asian country, the fact that he raised such an issue without being prompted 
suggests that physical and cultural distance (and difference) can be an enabler of trust 
when studying religious issues that are of a sensitive nature. Detachment from the 
“religious tension in Sri Lanka” obviates the fear of being “misquoted in any way”, 
and reveals the hitherto under-appreciated value of difference, instead of sameness.  
 
In the second instance, most respondents assumed I was a Christian researcher (see 
Barker 2003: 9-10), with the fact that I am an atheist producing mixed reactions. For 
some, my religious positionality made no difference, for others it rendered me less 
trustworthy and more likely to have an “agenda” (in one instance, an informant 
refused to allow the interview to be recorded on these grounds), whereas for most it 
provided an opportunity for proselytisation. In the last instance, this formed an 
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important part of the research experience by enabling me to gain an appreciation of 
different proselytisation strategies (from the irritatingly Socratic, to the blindingly 
directive), and, if anything, reinforced my own (non-) religious standpoint. In a lot of 
cases my religious positionality was assumed. I would be referred to as “brother”, and 
sometimes be asked to pray with, or for, a church or person17. That said, it should also 
be noted that, whilst I am an atheist by choice, I have been brought up within the 
Christian context of the UK. As a result, Christian values have had an indelible 
impact upon my own moral outlook and, additionally, the way I interacted with my 
interviewees.  
 
In the third instance my youth, like my racial characteristics, diffused a lot of 
(unnecessary) suspicion pertaining to my research objectives, and personal 
motivations. Despite being 26 during the time fieldwork was conducted, many 
informants asked how old I was, with most guessing that I was in my late teens/early 
twenties. As a result, many informants saw me as less “threatening” than a more aged 
researcher. This served to lessen (if not nullify) the power distance established by my 
race, and also encouraged me to be more forthright during interviews. Finally, whilst 
my gender did not appear to present much of an issue regarding researcher 
positionality, this is largely due to the fact that my interview sample was 
overwhelmingly male (see page 83). In itself, this reflects the male-dominated nature 
of religious leadership in Sri Lanka. However, should more females have been 
interviewed, gender would have undoubtedly played a more salient role in influencing 
the research process and outcomes. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In such instances, I would thank the interviewees for participating in the research, and wish them 
well for the future. Although not a prayer, such speeches seemed to meet the request in a satisfactory 
way. 
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Whilst differences in positionality can problematise the legitimacy of knowledge 
production and representation, a critical ethnographic approach can help ‘attend to the 
social and political processes that struggle against and work to unsettle the 
architecture of domination established through imperialism’ (Jacobs 1996: 161). 
Central to this approach is, as suggested by the examples above, the realisation that 
identities, positions and power relations exist in a constant state of interplay and 
contestation, and go beyond primordial categories of race, ethnicity or gender. 
Instead, the discursive formations of a critical ethnographic perspective help ‘create a 
complex field of values, meanings and practices’ (ibid. 13) that have different 
meanings in different contexts and can ultimately be used to close the gap between 
knowledge producers (i.e. researchers) and “native informants” (i.e. researched) 
(Spivak 1999; Skelton 2002; Butz and Besio 2004). Indeed, Moser (2008) has 
recently brought attention to the “profound” role of personality in shaping research 
processes and outcomes, showing how the “meta-categories” of researcher 
positionality soon became less important to the research participants than the inter-
personal skills, or the personality, of the researcher. It is argued that an understanding 
of personality complements that of positionality, with both contributing to the 
formation or erosion of power relations during the fieldwork process. Taking Moser’s 
elaboration one-step further, I argue that performativity, along with positionality and 
personality, completes what I understand to be a triumvirate of researcher reflexivity.  
 
As the research progressed, I found myself enforcing or disrupting my positionality 
through the actions that I performed. Two instances in Colombo reveal what I mean 
by this. One, during a tour of the premises of a Christian NGO, I came across an 
overflowing toilet cistern located in one of the outdoor toilet blocks. My guide, the 
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leader of the organisation, was only a couple of years older than me and we had, over 
the course of several meetings spanning two years, become friends. Whilst the fault 
was too big to ignore, he was unable to fix it and began asking for someone to come 
and help. By removing the lid of the cistern and fiddling around with the stopcock 
(the extent of my plumbing skills), I soon managed to stop the water from 
overflowing. Two, after an interview with the founder and assistant pastor of an 
evangelical church, I requested a copy of a letter I was shown during the interview, 
which documented a legal tussle the church was facing with the Urban Development 
Authority (UDA) over its expansion plans. The founder’s office had a relatively new 
scanner and printer, and he readily agreed to my request. After a few minutes spent 
fumbling around with it, neither he nor the assistant pastor could get the machine to 
work and, whilst calling for assistance, I tried to help and managed to fix the problem 
immediately.  
 
In both instances I “performed”, albeit briefly, a certain role that either challenged or 
enforced my positionality. In the first instance my ability to fix a toilet – a basic, 
perhaps even slightly degrading skill – seemed to destabilise the power relation 
between myself and my guide by surprising him regarding my ability to perform 
mundane, dirty jobs. According to Thomas (1993: 9), this performance is an example 
of critical ethnography in practice, which involves taking ‘seemingly mundane events, 
even repulsive ones, and reproduc[ing] them in a way that exposes broader social 
processes of control, taming, power imbalance, and the symbolic mechanisms that 
impose one set of preferred meanings or behaviors over others’. In the second 
instance, however, I was painfully aware of the “power imbalance” that was enforced 
by my performance, as my actions reflected a notion of the technologically-savvy 
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Westerner showing the less technologically-literate Sri Lankan how to use their own 
piece of equipment. My performativity served to destabilise (in the first instance) and 
enforce (in the second) my positionality, causing me to become more sensitised 
thereafter to the effect that my actions (and not just my appearance, attributes, or 
words) had on the reflexive positioning of the self in relation to the other.  
 
Sensitivity towards researcher positionality, personality and performativity is in 
keeping with the postmodern, anti-essentialist agenda of critical ethnography. The 
crossing of cultural boundaries suggests that the traditional binaries of insider/outsider 
and sameness/difference (those derided by Raju 2002 above) give way to more 
dynamic spaces of “betweenness” that are predicated less on positionality per se, and 
more on how such a position is communicated and negotiated during the course of the 
research process. Such spaces of betweenness see the researcher as neither connected 
nor disconnected from research subjects, but instead engaged in a constant state of 
(re)negotiation (Nast 1994). One outcome of (re)negotiation is the creation of new, 
and hopefully effective, spaces of exchange around the researcher and participant, 
new opportunities for knowledge production (specifically for Sri Lanka to evolve 
from being a fertile ground of empiricism to an ‘arena for the production of theory’ – 
Skelton 2009: 402), and the ensuing development of grounded theories (Glaser and 




The research is based on qualitative data that were collected in Sri Lanka throughout 
2010-11. 106 in-depth interviews were conducted in eight locations across the island 
	   78	  
with a variety of stakeholders, representing a variety of churches and parachurch 
organisations, Christian NGOs, representatives of Buddhist and Hindu organisations, 
and government bodies. Most interviews were with “elites” (i.e. those who play an 
instructive role in organisational decision-making), who were responsible for 
formulating and implementing strategies of evangelism, or imposing regulations or 
restrictions on minority groups. In addition, approximately a dozen ethnographic-style 
observations were made of worship and healing services, social ministries, and 
evangelical outreach events. Given the need to understand the complexities and 
subtleties of evangelical Christian growth in Sri Lanka, a qualitative methodological 
approach is warranted.  
 
Existing, often sociological, studies of inter-religious relations, tension and conflict 
are often predicated on quantitative methodologies that are used to generate all-
encompassing theorisations (see Yang 2006; Wuthnow 2011). Nuance is, as a result, 
relegated to the periphery of understanding, along with more qualitative explanations. 
Yet given, for example, Fox’s (2000: 436) assertion that ‘attacks on religious 
worldviews is a phenomenon that is very difficult to measure… an endeavor that is ill 
suited to the types of data collection and analyses performed here [i.e. quantitative 
regression analyses]’, qualitative understandings of religious change and conflict are 
needed, but lacking. More specifically, a qualitative approach presents a significant 
departure from normative substantiations of religious economy, which tend to be 
almost wholly deductive, and based on large-scale datasets derived from censuses and 
surveys. The methodological and theoretical exclusivity upon which existing theories 
are grounded have been strongly criticised for ignoring the value of qualitative 
understandings of religion derived from induction, narratives and ethnography (see 
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Ammerman 1997; Neitz and Mueser 1997; Bruce 1999). In addition, the usage of 
large-scale datasets in countries like Sri Lanka is inherently problematic, not least 
because of the unwillingness of evangelical groups to accurately report numerical 
measures of competitiveness (i.e. growth) to the relevant authorities, and the relative 
lack of resources and technical training needed to generate academically robust 
datasets within the developing world.  
 
3.5.1 Sampling technique 
 
The fieldwork followed a strong organisational path, with interviews being conducted 
(almost exclusively) with churches, parachurch organisations, Christian NGOs and 
some Buddhist and Hindu organisations and government representatives (see Table 2, 
below). In particular, the Buddhist perspectives included were with key proponents 
(and architects) of the proposed anti-conversion legislation. The deviation from new 
paradigm emphases on “congregational studies” (Woodhead 2009) is intentional and 
necessary, given the sensitivity surrounding evangelical Christian groups in Sri 
Lanka, and the need to understand the motivations and behaviours of those 
responsible for implementing organisational strategies of growth. Organisations 
varying in size, longevity, location, denomination and structure were all included, 
with no single organisational characteristic being (intentionally) privileged over 
others. That said, the emphasis on snowball sampling meant that organisations 
embedded within large, island-wide, networks were more likely to be sampled than 
other, more independent organisations. That is not to say that independent 
organisations were not included in the research; they were, albeit to a lesser extent. As 
a result, churches representing the country’s largest evangelical denominations, such 
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as the Assemblies of God and Foursquare, were more easily included. The 
decentralised nature of such networks does, however, discourage homogeneity 
(despite having such a denominational covering), meaning a variety of organisational 
nuances were still captured.    
 
Snowball sampling was carried out in two ways: first at the local level, and second at 
the trans-local level. All sampling began in Colombo, where my initial group of 
contacts was based. These contacts were initiated by email in 2009 and consolidated 
and expanded during short, preliminary trips to Sri Lanka in 2009 and 2010. By the 
time research commenced in August 2010, the first two weeks of interviews had 
already been arranged. Thereafter, within Colombo, sampling was relatively easy, and 
was a mixture of snowballing and cold calling. Given the (relatively) high density of 
evangelical organisations in Colombo, and their (relatively) more overt expressions of 
religious identity, cold calling was a straightforward process. Many organisations had 
an online presence from which a contact telephone number could easily be obtained; 
some urban evangelical churches had visible signboards outside their premises that 
included contact details, whereas others were listed in telephone directories or in the 
newsletters and evangelical literature of more established churches. I was, and still 
am, surprised by the very high success rate when cold-calling organisations. The first 
time I telephoned the Methodist church, for instance, I managed to speak to, and 
arrange an interview with, the President without any problems. I attribute this largely 
to my positionality as a white researcher, as discussed above. With just one exception, 
nobody declined to be interviewed on the basis that they disapproved, or were not 
otherwise comfortable with participating in the research.  
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To sample at the trans-local level, I relied heavily on my Colombo-based contacts to 
get started. Colombo is the primary nodal point of evangelical networks at the 
national (and international) scale, with provincial centres such as Galle (Southern 
Province), Kandy and Nuwara Eliya (Central), Vavuniya (Northern) and Trincomalee 
(Eastern) comprising some of the secondary nodes. The organisation of evangelical 
churches into networks greatly facilitated the trans-local snowballing technique. 
Given that Colombo is the point at which most of these networks converge, I found 
that by building strong relationships with the Colombo-based leaders (or 
“gatekeepers”) of evangelical church networks and denominations, they would readily 
grant me access to their constituent churches around the island. Working down the 
sampling hierarchy (i.e. from the primary node of Colombo, to the secondary 
provincial nodes, to rural villages) also reflects a form of “theoretical sampling” 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967), whereby ideas were formed in the primary and secondary 
nodes, and then tested in the rural villages. Before arriving at a new location, I would 
typically be in contact with three or four local churches, and from that starting point I 
was able to repeat the process of local sampling. At the local level, evangelical 
churches are organised into pastor’s fellowships, access to which catalysed the 
snowballing process. Indeed, outside of Colombo, I found myself relying on a 
snowballing strategy, largely because of the more subdued expressions of Christian 
identity, and the need for a formal introduction in order to allay any suspicions 
regarding the research. Even with a formal introduction, outside of Colombo I found 
myself having to work harder to gain the trust of my informants by revealing whom 
else I had interviewed, both in Colombo and the locality. Notwithstanding, the 
number of interviews I managed to conduct over the course of nine weeks is 
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testament to the success of this progressive sampling technique, with every 
respondent (without exception) assisting with the sampling if asked to do so. 
 
3.5.2 In-depth interviews 
 
In line with the critical ethnographic approach outlined above, in-depth interviews 
were the most effective way of starting a ‘deep and abiding dialogue’ (Madison 2005: 
9) with informants. Such a dialogue necessitated the construction of substantial and 
accurate meanings based on open and ongoing ‘question, debate, and challenge’ 
(ibid.). My positionality as a researcher (particularly regarding religion), previously 
discussed, catalysed such dialogue, especially the questioning of particular biblical 
(or, more generally, theological) rationale for certain actions and opinions. A variety 
of perspectives (including my own) were necessary, and useful, given that ‘not only 
will people perceive… [evangelical Christianity] from different perspectives, they 
will also describe and, perhaps, explain… [it] in different ways. Consciously or 
unconsciously, they will select from among the features presented to them’ (Barker 
2003: 8, original emphasis). Incorporating a range of informants – from the leaders of 
evangelical churches, to Christian university students, village converts, international 
missionaries and Buddhist monks – enabled me to account for differing 
interpretations and experiences of the spatial practices of evangelical Christianity in 
Sri Lanka.  
 
Overall, the interviews were strongly biased towards elites, that is, the leaders of 
evangelical organisations. This bias was partly intentional, and partly a function of Sri 
Lankan hierarchies of power. My intention for the research is to understand how 
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evangelical groups grow in Sri Lanka, and elites are, in my opinion, best positioned to 
create such an understanding, given their strategic role in organisations, their macro-
level understanding and micro-level experiences, and, more pragmatically speaking, 
their ability to speak and understand English. This was compounded by the realisation 
as soon as I started the research that, even if I had wanted to speak to less senior 
personnel, I would have had trouble doing so. Sri Lankan hierarchies of power render 
the voices of senior figures more “accurate” or “important” (or not, as the case 
sometimes was) than their more junior counterparts, and my insistence to speak with 
anyone other than the leadership would likely have been met with suspicion and 
refusal. Whilst this was not true in all cases, in many it was. The privileging of elites 
was also at the expense of the layperson: the recipient of evangelical outreach. Whilst 
layperson perspectives are undeniably important, and definitely deserve further 
investigation (Chapter 8 considers in more detail how they could contribute to an 
understanding of evangelical growth), they fall outside the scope of the thesis. Finally, 
there was a very strong gender bias, with all but three of the interviews being with 
men (97.2%). Such a bias is reflective of religious leadership in Sri Lanka as a whole, 
and is not, therefore, a function of any inconsistencies in the sampling strategy.    
 
The organisation of evangelical churches into networks, as described in the preceding 
section, also enabled me to scale-up or scale-down the interviews with relative ease. 
For example, the pastor of a typical evangelical church would be able to speak from 
three, sometimes four, scalar viewpoints. One, at the most micro-level would be the 
day-to-day actions, experiences and problems faced by the pastor’s individual church. 
Two, each church would usually be part of a pastor’s fellowship, consisting of a 
group of territorially defined evangelical pastors (e.g. those working in a given 
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district, or a subset of a district) that would meet regularly (usually once a month) for 
prayer, knowledge sharing and support. This invariably granted each pastor a more 
regional purview of evangelical activity, even those from the smallest, most 
independent, churches. Three, each church would be part of an evangelical 
“denomination”, or a national-scale church planting movement, usually, but not 
always, headquartered in Colombo18. Such alliances also precipitated more 
formalised, yet irregular, meetings, training sessions and support networks that 
granted each pastor a more national purview of evangelical activity. Four, at the most 
macro-level, pastors may have international exposure, granted via overseas 
sponsorship, or overseas training (of which The Haggai Institute in Singapore 
featured prominently, as did Indian, Singaporean and South Korean theological 
colleges). Such exposure granted evangelical pastors an international purview, 
enabling them to interpret evangelical Christianity in Sri Lankan relative to that found 
in other countries. Such a multi-scalar approach to understanding organisational 
behaviour accords with Kong’s (2001) call for the analysis of religious phenomena to 
traverse, and transcend, scale.  
 
Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured, open-ended approach. Whilst the 
use of an interview schedule (see Appendix 2) ensured a broad degree of consistency 
across all interviews, each would develop its own direction, appropriate to the semi-
structured approach. This granted informants a degree of control over how the 
conversation developed, and was ultimately successful in encouraging them to “open 
up”. Interviews lasted, on average, one hour. Some were significantly longer, others 
shorter. Nearly all interviews were conducted at organisational premises, or at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I also came across church planting movements that focussed specifically on a given region or 
province, such as the Hill Country, or the South.  
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homes of the informants (for the pastors of house churches, the boundary between the 
two is indistinguishable). The vast majority of interviews were conducted in English. 
For those that were conducted in Sinhala or Tamil, a translator was used. In all 
instances it was the prerogative of the informant to assign a translator, usually a close 
friend or colleague. This not only aided the building of rapport and trust, but also 
aided the process of cross-cultural knowledge production as it placed the respondent 
in a position of relative power, control and comfort vis a vis the researcher (see 
Twyman et al. 1999). Indeed, sensitivity surrounding evangelical activity and the 
often-disproportionate reactions to evangelism meant that informants would have 
likely been unwilling to disclose their evangelical practices to unknown, third part 
translators (see Hopkins 2007). I, on the other hand, was privileged insofar as my 
positionality meant that I was detached enough from the domestic setting to be 
outside of the local structures of power and influence (and corruption), yet suitably 
embedded within evangelical networks (through my strong contacts with the 
evangelical leadership at the national and local levels) to ensure my own legitimacy as 
a researcher.  
 
Consent was obtained verbally, and recorded before each interview commenced. All 
except two interviews were recorded; for these two anomalies (who rejected the 
formality associated with recording, deeming it “unnecessary”), detailed notes were 
taken instead. Upon completion of the interview, or as soon as possible thereafter, all 
digital data (including voice recordings and photographs) were uploaded onto a laptop 
computer and backed up using an external hard drive. Whilst I initially attempted to 
transcribe the interview data as it was collected, I quickly realised that my time was 
far better spent sampling and organising my schedule of interviews and visits for the 
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coming days. This ensured that my in-country productivity was maximised. All 
interviews were fully transcribed as soon as possible upon returning to Singapore. As 
explained above, in order to treat the opinions and identities of the research 
participants with utmost confidentiality (important given the acts of persecution such 
individuals have experienced, and the often illicit nature of evangelical competition), 
the interview data is presented with a healthy degree of abstraction. All names (even 
pseudonyms) of individuals and organisations, and specific locational identifiers have 
been omitted; what remains is an acronym to signify the type of organisation the 
respondent represents (Evangelical Church, Evangelical Parachurch, Christian NGO, 
Christian Convert, Mainline Church, Buddhist Organisation, Urban Development 
Authority), and a locational identifier at the district level: Colombo (Western 
Province); Galle, Matara, Hambantota (Southern); Kandy, Nuwara Eliya (Central); 
Vavuniya (Northern); Trincomalee (Eastern) (see Table 2 and Figure 2, below). 
Quotations included in the thesis were selected based on how representative they are 
of broader opinion, and on clarity of expression.  
 
Table 2 provides a top-level overview of the interview sample by location and 
organisation type. 
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Table 2 shows that 45.3% of all interviews conducted were with representatives of 
evangelical churches, and 72.6% with evangelicals across all organisational 
categories. Such bias is intentional, given the need to understand as well as possible 
the strategies and outcomes of evangelism that form the backbone of this research. 
Moreover, the concentration of evangelical activity in Colombo accounts for its 
dominance in interview location (50%), followed by the Southern and Central 
Provinces (18.8% each). Relatively fewer interviews were conducted in the Northern 
(7.5%) and Eastern (4.7%) Provinces for reasons outlined below. What Table 2 does 
not reflect are the supplementary data sources that were used to complement the 
interview data. These included site visits, document verification and event attendance, 




Observations complemented the interview data, and helped to ground the study in the 
lived reality of evangelical space. The necessity of observing the spatial practices and 
determinants of evangelical organisations is that it is ‘probably the only way in which 
we could ever understand the reality of religion as practised by ordinary individuals’ 
(Stringer 2008: 19). Observing the performative aspect of evangelism helped to build 
an understanding of how organisations introduced and enforced strategies of 
evangelism through their spatial practices. The primary form of observation (besides 
those of local religious landscapes and iconography) was evangelical worship 
services, which ranged from attending one of Colombo’s megachurches (see Figures 
3 and 4, below) to numerous house church services and prayer meetings located in 
Nuwara Eliya’s estate lines (see Figures 7 and 8, below – also Martin 1990: 185-204). 
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Whilst attending “formal” church services (i.e. those held in registered church 
buildings) was a straightforward, and often fairly impersonal, process, attending a 
house church was often predicated on being invited by the pastor responsible for 
conducting the service. In Nuwara Eliya, where I attended nearly ten such services, 
this involved long, precarious, and often very uncomfortable, rides on the back of a 
motorbike along the rocky paths that have been carved through the region’s tea 
estates. Without the willingness of the pastors to chaperone me in such a way, 
accessing the estate lines (explained below – see Figure 7) would have been 
impossible. For all services, I positioned myself at the back or side of the room so that 
my presence would provide as little unnecessary disruption as possible. Whilst for 
megachurch services this was easily achieved, for house church services (which 
ranged from five to approximately fifty people), the disruption caused by my 
attendance was unavoidable (especially seeing as I was often formally introduced by 
the pastor in charge). Nevertheless, I remained a non-participatory observer of the 
proceedings – something that was made possible by the fact that all house church 
services were in the vernacular.   
 
In addition to church services and prayer meetings, I also spent time at the premises 
of Christian NGOs, especially those that focussed on youths and children through the 
provision of youth clubs, feeding centres, Montessori schools (and other educational 
facilities) and orphanages. Each interview also provided opportunity for observation; 
those conducted in churches enabled me to gain a snapshot of the day-to-day 
operations of evangelical churches. What adorned the walls, who interrupted the 
meeting (and with what news), what was displayed on tables, shelves, or cabinets, and 
other such banal information, was noted and often discussed during interviews, and 
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provided an innocuous means of gaining a deeper, more applied, understanding of 
evangelical strategies and motivations. Going beyond these more formalised spaces of 
evangelical activity, consideration was also given to those of a more informal, 
symbolic and ad hoc nature. The public display of Christian signs, banners or 
messages and informal networking that arises during Christian-Buddhist/Hindu 
interactions was observed. To clarify what I mean by “informal networking”, when 
walking between estate lines with a pastor in Nuwara Eliya, we encountered a 
Tamil/Hindu lady who had injured her foot and was therefore unable to work. During 
the course of the discussion, the pastor offered to pray for her, an offer that was 
refused on the grounds that it made her uncomfortable. This exchange is an example 
of informal networking, as it brings to light the often-opportunistic nature of Christian 
interaction, and the unease that it can create amongst non-Christians.  
 
Finally, I also observed latent, and overt, forms of structural and direct resistance to 
the spaces within which evangelism occurs. Whereas structural resistance was 
discerned through an interpretation of the social landscape and/or built environment 
(e.g. the construction of Buddhist shrines or flying of flags in front of churches – see 
Chapter 6), direct resistance involved more everyday experiences, such as the playing 
of non-Christian music or Buddhist chanting during services. Observations therefore 
served to expose both how evangelical organisations use space to evangelise (thus 
resisting the dominant Buddhist order), and how evangelism is resisted through the 
counter-use and counter-meaning of space. For all observations, photographs and 
field notes were taken and analysed. As the observational part of the research was 
ongoing, and very unstructured, it is difficult, and disingenuous to present it in tabular 
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format. Instead, I have absorbed the observational data into the discussion where 
necessary in order to illustrate certain ideas or arguments more clearly.  
 
3.6 Research sites 
 
Fieldwork was conducted in eight districts and five provinces located throughout the 
island: Colombo (Western Province); Galle, Matara, Hambantota (Southern); Kandy, 
Nuwara Eliya (Central); Vavuniya (Northern); and Trincomalee (Eastern). Whilst 
most of the fieldwork was conducted in Colombo (where, as previously discussed, 
evangelical groups are concentrated and networks of island-wide evangelical churches 
and outreach programmes co-ordinated), a range of structural contexts and 
expressions of Christian agency were captured. These included the Buddhist 
strongholds of the south (which was also badly affected by the 2004 Asian tsunami) 
and Kandy, to the impoverished tea estates of Nuwara Eliya, and post-war 
reconstruction in Vavuniya and Trincomalee. I am confident that these research sites 
capture the full gamut of evangelical agency and structural resistance experienced 
throughout the country. The only site I intended to visit, but was excluded from the 
study, was the town of Jaffna, located in the far north of the country. At the time of 
fieldwork, Jaffna was still relatively closed to foreigners, who required a letter of 
approval from the Ministry of Defence and were only allowed to fly into Jaffna from 
Colombo. In my evaluation of the situation, the time and cost of visiting Jaffna 
outweighed the benefits of including the site in the research. In addition, I was 
unwilling to jeopardise my work in the other sites, particularly the Central and 
Southern Provinces, where opportunities for sampling (especially outside of the 
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evangelical community) and observations were readily available, and subsequently 
elicited some of the richest data.    
 
Field sites were selected based on coverage, and were decided during the Colombo 
stage of fieldwork. Being a country-level study of evangelical Christian growth, I 
actively sought field sites that covered the country’s territorial extremities, whilst also 
being representative of some of the different and variegated contexts in which 
evangelical churches operate throughout the island. Figure 2, below, highlights the 
eight districts in which I conducted research. Whilst the majority of research was 
conducted in the capital of each district, where churches are more clustered and 
therefore more amenable to sampling, in some areas (particularly in the Southern 
Province and Nuwara Eliya, where churches tend to be more spatially dispersed), I 
also conducted ad hoc interviews outside of the district capitals when necessary.  
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Figure 2: Map showing field sites at the district level in Sri Lanka 
 
In order to gain an understanding of the characteristics and contextual nuances of the 
eight districts, they shall now be introduced at the provincial level.  
 
3.6.1 Colombo and the Western Province 
 
Colombo is Sri Lanka’s administrative capital, and is very much the engine of 
evangelical Christian growth in Sri Lanka (see Chapter 5). It has the largest number of 
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evangelical Christians (and, correspondingly, the largest number of evangelical 
churches) in the country, and is therefore the primary nodal point for the country’s 
evangelical community. In Colombo, the evangelical community is perceived to be 
strong, which is part testament to the congruity of Christianity and modernity (with 
Colombo being further along the path of modernity than any other Sri Lankan town or 
city), and part reflection of the diminished role of Buddhism in more urbane, and 
therefore less parochial, contexts. More affluent congregations mean churches are 
typically wealthier, and more financially stable and secure than their rural 
counterparts. The country’s largest evangelical denominations – such as the 
Assemblies of God and the Calvary Church – are highly visible, and have a well-
established presence in Colombo. Represented by large and impressive buildings, 
both churches are two of the most recognisable symbols of the evangelical Christian 
community (see Figures 3 and 4, below). The People’s Church, for example, is 
Colombo’s (indeed, Sri Lanka’s) foremost evangelical church and flagship for the 
Assemblies of God, and can accommodate a congregation numbering in the 
thousands. On Sundays it operates a free bus service that ferries Colombo’s slum 
dwellers to and from the church, nullifying the obstacle of distance and cost of travel 
that prevents some Christians from attending church (a problem faced by many 
smaller churches). Its influence is also unsurpassed, with members of the 
congregation including government ministers and several high-ranking business 
executives. In this sense the People’s Church is a symbol of evangelical strength and 
embeddedness that visibly cuts across ethnic, economic, social and political divisions.  
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Figure 3: Inside the People’s Church, Colombo 
One of the country’s two “megachurches”, the People’s Church attracts a large, and 
influential, following. 
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Figure 4: The external façade of the Calvary Church, Colombo. 
Along with the People’s Church, the Calvary Church is an evangelical Christian 
landmark in Sri Lanka. 
 
A majority of time was spent in Colombo, and exactly 50% of the interview data are 
derived from Colombo-based informants. This was intentional, as Colombo contains 
not only the highest density of evangelical churches in the country, but also the 
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biggest range of organisations that I could approach, which explains why it is the 
most heterogeneous sampling site. Pragmatically speaking, it was also easiest to 
sample in Colombo, as informants tended to be more visible, easily contactable 
(either via phone or email) and readily interviewed (i.e. standards of English are 
higher, and travelling distances lower, making them more accessible). As previously 
discussed, Colombo was also the starting point for nation-wide snowball sampling, 
meaning the development of strong and plentiful contacts in Colombo made the 
process of sampling in other areas noticeably easier.  
 
3.6.2 The Southern Province 
 
The Southern Province, which is made up of the districts of Galle, Matara and 
Hambantota, is the epicentre of Christian-Buddhist tensions, and the engine of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. It is defined by ethnic and religious homogeneity and 
is where fundamentalist Buddhist rhetoric is fomented, and enacted. As a result, it is a 
difficult place for evangelical churches to establish themselves and grow, with 
strategies of evangelism being longer-term and more reactive than elsewhere in the 
country. Churches are typically dispersed (except in the coastal towns of Galle and 
Matara, where research was primarily conducted), and the distances between them 
great. Attacks against southern-based churches are typically more frequent and violent 
than elsewhere. The southern coastline is a popular tourist destination, and is heavily 
populated with resorts, bars and hotels. Pastors labelled tourist “hotspots” – 
Hikkaduwa, Galle Fort and Unawatuna, for example – as being ridden with “sin” and 
plagued by alcohol, drugs, prostitution and homosexuality. This stands in contrast to 
the interior, which is populated with small towns and villages, and is believed to be a 
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bastion of Sinhala-Buddhist culture and values. The 2004 Asian tsunami severely 
affected the southern coastal region, causing widespread upheaval. Responses from 
the international and domestic evangelical communities were swift and decisive, and 
brought to the surface many of the issues that galvanise Christian-Buddhist tensions. 
These issues are covered in more detail in the ensuing chapters. Notably, the tsunami 
caused a resurgence in Buddhist religiosity in many southern coastal towns, with such 
resurgence being manifested in the recent (re)construction of Buddhist statues and 
shrines (see Figure 5, below).  
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Figure 5: A sign of Buddhist religiosity in Galle?  
Statues like this are abundantly visible in Galle’s town centre, although Christian 
sceptics often question the motivations behind their construction (see Chapter 6). 
 
My time in the Southern Province was split almost equally among churches located in 
the coastal towns, and those in the interior. The long distances I had to travel in order 
to reach churches (especially those located in the interior) meant that a whole day 
would typically be spent visiting just one church. Interviews were usually longer, 
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more informal (as they were often conducted after I had eaten lunch with my 
informants, during which time rapport was quickly and easily built) and often had 
various other informants dropping in and out to add opinions, stories or thoughts. This 
was in contradistinction to the two or three interviews I would conduct per day in 
areas where evangelical activity tended to be more concentrated (and/or accessible), 
such as Colombo and the Central Province. As a result, the research I conducted in the 
Southern Province was more participatory than elsewhere, and often elicited more 
multi-layered responses that incorporated aspects of religion, culture, history and 
personal narrative. Language, and access to translators, was a more common problem 
in the Southern Province than it was in Colombo and the Central Province, which 
served to slightly restrict the sampling process.  
 
3.6.3 The Central Province 
 
A cooler climate, undulating terrain and a highly stratified population define the 
Central Province. Research was conducted in two of the province’s three districts: 
Kandy and Nuwara Eliya. Kandy is the cultural heart of Buddhism, and was the last 
capital city of the Sri Lankan kings. Currently the administrative capital of the Central 
Province and UNESCO world heritage site since 1988, it is home to the ancient 
Temple of the Tooth Relic (causing one interviewee to describe Kandy as “the 
Vatican of Buddhism” – see Figure 6, below), and the annual Esala Perahera (“The 
Festival of the Tooth”). Like the coastal towns of the Southern Province, Kandy’s 
popularity as a tourist destination, not to mention its strong Buddhist heritage, has 
also rendered it a place of “sin” in the Christian imagination, one that presents both 
problems and opportunities for the city’s evangelical community. Whilst the 
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opportunities are self-evident and often couched in the language of salvation and 
moral upliftment, the problems provide more interesting insights into how pastors 
conveniently appropriate local discourses as justification of action. Anecdotal 
evidence of evangelical pastors committing adultery, drinking alcohol, appropriating 
church funds for personal use and falling out with other pastors (leading to church 
fission, which is covered in Chapter 6) are rife, and attributed to, even reflective of, 
the power of “sin” in Kandy.  
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Figure 6: Kandy – “the Vatican of Buddhism” – at dusk  
In the background, on top of the hill, is the Bihiravokanda Buddha statue, which 
overlooks the city, and is a constant reminder of Buddhism’s “foremost place”, 
according to the Sri Lankan Constitution. 
 
Whilst Kandy is the administrative capital of the Central Province, Nuwara Eliya is 
the epicentre of Sri Lanka’s tea producing industry. Nuwara Eliya’s town centre 
features a mix of Sinhala businesspeople and Tamil labourers, whereas the 
surrounding tea estates are homogeneously Tamil-Hindu, and are populated by tea 
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planters and pluckers. Brought to Sri Lanka by the British from Southern India as 
indentured labourers during the colonial epoch, such “Hill Country Tamils” (whose 
more immediate ancestral ties with India render them qualitatively different from the 
Tamils living in the Northern and Eastern Provinces) work on the country’s tea estates 
and live in close-knit, yet often isolated communities. Hinduism prevails, and is 
becoming increasingly belligerent in resisting Christian proselytism. This echoes the 
problems faced by pastors in the Southern Province, where Buddhism dominates. 
Estate workers are housed in “estate lines” (see Figures 7 and 8, below); rows of 
squalid housing, arranged along terraces that are cramped and unhygienic, and have 
led to the formation of close-knit communities that are resistant to change. Without a 
motorcycle, it can take hours to walk from an estate line to a main road in order to 
catch a bus into Nuwara Eliya or any other town, making each estate line, and each 
estate, a highly self-sufficient, yet often introverted, community.  
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Figure 7: An estate line in Nuwara Eliya 
Note the khovil (Hindu temple) to the left of the picture; the undulating terrain causes 
tight spatial clustering, meaning Christians and Hindus live, and worship, cheek by 
jowl. 
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Figure 8: Inside the estate lines  
Conditions are typically cramped and squalid, with multiple family members sharing 
one room; communal cooking and bathing facilities are shared with neighbours. 
 
My time in the Central Province was split equally between Kandy and Nuwara Eliya. 
The tight spatial clustering of evangelical churches and activities caused by the terrain 
catalyses the interactions between pastors and their congregations, between churches 
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and between religions, and in Nuwara Eliya enabled multiple observations to be made 
of house church services and prayer meetings. In Kandy, a number of interviews were 
conducted with Buddhists who represented organisations proclaiming an anti-
Christian/conversion stance, alongside the focus on evangelical organisations. In 
Nuwara Eliya, interviews with local evangelical representatives were complemented 
by insights gained from an American Christian missionary, whose outsider 
perspective on Christianity in Sri Lanka proved to be invaluable.  
 
3.6.4 The Northern and Eastern Provinces 
 
The Northern and Eastern provinces are home to the country’s largest ethnic minority 
group: the Tamils. Being the frontline of the three decade long civil war, they are sites 
of political degradation and are now populated with refugee camps, landmines and 
resettlement villages. Vavuniya is primarily a logistics hub, bustling with NGOs and 
relief workers delivering aid and other supplies throughout the Vanni region (an area 
in the north of Sri Lanka that encompasses the districts of Mannar, Mullaitivu and 
Vavuniya). There is also a strong military presence, with the Sri Lankan Air Force 
operating a large base along one of the main approach roads to Vavuniya town. The 
region is one of change and impermanence, where decades of fighting have resulted 
in thousands of people being dispossessed, killed or relocated. Slowly, normalcy is 
being restored. New resettlement villages are being built, families are regrouping, and 
Christian groups are seizing opportunities to evangelise and establish themselves 
before the region fully stabilises. Here, religion and relief operate in conjunction with 
each other; a dynamic that is explored in Chapter 4.  
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In Trincomalee, the situation is slightly different. Being a strategic port with a rich 
religious history, it has, over recent years, been occupied by both LTTE and 
government forces. Like the coastal towns of the Southern Province after the tsunami, 
the cessation of hostilities has resulted in more overt expressions of Hindu religiosity, 
in particular the (re)building of khovils and shrines by affluent benefactors (see Figure 
9, below), and regular, large-scale Hindu processions. The town also has a significant, 
and clearly segregated, Muslim population. Like the Muslim quarters, evangelical 
churches are spatially clustered, and are also active at the district level.  
 
	  
Figure 9: (Re)building Hinduism in Trincomalee  
Like in Galle, the (re)construction of religion is big business in Trincomalee, with 
khovils and other Hindu artefacts emerging throughout the town. 
 
Conducting fieldwork in Vavuniya and Trincomalee proved to be the most difficult of 
all the field sites, and explains why these two areas account for the lowest proportion 
of interviews overall. In Vavuniya, mobility was a real problem: churches are 
spatially dispersed (and unconnected via public transport), and overwhelmingly 
home-based, which meant that finding them was difficult without close guidance from 
the pastor in charge. Refugee camps were still out of bounds to foreigners due to 
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international scrutiny at the time surrounding allegations of human rights abuses 
perpetrated during the war, in which the camps featured prominently (see Weiss 
2011). In both locations, language, and access to suitable translators, was another 
problem. Unlike in the Southern Province, however, this did not dampen the 
enthusiasm of informants to be interviewed, but in some instances it did compromise 
the quality of data that were collected.  
 
3.7 Summary  
 
This chapter has outlined the empirical context and methodological approach that 
guided the fieldwork and data collection. The first part of the chapter focussed on Sri 
Lanka’s contested religious marketplace. I explained how, since the colonial epoch, 
the proliferation of right-wing Buddhist groups (of which the Jathika Hela Urumaya is 
a contemporary example) has seen a rise in religious protectionism, and the 
development of the exclusionist political ideology of Sinhalatva. The Prohibition of 
Forcible Conversion Bill, proposed in 2004, provides one of the most recent attempts 
at religious protectionism and, irrespective or whether it is passed or not, has severe 
implications for the religious freedom of all. Following that I discussed the 
oligopolistic nature of Sri Lanka’s religious marketplace, showing how the 
Constitution grants Buddhism the “foremost place” yet grants other religions freedom 
of expression. I argued that, because many evangelical Christian groups are not 
formally recognised by the state, and often operate outside of regulatory boundaries, 
there is an important distinction between the formal (of state-sanctioned religions) and 
informal (of non-recognised religions) religious economies.  
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The second part of the chapter focussed on methodology, methods and research sites. 
I explained that a critical ethnographic approach was adopted on the grounds that it 
unsettles taken-for-granted assumptions, and therefore encourages critical 
engagement with existing understandings of religious growth. Following that I 
explored cross-cultural research ethics, in particular highlighting the unique value of 
ethnic difference (as opposed to sameness) in building trust, and the hitherto 
unrecognised role of performativity in either disrupting or enhancing the effect of 
researcher positionality. In line with the aims of the research (i.e. to understand 
organisational strategies of evangelism), I showed how the sampling framework 
followed a strong organisational path, privileging the opinions of “elites” over 
“laypersons”, yet incorporating a range of stakeholders, both religious and secular, 
Christian and non-Christian. I then explained that the use of qualitative methods – in-
depth interviews and observations – provides a significant and necessary departure 
from existing, often quantitative studies of religious growth. Finally, I introduced the 
various research sites around the island, all of which reflect different structural 
contexts that, to a greater or lesser extent, influence the activities of the evangelical 
groups operating therein.  
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CHAPTER 4: REALISING EVANGELICAL AGENCY WITHIN A 




This chapter engages with the fundamental problem facing evangelical groups 
operating in the 10/40 Window, that is, how agency can be expressed and 
competitiveness maintained in a context that is structurally hostile to Christianity. 
Around the world entrepreneurial religious groups have become adept at co-existing 
alongside monolithic encampments of religious hegemons; often subverting them for 
their own competitive gain (see Miller and Yamamori 2007; Grim 2009). Yet the 
attention paid to the competitive resilience and growth of groups operating within 
such contexts has been cursory, with the case of evangelical Christian growth in Sri 
Lanka being symptomatic of such neglect (see Stirrat 1998: 165). Thus despite Hill 
and Olson’s (2009: 631) assertion that ‘unfortunately, it is not very clear what 
religious competition is’, for the purposes of this chapter competitiveness is simply 
taken to be a measure of the efficacy of evangelical groups to grow numerically (in 
terms of conversion and the planting of churches), and to withstand the regulatory 
checks that are designed to control (often limit) such growth. Such checks define 
structurally hostile environments, and often predicate the need for more innovative 
strategies of evangelism.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to explain how evangelical agency is realised in Sri Lanka. I 
start by introducing the motivational drivers of evangelical groups, and show how 
such drivers stimulate competitive action, rather than withdrawal. Focussing 
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specifically on the competitive actions of such groups, I go on to explain how existing 
understandings of religious economy fail to account for such pervasive forms of 
competitiveness. I suggest that a relational model of competitiveness provides a 
cogent explanation of evangelical Christian growth within the restrictive religious 
marketplace of Sri Lanka. The model is based on the observation made in Chapter 3 
that, in Sri Lanka, an informal religious economy exists; one that is not formally 
recognised by the state, closely regulated, but is defined by persistent forms of 
evangelical competitiveness. I explore the patterns of secrecy and subterfuge, the role 
of foreign catalysts and the strategic extra- and intra-group networks of influence that 
enable evangelical groups to remain competitive. Finally, I show how evangelical 
groups use the structural mosaic as part of their strategies of Christian co-optation (i.e. 
for groups to engage society and gain acceptance) and influence (i.e. to express 
Christian agency).  
 
4.2 Scalar determinations and dissident geopolitics 
 
First it is necessary to examine the scalar determinations of evangelical groups. Doing 
so will bring to light the motivations that exacerbate the asynchronous relationship 
between the regulators (Buddhist) and the regulated (Christian) in Sri Lanka. 
Evangelical Christian groups are defined by the resolutely geopolitical ambition to 
“make disciples of all nations19”. In doing so they practice what Bryant and Lamb 
(1999: 8) term the ‘ideology of mission’ whereby religious domination (expressed in 
terms of “salvation”) is the ultimate goal. Ideologically they transcend the boundaries 
imposed by the state and enforced by indigenous religious groups by actively seeking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 These are the words of the resurrected Jesus Christ to his disciples; known as The Great 
Commission, it is a central Christian tenet and key justification for mission work and evangelism (see 
Chapter 1). 
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to baptise people into a trans-ethnic, trans-territorial faith community. Constructing a 
higher level of authorisation validates Christian claims to local religious markets, and 
challenges the regulatory controls that seek to contain their growth. West (2006: 280) 
has shown how, in Turkey, Islamic social and political movements do not ‘oppose the 
actions of any particular state’ but instead subordinate the state ‘to a functional role 
within a transcendental order defined by a religious faith’. Referred to as “dissident 
geopolitics”, the actions of evangelical groups are similarly driven by transcendental 
motives that, where necessary, show invariance towards the state, religious hegemons, 
and the territorial sovereignty claimed by each.  
 
Dissident geopolitics is grounded in action at the micro-scale. Sri Lanka’s evangelical 
community relies on a transcendental order (or, as one mainline pastor put it: “they 
claim a monopoly of truth”) to validate their marginal position in society. Such an 
order informs how they compete, and remain competitive, on a day-to-day basis. One 
evangelical pastor in the northeast of the island resolutely stated that “we don’t think 
that power is in the majority; we believe power is in God” (Evangelical Church, 
Vavuniya). Blinkered views of power like this immediately problematise the efficacy 
of regulatory controls seeking to curtail the freedom of evangelical groups. Opinions 
surrounding the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill, for example, bring to light 
how the law of the bible transcends that of the state. An exchange with a pastor of a 
mainline church in Colombo draws out the tension between secular and biblical law 
well: 
 
Until lately I was very worried about this [the Bill], and, oh my goodness, 
what’s going to happen? But, you know, if I believe in the sovereignty of God 
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and if I believe in a living God who is Almighty, I mean, what is this? Big, 
big, big nonsense… I believe in a God that is much greater than our 
[humanity’s] puny efforts to stifle opposition.  
If it is passed, will it affect what you do? 
Yes.  
Will you change? 
I won’t change what I’m doing.  
Even if that means being punished by the law? 
Yes.  
 
Sentiment like this was echoed across all churches and geographies. Perceived 
discrimination against the actions of evangelical groups, and the re-framing of 
domestic matters within a broader, biblical schema, reflects defiance to an unjust 
state, and an unjust law: “we are making a storm of a gentle breeze… the law is 
against the bible: I am ruled by a higher law in that sense” (Mainline Church, 
Colombo); “we are not worried about these phrases called “unethical conversion”: we 
are here to convert and we will do it – that [the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion 
Bill] will not deter us” (Evangelical Parachurch, Galle). Transcendental motivations 
encourage a more relativised interpretation of civil law; with one Buddhist 
interviewee accurately claiming that “they [evangelical Christians] become a law unto 
themselves” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). This, I argue, encourages (often 
violent) responses from anti-Christian groups, and highlights the fact that evangelical 
groups would rather face recriminative action than compromise their biblical rights.  
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Whilst responses to the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill remain discursive, the 
razing of churches poses a more immediate, and real problem. Places of religion hold 
a sanctified, and highly symbolic, position in Sri Lankan culture. Physical attacks 
against churches hold a significance that extend beyond the building itself; they 
represent an ideological affront to the spatial encroachment of marginal groups at the 
expense of the dominant religious order. Such meaning is, however, lost on 
evangelical churches, whose dissidence stems from a competing construction of 
religious place: “for us a church cannot be burned down, or broken down by human 
hands because [a church is] people gathered together and not buildings; buildings 
don’t mean a thing” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). Here, as in the example 
above, the dismissive reference to the regulatory power of humans (“our puny efforts 
to stifle opposition” and “broken down by human hands” respectively) is ridiculed 
when framed within the Christian transcendental order. Not only does the 
transcendental order legitimise acts of defiance against Buddhist antagonism, it also 
stimulates a drive to realise Christianity’s geopolitical vision, irrespective of the 
consequences.  
 
It is this disregard to the consequences of their actions that contributes to an image of 
Christian defiance. Acts of defiance characterise the evangelical movement, and 
appear to convey a message of resilience and unwavering commitment to Christian 
growth. Such defiance can be extreme, and often becomes a form of self-fulfilling 
rhetoric: “thank God we are safe, but if they attack even, we still have to do the 
ministry here” (Evangelical Church, Galle); “I am ready to give my life because God 
has called me to th[e] ministry; I am ready to give any time, my wife also” 
(Evangelical Church, Nuwara Eliya). Indeed numerous, and often well publicised, 
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examples of physical violence perpetrated against Christians adds depth and meaning 
to such outward projections of defiance. By challenging the ideological hegemony of 
Sri Lankan Buddhist exclusivism in such a way, evangelical groups create, occupy 
and maintain a space of resistance, which casts doubt over Fox’s (1999: 290) 
assertion that ‘the main goal of the adherents of these [i.e. resistant] religions is 
survival and they usually do not attempt to spread their influence outside of their own 
geographical and social milieu’. To the contrary, an evangelical remit mandates such 
groups to spread their influence as far as possible. The disregard granted to their 
“survival” and physical safety strengthens commitment to Christianity, and increases 
their influence, rather than diminishing it. A strong message of persecution is 
communicated to the international Christian community in particular, which typically 
responds in a manner that is in disproportion to the original need (see the “Foreign 
catalysts” section below).  
 
Having established the motivational drivers behind Christian competitiveness, it is 
now necessary to examine how such motivation is translated into action at the local 
level. To do so, using religious economy principles, I argue that a relational model of 
Christian competitiveness exists in Sri Lanka, as outlined below.  
 
4.3 A relational model of Christian competitiveness  
 
Normative understandings of competitiveness in a religious economy assume a high 
degree of synchronicity between the regulators (the monopoly) and the regulated (the 
minorities). Monopolies make it difficult for competitors to compete, so they stop 
competing with the same degree of voracity. Causal relationships like this are rare, 
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especially in the oligopolistic marketplace. Instead, I argue that a relational model of 
competitiveness will encourage an understanding of how groups vary the type of 
competitive strategies they employ in order to overcome restrictions on growth. More 
specifically, I suggest that as regulation increases, minority players operate in 
increasingly covert (or informal) ways. Such a dynamic is evident throughout Sri 
Lanka; areas of strong Christian opposition precipitate a shift towards secrecy, which 
see evangelical groups continuing to work, albeit “very quietly” (Evangelical Church, 
Nuwara Eliya), also referred to in one area as “the silent work” (Evangelical 
Parachurch, Vavuniya). Conversely, deregulation results in more overt – and therefore 
visible, and measurable – forms of inter-religious competition (e.g. more public 
displays of Christian religiosity, as shown by buildings, banners and outreach). 
Accordingly, rather than regulation determining the outcomes of competition, I argue 
that regulation determines the type of competition that minority groups employ in 
order to operate independently of a regulatory environment that seeks to restrict 
autonomous action. Put differently, the model explains how evangelical groups 
remain competitive, despite being embedded within punitive structures of power, 
regulation, and control. 
 
Beyond religious economy theorisations, existing understandings of the 
competitiveness of evangelical groups tend to be descriptive, and divorced from the 
socio-religious structures in which they are embedded. As I argued in Chapter 2, the 
evangelical organisation has been treated as a key arbiter of change, with existing 
work pointing to the structural flexibility and decentralised nature of evangelical 
groups in particular (e.g. Gerlach and Hine 1968). Characteristics like these, which by 
now are widely accepted as catalysts of growth, do, however, take on different forms 
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and meanings in different religious contexts. Martin’s (2002: 154, 6) recognition that 
such groups are ‘freewheeling religious entrepreneurs’ that often employ ‘ingeniously 
pragmatic’ ways of circumnavigating regulatory frameworks and engaging with 
society provides a more relational perspective, but can go further to show how 
strategies used to remain competitive are formed in response to the structural forces 
that inhibit growth. Whilst I do not suggest that evangelical vigour is diminished or 
nullified in any way, it does take on different forms that are sensitive to, and therefore 
reflective of, the broader workings of the religious economy. Below I introduce three 
of the most salient characteristics of evangelical groups that are looking to consolidate 
and improve their market share under oligopolistic conditions: patterns of secrecy and 
subterfuge to help overcome boundaries to growth, the role of foreign catalysts, and 
strategic extra- and intra-group networks of influence.  
 
4.4 Overcoming boundaries: patterns of secrecy and subterfuge 
 
Throughout the 10/40 Window, evangelical groups are both a cause and focus of anti-
Christian suspicion and animosity. As a result, evangelical groups are subject to close 
surveillance, a dynamic that is evident not just in Sri Lanka, but also in countries like 
Indonesia (McGregor 2010: 738) and Bangladesh (Ahmad 2005) as well. In light of 
this, a core proposition of the relational model of competitiveness is that, in a context 
where a minority group faces repression, they will remain competitive by acting in 
increasingly covert ways. Such actions can be subdivided into those defined by 
secrecy (i.e. being intentionally discreet) and subterfuge (i.e. being intentionally 
misleading). Past studies speak of religion and secrecy in terms of information (e.g. 
Bok 1989; Barkun 2006), whereas the focus here is on action. The differences 
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between secrecy and subterfuge are inconclusive, and most actions contain elements 
of both; hence they need to be examined in tandem. Three patterns in particular help 
Christian groups overcome boundaries to growth in Sri Lanka: the (in)visibility of 
evangelical Christian presence, the willingness to mobilise and deploy the laity and 
innovative strategies of spatial diffusion. More specifically, I explore how evangelical 
groups often eschew the expected trappings of Christian identity, such as church 
buildings and religious dress, in order to avoid surveillance and suspicion; how 
groups rely heavily on the laity to evangelise and increase their sphere of influence; 
and how telephone and CD ministries are examples of two particularly innovative, 
and effective, strategies of spatial diffusion.   
 
4.4.1 The (in)visibility of evangelical Christian presence 
 
Throughout Sri Lanka, the religious infrastructure of the evangelical movement – that 
is, the churches that act as a central gathering place for congregations – is 
overwhelmingly inconspicuous. Houses are commonly used to hold worship services. 
In a country where religious buildings are easily identified, and respected, the house 
church eradicates any outward signs of evangelical competitiveness, meaning: “they 
[Buddhists] cannot piece us together because we don’t have visible buildings, the 
church architecture is not there” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). At the same time as 
being biblically justified according to the New Testament bias of evangelical groups, 
the use of house churches also serves an eminently practical purpose by “tend[ing] to 
go more under the radar in the sense that they operate in that grey area” (Evangelical 
Church, Galle). The “grey area” of the house church is replete with tension, yet 
remains an uncompromising source of competitive strength, and growth, for 
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evangelical groups: “you can actually be more aggressive in entering into a non-
Christian area when you go into a house… it’s a very low cost crusade; and you can 
do it every week” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). Whilst the main difference 
between “house” and “church” is its outward, physical appearance, some pastors use 
simple semantics to confuse people into misinterpreting the church: “a lot of pastors I 
told, don’t tell anyone we are making church, tell people we are making a worship 
centre… people can’t understand what is that worship centre” (Evangelical Church, 
Nuwara Eliya). In this instance, the fact that “people can’t understand what is that 
worship centre” parallels the fact that many cannot understand the concept of a house 
church, a problem that is explored in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
Such an informal approach to religious growth is clearly articulated in the church 
planting strategies of Christian groups. The following example shows how church 
planting, and growth, is intended to be as unobtrusive and misleading as possible: 
 
We [the church] buy a house, and we station an evangelist there. And maybe 
[for the] first six months he doesn’t do anything, any evangelism. He just 
stay[s] there, pray[s], and ha[s] a relationship with the people, building up a 
relationship with the people. Sometimes we allow him to work somewhere, 
because otherwise people ask ‘what are you doing here?’ So sometimes we 
allow him to work somewhere, so he can say that ‘I’m working, that’s why 
I’m here’. So gradually he has to build up a rapport with the people. And then, 
at once we cannot have services in that house, we have to have services in 
believer’s houses (Mainline Church, Colombo). 
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What is evident from this example is the overriding need to disguise the Christian 
identity of the pastor, to the extent that he is encouraged to take up secular 
employment in order to arrest speculation and suspicion. Indeed, the need to disguise 
the pastor’s motivations for moving there (“he can say that ‘I’m working, that’s why 
I’m here’”) provides a clear example of the necessity for subterfuge that is an integral 
part of evangelical growth strategies. Also notable is the empowerment of the laity 
from the outset; in this case, using their houses to hold church services.  
 
Apart from the religious infrastructure of the house church, a distinguishing feature of 
evangelical clergy is their nondescript appearance, which stands in contrast to their 
religious counterparts. As Henkel and Sakaja (2009: 52) recognise in their discussion 
of the growth of the Baptist Church in Croatia, a ‘strategy of invisibility’ is needed to 
‘avoi[d] potential conflicts implicit in the negative stereotypes’ that may be associated 
with religious dress, and other attributes of religion. Besides the potential for such 
negative stereotyping, in Sri Lanka the problem of religious dress is more paradoxical 
in nature, given that religious dress, and conformity in dress, is held in high regard, 
irrespective of religious affiliation. The vast majority of evangelical pastors eschew 
the cassock, collar, or any other such identifiers as they attract attention, making their 
actions more visible, and more restrictive: “if you identify yourself as a clergyman, 
then the clergyman becomes isolated; people will treat him with respect, but they will 
keep a distance from him” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). Such a dynamic is more 
pronounced in the rural areas, especially those in the south, where one pastor 
explained how: “people would never sit and eat with me because I’m a pastor… You 
see they have this clergy, they have this religious hierarchical mentality, it comes 
from Buddhism… where you honour the robe more than the person” (Evangelical 
	   121	  
Church, Galle). Power distance (or a “religious hierarchical mentality”) poses a 
problem for evangelists looking to build strong social bonds with people as part of the 
process of proselytisation. In addition, religious dress not only elevates the pastor 
above the people they are trying to ingratiate themselves with, but it also allows for 
easy surveillance from non-Christian groups. The need to avoid surveillance is 
especially pronounced in rural villages, which tend to be more homogeneous, 
traditional, and resistant to change than urban society. In order for churches to be 
planted and to grow in such areas, dress becomes a strategy of subterfuge that 
removes any visible trace of the encroachment of minority groups: 
 
There are a lot of villages that Buddhist monk has told that they will not allow 
any [Christian] pastor to come into this village. So if I go with a cassock or 
collar, definitely the news will go very quickly to that Buddhist monk that 
pastor has come to the village; so it’s very difficult for me to go and serve 
there. So normally when I go to that village I remove the board of the church 
from the man, and I just go casually and have prayer meetings (Mainline 
Church, Colombo). 
 
The need to “remove” the physical trappings of Christianity is in contrast to 
evangelical pastors, whose dissident style is dictated by the rejection of Old 
Testament principles of religious dress. Indeed, most evangelical pastors choose not 
to dress in a way that reveals their religious identity or position to society; a choice 
that contrasts with the high visibility of monks and other religious leaders in Sri 
Lanka. Adopting a more transgressive, and less defined religious identity does not 
stop with the clergy. Converts are discouraged from identifying themselves as 
	   122	  
Christian – “it is unnecessary to change your label, because there are issues of 
community and identity” – with the evangelical leadership being keen to obfuscate 
their numerical position: “the vast part of the evangelical church decided that we 
would much rather they [Christian converts] actually put their birth religion than their 
new faith [for the purposes of census enumeration]” (Evangelical Church, Galle). 
Fundamentally, therefore, evangelical organisations operating in Sri Lanka remain 
competitive because they eschew the trappings of religious identification; symbols of 
expected religiosity are substituted instead for an uncompromising mantra of 
progressive growth. 
 
4.4.2 Mobilising and deploying the laity 
 
As can be gleaned from the preceding sub-section, Christian pastors, as much as their 
churches, stand to benefit from downplaying outwards signs of religiosity. Instead of 
engaging directly with non-Christians, it is often the prerogative of the laity to use 
their social influence to expand the church; a process that has long been recognised 
and is captured by Lofland and Stark’s (1965: 871) maxim that ‘conversion [i]s 
coming to accept the opinions of one’s friends’, previously cited in Chapter 2. 
Notwithstanding, an appreciation of the role of the laity as a tool of religious 
concealment, and not just persuasiveness, is currently lacking. As the leader of one of 
Sri Lanka’s largest evangelical churches told me: “the power of the church is the 
people of the church; it’s not its theological, doctrinal beliefs and finances in the bank 
and big buildings, it’s the power of the people and we must know how to use them” 
(Evangelical Church, Colombo). Using the laity in such a way is another articulation 
of how the role, operation and expansion of Christianity are downplayed in society. 
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Public cognisance of the debate surrounding unethical conversion has caused 
evangelical pastors to be viewed less as clergy and more as “converters” (Evangelical 
Church, Colombo), whereas the laity helps to allay such perceptions. Mobilising the 
laity to evangelise through their social networks, and within their social sphere of 
influence, enables Christianity to spread from the inside out. This is particularly 
important in places like Sri Lanka, where Christianity maintains a popular mantle of 
foreignness: “you will never be able to break in from the outside; that’s impossible” 
(Evangelical Church, Galle). One pastor explained his motivations for mobilising and 
deploying the laity in detail: 
 
I will not go and tell the people about Jesus Christ, because people know that I 
am a pastor, a priest. So they always think this fellow is spreading the gospel; 
I am very quiet, I am not doing anything… But I urge people, believers, you 
bring your neighbour, your friend, then there is no problem. The people see 
that I am a very quiet person, I am not spreading the gospel. Like Catholic 
priests, they are always inside. But I am teaching the people, the people are 
doing it [evangelism], and when the people are doing it, that means less 
problem[s] (Evangelical Church, Galle).  
 
As described above, the benefits of evangelising through the laity are that it detracts 
attention from the pastor, who will readily become circumspect if they are found 
“spreading the gospel”. Instead, the value of emulating Catholic clergy (and, indeed, 
Buddhist monks) in being “always inside” is that suspicion is averted, and conflict 
avoided. Another reason not stated above, however, pertains to the actual influence 
that an evangelical pastor has over the non-Christian community. Lacking subtlety in 
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how non-Christians are approached may serve to both entrench anti-Christian 
sentiment, and waste time and resources on developing relationships that the laity 
have already formed: “I don’t go from house to house to evangelise because they 
won’t take any notice of me so I don’t want to go. It is the believers who are under me 
who will bring other families, because it is their village, their friends, their relatives” 
(Evangelical Church, Hambantota). Being new, or different, is often construed in 
negative terms as a source of destabilisation that threatens the prevailing structure of 
society, especially in the Southern Province, where one pastor commented that “every 
newcomer is a suspect; you have to prove yourself over many years” (Evangelical 
Church, Galle). In this sense, therefore, the laity provides almost immediate access to 
the community, creating a multiplier effect whereby the influence and teachings of 
one pastor diffuses out through pre-existing relationships and channels of 
communication (see Figure 10, below).   
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Figure 10: Growing the church by asking the laity to “Harvest 12” 
This Colombo-based church requires its members to write down the names of twelve 
non-Christian friends or acquaintances. The church then spends three months praying 
for the list-members, following which they are invited to a crusade rally and asked to 
convert. Such a strategy is, apparently, highly effective. 
 
When it comes to mobilising and deploying the laity, strategies of engagement have 
changed over time. They have become more subtle and discreet in response to 
mounting anti-Christian sentiment and awareness, with the need for subtlety 
influencing how laity is taught to evangelise within their sphere of influence. One 
pastor explained how:  
 
[The] earlier strategy was you indoctrinate him [the convert] wholesale, 
Monday to Sunday, which results in him being cut off from his background 
and home. Then you bring him to a stage where you tell him ‘OK, you have to 
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go home and evangelise your family’, but the bridges have been burnt… So 
you can’t go back. So now our approach is that even, say even if I meet you, I 
would first be a friend to you, a genuine friend to you, not with the intention 
of evangelism, I will just care for you, I will just smile with you, I will talk 
with you, I will be there when you are having a funeral or a death in your 
family; I will be there at all times… It’s a very passive, it seems a very passive 
one [strategy], but that’s the one I believe the bible is talking about 
(Evangelical Church, Kandy).  
 
As this example shows, the need to downplay difference resonates at two levels: first 
by using the laity as the frontline of evangelical outreach, rather than the clergy, and 
second by encouraging the laity not to evangelise overtly, but to manoeuvre 
themselves into a position of friendship whereby they can begin to “passive[ly]” 
influence those around them. This increases the depth of Christian embeddedness, 
serving to enable Christianity to spread in a manner that is innocuous, and 
relationship-driven. Notwithstanding, the opportunistic nature of such engagement 
creates problems that go beyond the difficulties faced when recruiting new believers. 
Empowering the laity in such a way can encourage capitalising behaviours – those 
that tend to serve the individual, sometimes at the expense of the group – and 
contributes to processes of church fission. Whereas some churches actively encourage 
the laity to take on the responsibility of church planting – “anybody in our church, we 
have said, ‘if you have an opening anywhere, you just go and start it… don’t miss the 
opportunity’” (Evangelical Church, Colombo) – in practice such a bottom-up, 
egalitarian approach to religious growth has deleterious consequences for churches, 
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communities and Christianity in general, which are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6.  
 
4.4.3 Strategies of spatial diffusion 
 
The final way in which evangelical churches overcome boundaries is by practicing 
strategies of spatial diffusion. Such strategies, like the mobilisation and deployment of 
the laity outlined above, seek to spread Christianity in ways that are less visible and 
more far-reaching, serving to further increase the Christian sphere of influence 
beyond the confines of the church, and the network of Christian believers. For non-
Christians, such strategies also provide an opportunity to experience Christian 
teachings and healing without the stigma associated with visiting a church or pastor. 
Indeed, a Kandy-based member of the Buddhist right admitted the effectiveness of 
such strategies: “we think we are the majority and so we still have the majority feeling 
in us, but they are making inroads to every aspect of our lives”. Two strategies in 
particular were identified as being particularly ubiquitous and innovative. These are: 
prayer walks (ubiquitous), and the development of what I term “non-proximate” 
strategies of engagement – in this case telephone and CD ministries (innovative) – 
that enable Christians and non-Christians alike to experience Christianity in a non-
proximate way.  
 
In the first instance, prayer walks involve pastors and laity walking around a 
neighbourhood or village, either individually or in groups, praying for the upliftment 
of the church and the inhabitants of the locality. They were organised and practiced 
by nearly every evangelical church included in the research, and are a form of 
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spiritual warfare that is part leveraging of the transcendental forces that form a key 
motivation for evangelists, part concession to the hostile context within which 
churches operate. Whilst commonly used amongst established churches to facilitate 
expansion and/or acceptance within a community, prayer walks are also used as a tool 
by pastors hoping to establish a church in a new area. The use of prayer is a substitute 
for human communication, with Christians using their presence and movement as a 
means of channelling spiritual forces to help overcome the resistance to Christianity. 
A Colombo-based leader of a parachurch organisation outlined the process and 
rationale of conducting prayer walks so extensively throughout Sri Lanka:  
 
In Sri Lanka, it’s generally a hostile environment, so you generally don’t pray 
out aloud when you’re walking… It’s a sign of human weakness, when you 
walk out into a village, you have no way of changing those people, and since 
we believe there are spiritual powers affecting, influencing, controlling lives, 
there is no way you can oppose them on your own, but then it is a sign of 
humility against that power… Prayer walk is in one way just an outward 
expression of your inward faith, or your inward desire.  
 
The notion of expressing “a sign of human weakness” is important, and often 
compounded by a number of symbolic expressions of vulnerability that are conveyed 
by a pastor of a Colombo-based church: “some of them [doing the prayer walk] were 
mothers carrying their infants in their hands, and they would walk in the night, and 
sometimes they would walk in the rain” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). The 
sacrificial element to the prayer walk is one that emboldens Christian resolve and is as 
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much an expression of faith as it is a commitment to faith. The same pastor went on to 
tell me how: 
 
The people who went on the prayer walk, they became mature and more 
strong [sic] in their faith and in their lives. And then in the church I could 
observe a sudden spurt of growth, miracle growth, people came from outside 
and then even the people in the church, like the choir or the youth, everyone 
suddenly became more committed, more active, more involved, and new 
ministries were begun thereafter. And also, wherever I was conducting 
services, I witnessed a greater sense of freedom.  
 
As this example attests, not only do prayer walks release Christian spirituality from 
the confines of the church, enabling spiritual freedom and movement in places where 
it may otherwise be suppressed, but they also galvanise commitment to the church 
and its actions. Termed “miracle growth”, the act of dislocating the churches’ 
activities (e.g. prayer, sacrifice) from the church itself serves to induce commitment 
amongst existing members, and interest amongst non-members.  
 
In the second instance, some of the most innovative strategies of spatial diffusion are 
those that engage non-Christians via non-proximate means. In other words, 
Christianity is made available to people without them having to enter a church, 
engage in proximate forms of interaction, or to reveal their identity in any other way. 
Two examples highlight the value of such strategies: telephone ministry – a centre 
staffed by Christians that people can anonymously call into and discuss their 
problems or ask for prayer – and CD ministry – the recording of evangelical services 
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onto CDs and distributing them amongst the congregation and laity. Regarding the 
telephone ministry first, the key to its success is the anonymity it grants callers. 
Calling the organisation enables people to meet a spiritual need without having to put 
themselves in a situation that could attract unwanted attention. As an administrator for 
the telephone ministry told me: “I don’t know who is on the other end of the 
telephone line… You don’t see me, I don’t see them, I only hear the voice… So 
people find it very much easier to pray, ask for prayers, anonymously over the phone, 
and for us to pray… There is no identity crisis or anything like that” (Evangelical 
Parachurch, Colombo). Whilst the telephone presupposes a degree of physical 
distance between caller and receiver – which ensures the concealment of physical 
identity, the avoidance of surveillance, and reduces the risk of being identified – it 
simultaneously overcomes distance by being a form of outreach that is not contingent 
upon territorial proximity. The same administrator went on to tell me how the 
telephone ministry is most effective amongst people “who are in different places, who 
are not able to come, in far away places, who are not able to come here [Colombo], to 
come specifically and ask for a particular thing”. By creating and overcoming 
distance, therefore, the telephone is an effective tool that reaches out to people whilst 
avoiding suspicion and surveillance.  
 
A key difference between the telephone ministry and CD ministry is that, whilst the 
former is a bespoke service that is designed to meet the specific needs of callers 
through prayer, the latter is a more general attempt to reach out to non-Christians and 
non-active Christians (i.e. those who are unwilling or unable to attend church) by 
enabling them to experience a Christian sermon without having to attend a Christian 
church. The senior pastor of a church that pioneered the CD ministry in Colombo 
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emphasised the point that “there are people who cannot come to church freely”, 
instead saying how every Sunday the sermon he preaches is recorded, copied onto 
CDs and distributed after the following weeks’ service, meaning “people [can] listen 
to them in hospitals, people [can] listen to them in their homes… every time I preach 
it’s recorded”. This means the sermon can be kept, repeated and distributed among 
friends and family, and represents the diffusion of Christian doctrines outside of the 
church and into the private spaces of the individual. The success of this approach is 
that the CD provides an innocuous gateway that enables Christianity to spread into the 
non-Christian home, with the pastor describing how “yesterday I was invited to pray 
for a Muslim who is paralysed, an old lady… being Muslims they don’t disclose the 
fact that they’re calling a pastor to their home to pray, but God is working in ways 
where, you know, something little like this [a CD] is reaching even a Muslim”. 
Overcoming the barriers and stigma associated with Christianity, both telephone and 
CD ministries enable Christian groups to engage with non-Christians in ways that are 
iterative, unsuspecting and often, therefore, effective in building up a layer of 
acceptance amongst individuals and communities.   
 
4.5 Foreign catalysts 
 
The role of foreign players in buttressing Sri Lanka’s evangelical movement is 
difficult to ascertain. Whereas some evangelical churches (usually the larger ones) 
have policies in place that disallow the acceptance of funds from overseas, other 
churches explained to me in detail how they raised funds for building projects, and 
others asked me directly to put them in contact with potential sponsors in the UK and 
Singapore. Access to foreign sponsorship galvanises competition amongst churches, 
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and can result in the aggressive recruitment of new believers (as proof of growth) or 
an exaggeration of circumstance (as proof of need). Regarding the second point, 
communicating a message of vulnerability (whether economically, physically or 
politically) can translate into being in a position of strength when liaising with foreign 
donors. As one very experienced representative of a Colombo-based parachurch 
organisation put it: “they [churches] can personally raise funds from abroad, and they 
can even sell the country and say that there is persecution and they get money; that’s 
one card that they play”. “Sell[ing] the country” presents a survival strategy employed 
by local actors to gain sympathy and support from international audiences. Indeed, 
every Buddhist (and some mainline Christians) I spoke to saw clear linkages between 
Sri Lanka’s evangelical movement and overseas donors. Such allegations fuel, and are 
symptomatic of, the broader, stereotypical image of Christianity as a foreign religion, 
with overseas influence causing some Sri Lankan churches to be dependent on such 
funds, which in turn catalyses more aggressive and belligerent strategies of 
evangelism, and more inter- and intra-religious friction. The catalysing effect of 
foreign involvement is, therefore, twofold: to provide funds and other resources for 
local churches in order to stimulate growth and evangelical vigour, and to contribute 
to (and, in a sense, reify) Buddhist projections of Christianity as a foreign religion.  
 
Whilst conducting research in Nuwara Eliya, I stayed twice in a mission house 
attached to a well-established evangelical church. During the second stay, my visit 
coincided with that of an American missionary who, for the past two years, had made 
annual, self-funded trips to Sri Lanka, each being two to three months in duration. His 
affiliation with one evangelical denomination saw him working closely with a 
network of five churches located throughout the Central Province and Colombo, as 
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well as conducting regular English and theology classes for trainee pastors. Over the 
course of numerous, informal conversations with him, and one in-depth interview, 
various insights were gained into the inter-relationships between geographically, and 
culturally, dislocated donors and recipients that are a defining feature of the global 
evangelical movement. His insights and experiences reveal the often unspoken (or 
denied) dynamics of international Christian networks of support, dependence and 
relative need. Below I explore two characteristics of foreign involvement in Sri 
Lanka’s evangelical community: the role of relative need in justifying foreign 
involvement in domestic affairs, and the ensuing tension that arises when foreign 
provision meets local need – creating what I term a space of parallel entitlement.  
 
4.5.1 Relative need 
 
Foreign sponsorship entails a projection (often distortion) of foreign needs onto 
domestic circumstances, serving to close the gap between donor and recipient needs 
and/or expectations. This often results in over-provision on the donor side, and 
inflated expectations on the recipient side. Whilst recipients stand to gain from access 
to exponentially greater levels of funding and other resources, donors are driven by 
more intangible objectives. When asked why the missionary feels the need to involve 
himself in a subset of Sri Lanka’s Christian community, he explained it was because 
of “the need, to me the need is unbelievable here… People say ‘why are you going 
back again?’ And I said ‘it’s hard to explain, it’s like something is pulling me there’. 
They need help so bad in my opinion” (American Missionary, Nuwara Eliya). The 
impression of “unbelievable” need is what drives such relativised constructions, 
which are further multiplied when projected onto other donors:  
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I show them [the missionary’s “home” congregation] the pictures and things, 
and the need, so they can see, I mean, I said I would like to bring a whole 
planeload of Americans to this country and let them see what it’s like. I think 
it would just be a world of awakening for all of them; I should say that about 
all the countries I’ve been to. Because we’re so spoilt in the US, we are. You 
want something, you really don’t have to think about it, you just go and buy it. 
But here they don’t know if they will have enough money to feed their family 
or pay their doctor bills or anything. Our teenagers are too spoilt; everything is 
given to them, handed to them. 
 
The last sentence is a clear, if ironic, parallel between “spoilt” American teenagers 
and the equally dependent Sri Lankan pastors that are the beneficiaries of overseas 
support. In this vein the missionary talks of “awakening” the consciousness of 
Americans, drawing comparisons with how “spoilt” Westerners are in relation to Sri 
Lankans and Sri Lankan churches. Yet comparing Sri Lankan living standards and 
needs to those of the West is an exercise in relative need; a fallacy that serves to 
entrench perceptions of Christianity as both a foreign religion, and one that is 
financially, and materially beneficial to those that are embedded within transnational 
evangelical networks of support. Relative need impacts the quantum of financing for 
salaries or projects, and the type of project that is undertaken as well. An example 
recounted by the missionary proves the point well. One pastor had asked for funds to 
be raised in America so that his church could be relocated, and rebuilt, in its entirety. 
The missionary’s willingness to accede to such a request (by way of comparison, the 
other pastors had asked for funds for new roofs to be built) is, it seems, because of a 
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mismatch in expectation between the location of a church in America, and one in Sri 
Lanka’s upcountry: 
 
Why do they need to build a new church? 
Well for one thing the location, oh my stars! I wonder how many hundred 
steps it is up to that church? And it’s [sic] not nice steps; it’s all dug out into 
the dirt with tree roots coming through there, oh man. And how some of those 
elderly ladies can get up there, I do not know. Oh man… I mean just walking 
those steps is an experience in itself… And the tree roots, and last time it 
rained on Saturday night too, so coming down was worse than going up. I 
mean that one elderly lady; she just scared me. I thought if she slips she’s 
going to take everyone with her! She hung onto the grass and the weeds on the 
sides of… Oh man… 
But I would say that kind of situation isn’t uncommon up here… 
No, they’re used to it!  
 
Here, the “not nice steps” (see Figure 11, below, for a similar example) that he 
deplores justify the need to relocate, and to rebuild the church in a more accessible 
location. The most illuminating insight is found in the last two lines, when the 
missionary acknowledges that the need to negotiate steps that are “dug out into the 
dirt” is “an experience in itself” for him, yet is a standard form of movement and 
accessibility for local residents (“they’re used to it!”). American standards of mobility 
and safety are not only being projected onto a non-American setting, but the 
missionary also strives to bridge the gap between the two countries through his 
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fundraising efforts and sponsorship for such projects, effectively creating a space of 
parallel entitlement.  
 
	  
Figure 11: An evangelical church in Nuwara Eliya, built using funds raised in 
Singapore  
Note the location and the steps leading up to the church – a common sight in the 
upland areas of Sri Lanka. 
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4.5.2 The space of parallel entitlement 
 
Relative need creates spaces of parallel entitlement: the meeting of foreign provision 
and local need. Access to wealth makes local pastors feel entitled to Western 
standards of provision, and perpetuates a cycle of dependence that entrenches the 
foreign mantle of the evangelical movement. Whilst every Christian I interviewed 
denied receiving regular payouts from overseas (although that is not to say they 
denied receiving needs-based funds for building projects and so on; similarly, most 
accused other churches of accepting such payouts), the Buddhist right argue that the 
evangelical movement is entirely supported by foreign donors. The experiences of the 
American missionary reified the Buddhist position, explaining that for the five 
churches under his purview: 
 
The pastors get paid through… the US. They get the funding for their wages… 
 But because the people that are joining the church are much poorer, their
 tithes can’t sustain the church, so that’s why [America] has to finance
 them?  
Yeah, because the pastors told me they get about three hundred dollars per 
month, and it comes from… the US.  
Is that just their salary, or is that for the [whole] church? 
That’s just their salary. 
That’s a lot of money, don’t you think? 
Not really, when you think of the families living here, a lot of them have, I 
mean [one pastor] has two kids in college. I don’t know. And his parents and 
her parents live with them. 
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That’s probably why! 
No. I don’t know how they can make it, to be honest. 
 
My challenge to the salary quantum being paid to the pastors was deliberate, given the 
anecdotal claims I had received from around the island of pastors’ salaries, ranging 
from a USD 40 per month stipend for Colombo-based pastors, to USD 30 per month 
being granted to pastors by a southern-based church planting movement. By 
comparison, in 2009 the median per capita income of an estate worker in Sri Lanka 
was Rs. 4,242 (approximately USD 39) per month, rising to Rs. 5,446 (approximately 
USD 50) for the Central Province in general (Department of Census and Statistics 
2009). These salaries were corroborated during conversations with estate workers and 
pastors during the course of fieldwork, and highlight the gulf that exists between 
foreign-funded pastors on the one hand, and their domestic counterparts and the Sri 
Lankan layperson on the other. Put differently, the significant financial benefits 
pastors receive by being funded from overseas sources serves to set them apart them 
from their domestic counterparts, whether Christian or non-Christian, clergy or laity.  
 
Foreign sponsorship of salaries and building projects (and other ad hoc needs, such as 
the purchasing of motorcycles) results in the distribution of wealth and the furthering 
of the globalist ambitions of the evangelical movement. It became obvious during the 
course of the fieldwork that such sponsorship is based on a simplistic treatment of 
poverty alleviation and local need. Foreign sponsors create, whether knowingly or 
not, a local market for their affections. This shows not only ‘a capacity to control 
transnational impact’ (Heuser 2009: 71; cf. Anderson 2005b), but a willingness to 
manipulate it as well. Pastors compete against each other to prove themselves more 
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worthy than their peers; a dynamic that is greatly exacerbated by the fact that foreign 
sponsorship is often disproportionate to actual need. This encourages more aggressive 
strategies of proselytisation (which shows, in its crudest form, a return on 
investment), which and are especially pronounced amongst smaller churches that 
operate outside of existing frameworks of accountability. It also encourages an often-
inflated portrayal of the problems facing evangelical groups: “[there is] this 
persecution syndrome that is going on in this country; you know, if you are 
persecuted, you get a lot of pity from the West” (Mainline Church, Colombo). The 
“persecution syndrome” exacerbates dependence on foreign funding and provokes 
disproportionate reactions from right-wing Buddhist factions who readily capitalise 
on foreign intervention as the foundations of a number of contemporary conspiracies 
concerning the imperialistic actions of the neo-colonising West. The space of parallel 
entitlement serves to both create a market of local recipients, and opens the channels 
through which foreign groups can begin to exert influence and control over the 
domestic market. As Christian groups typically compete to become more embedded 
within international networks of support and collaboration, over time this has served 
to legitimise the competitive actions of local players and the controlling actions of 
foreign players. To various degrees such embeddedness requires them to reflect ‘the 
policies and practices of distant institutions working in very different sociocultural 
[and socio-political] contexts’ (McGregor 2010: 735), fuelling allegations that at the 
ideological level they are part of a global project of postcolonial recolonisation 
(Goonatilake 2006). Indeed, given that there are more missionaries today than at any 
other time in history (Clarke 2006), and given the important role of international 
Christian NGOs in directing church-planting campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa (Hofer 
2003), the ramifications of this hypothesis require much closer consideration.  
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4.6 Strategic extra- and intra-group networks of influence 
 
The third and final characteristic of the relational model of competitiveness is one of 
the most unique and enduring characteristics of the evangelical movement, that is, the 
importance of internal and external networks of support and influence. Whilst the 
beneficial relationship with foreign churches and sponsors has already been 
addressed, this sub-section focuses more on the domestic networks of evangelical 
churches and organisations. Such networks have an agglomerative effect, providing 
individual churches with a web from which resources, contacts and ideas can be 
extracted, whilst enabling them to retain the autonomy needed to respond to growth 
opportunities as they arise. Below I examine the role of extra-group and intra-group 
networks of influence. By intra-group networks, I mean those within Sri Lanka’s 
evangelical community (whether an evangelical church, parachurch or NGO); by 
extra-group I mean those with other (non-evangelical) stakeholders in Sri Lanka’s 
religious marketplace, and the global evangelical community. Defining the global (i.e. 
non Sri Lanka-based) evangelical community as extra-group is in recognition of the 
fact that the objectives of Sri Lanka-based and non Sri Lanka-based evangelicals 
often differ, and outside involvement in Sri Lanka’s evangelical community may not 
necessarily be in the groups’ best interests.  
 
4.6.1 Extra-group networks 
 
Existing understandings of evangelical Christian networks tend to focus on how 
congregations are encouraged to evangelise within their social spheres of influence, 
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the aim being to bring their immediate family, friends, and colleagues into the 
Christian fold. Beyond conversion, however, extra-group networks are also developed 
in order to ‘tie the Pentecostal infrastructure to the overall structure of the established 
social system within which Pentecostalism exists, and help the Pentecostals to deal 
with the systems to their advantage’ (Gerlach and Hine 1968: 28), as previously cited. 
The competitive nature of oligopolistic economies makes such networks all the more 
salient, as they are ‘need[ed] to mobilise other resources [in order] to succeed in the 
marketplace’ (Yang 2010: 201). Given the marginal position of evangelical groups in 
Sri Lanka, extra-group networks are typically harder to form, more selective, and 
more opportunistic in outcome. They are also often high-risk, involving strategic 
collaborations based on mutual gain. If successful, such networks accelerate the 
consolidation of minority groups within the formal socio-religious structure.  
 
In Colombo, for example, an evangelical church wanted to enlarge its premises. In 
order to do so, government permission is needed, something which is notoriously 
difficult to obtain via official channels. To overcome this problem, the leader of the 
church told me how he co-opted local Members of Parliament (MPs) with the promise 
of electoral votes: “we will choose some MPs, ministers, to invite to our church… 
[we say] we will give you our votes, because 600 votes is here; if you win, you will 
help us”. Identifying an opportunity to develop a relationship with political leaders 
based on mutual gain – “we use that weak point” – the church is able to exert 
influence, gain strategic support, and in doing so, overcome a significant barrier to 
physical expansion. Beyond the meeting of political need, gifts are another means by 
which evangelicals are able to develop strategic networks of support. In the south of 
the island, for example, the stifling dominance of Buddhism renders Christian 
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expansion exceptionally difficult. Nonetheless, churches have become adept at 
winning the approval of key political personnel through the provision of gifts: 
 
We are giving small, small things. With small things we can do great things. 
You know in the village, you have the… chief. In the village, he is the man 
always reporting to the GA’s [government agent; the local government 
representative] office. So sometimes he is against [the church], but for small 
thing we can get the help from him, giving a small present: a pen, calendar, a 
diary. With that you can turn these people (Evangelical Church, Galle).  
 
Here, the strategic element of the network is contingent upon the ability to “turn these 
people”, even those that are originally against the church. In turn, this provided the 
church a significant degree of leeway when it comes to evangelism, physical 
expansion and the avoidance of other, more punitive forms of anti-Christian 
reactionism. Both examples show how networks act as a conduit that bridge the gap 
between the informal religious economy and more formalised structures of power. 
Risk and trust are integral to such strategic collaborations, creating an uneasy tension 
between formal acceptance, and the concealment of informality.  
 
Many churches capitalise in some way on informal encounters with overseas 
organisations, whereas overseas organisations can also be seen to capitalise on the 
precarious position of Sri Lanka’s evangelical community (see example below). In 
order to harness support, funding, or recognition from abroad (and in response to 
government restrictions on visa issuance for foreign clergy), evangelical churches 
have become adept at going beyond formalised networks of international 
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collaboration, and reflect what Martin (2002: 25-7; e.g. Hüwelmeier et al. 2010) terms 
the ‘transnational vistas’ of evangelical groups. Utilising social media platforms to 
share (often biased and/or exaggerated) pictures and videos of evangelical successes, 
and persecution, to international audiences, they are able to turn a variety of different 
situations to their advantage. Media channels can provide a vivid, if easily 
manipulated, account of evangelical activity that is used to convey an image of 
Christian agency where it may not otherwise exist: 
 
I can remember one small example, there is a reverend father… he’s a 
Sinhalese father, he was [based] in Mullaitivu; so some pastors came there 
from foreign country, local people who had settled down in [a] foreign 
[country], they were keeping their hands on him and praying… and they had 
taken [a video], they televised the thing, they went and showed it overseas and 
said ‘here, we went and prayed in Sri Lanka and we went and converted the 
reverend father into an evangelical’. The father was telling me, by doing all 
those things, the purpose of God [is lost]… That purpose is lost if these people 
do like this (Evangelical Church, Vavuniya). 
 
The misrepresentation created by such imagery is a powerful tool that is used by 
evangelicals to garner support and attention from overseas. Like the pictures taken by 
the American missionary back to his home congregation (described above), they are 
an integral part of the “awakening” that he talked about, presenting an image of Sri 
Lankan Christian vulnerability, or, as in this case, an example of evangelical 
successes (i.e. conversion, or not) in the face of adversity. Moreover, the ease with 
which such images can be misrepresented is to the chagrin of the wider (i.e. non-
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evangelical, or mainline) Christian community in Sri Lanka, and likely stimulates 
competition within and between groups. This has become a bitter source of contention 
– “the propaganda side is extremely good” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo) – and 
has consequences that go beyond the day-to-day workings of the religious 
marketplace. Two types of extra-group network therefore aid Christian 
competitiveness: strategic collaborations that are used to generate specific outcomes 
at the micro-scale, and a more general transmission of information that is used to 
generate strategic outcomes at the macro-scale.  
 
4.6.2 Intra-group networks 
 
Strong intra-group networks result in the sharing of resources and goodwill amongst 
churches and theologically aligned non-church organisations. The role of intra-group 
networks is well established in the literature, with Gerlach and Hine (1968: 29) being 
amongst the first to recognise how ‘funds and other goods and services to support the 
activities of evangelists [and others]… flow throughout this infrastructure [of the 
Pentecostal movement], across organizational lines, from group to group’. Whilst the 
organisational function of intra-group networks requires little further elaboration, an 
understanding of how they contribute to more subtle forms of religious influencing is 
lacking. Such influencing is pronounced in hostile environments, and is practiced 
throughout Sri Lanka. In the tea estates of the Nuwara Eliya, for example, public 
infrastructure is limited, especially the provision of adequate sanitation. Streams are 
directly used for a variety of purposes, including bathing, irrigation, washing clothes, 
cooking and the dumping and disposal of sewage and human waste. Water pollution 
is a problem that degrades the soil and affects individual health. A Nuwara Eliya-
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based pastor, aware of this problem, requested three lavatories from a Colombo-based 
Christian NGO. Establishing them in a large estate line (see Figure 12, below), his 
actions garnered favour from the local community. Strong intra-group networks like 
these exist at both the local, and national (of which Colombo is often a nodal point) 
scales, and enable churches to act with autonomy, but also to leverage the advantages 
of being part of a larger movement with ease. Such networks enable the evangelical 
movement to be self-supporting, causing agency to be transmitted and realised around 
the country.  
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Figure 12: Providing toilets (the two pale blue/green buildings in the background 
of the picture) for an estate line in Nuwara Eliya 
Donated by a Christian NGO in Colombo, the toilets garnered community approval 
and eventually enabled the pastor-in-charge to build a church adjacent to the 
cubicles (not in picture). 
  
The example presented above also reveals an important dynamic that enables 
evangelical groups to establish themselves in localities that may otherwise be hostile 
to Christianity. As mentioned, the lavatories served to ingratiate the pastor with the 
local community. Subsequently, he built a church adjacent to the lavatories, despite 
the estate line already being home to two, very well established, mainline churches. 
The use of non-religious agency, like that outlined above, by evangelical groups is a 
	   147	  
defining characteristic of the evangelical movement. It enables them to attain a degree 
of structural acceptance before expressing religious agency. It is this dynamic that the 
second part of this chapter shall address, focussing specifically on how evangelical 
groups gain acceptance and express agency via the structural mosaic.  
 
4.7 The structural mosaic in action 
 
Existing understandings of Christian growth show how structural drivers emphasise 
secular characteristics that lead to growth (e.g. poverty, anomie), whereas evangelical 
agency favours the characteristics of religion (e.g. charismata) and religious groups 
(e.g. flexibility, networks) that lend themselves to growth or decline. The ensuing 
discussion seeks to reconcile these standpoints by recognising the non-religious 
characteristics of evangelical groups, and the role of religion in the structure of Sri 
Lankan society. The strong emphasis evangelical groups place on social ministry (a 
collective term used to describe a range of social activities, such as feeding 
programmes, aid distribution, healthcare clinics, child adoption schemes, 
Montessori’s, and so on) serves not only a theological purpose, but an indelibly 
practical one as well. Structural resistance causes non-religious engagement with 
society to become a strategic imperative for evangelical groups, who regularly exploit 
socio-economic deficits in order to circumnavigate prevailing patterns of religious 
dominance and repression. Leveraging the structural mosaic does, in this sense, 
enable religious values to be ‘asserted, contested, or adapted in and through the 
organisational structures and relationships generated out of development practice’ 
(Olson 2008: 393). Subtle expressions of religious agency dilute structural power, 
sovereignty and control via processes of “alternative discernment” (see Myers 2003; 
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Wallis 2005) that enable the flourishing of religious alternatives. More specifically, as 
Cloke (2010: 234) explains, such processes lead to the ‘rupturing of the seemingly 
hegemonic spaces of the current order, producing new lines of flight and new spaces 
of hope’. This involves evangelical groups first embedding themselves within local 
structures (by creating “new spaces of hope”), before shaping them to their advantage 
(and creating “new lines of flight”).  
 
Below I explore two specific facets of the structural mosaic that facilitate Christian 
co-optation, and the ability of Christian groups to influence others. As a strategy of 
Christian co-optation, the structural mosaic enables otherwise marginalised 
evangelical groups to embed themselves within a locality, yet as a strategy of 
religious influencing, the structural mosaic enables more established evangelical 
groups to actively exert agency and grow.  
 
4.7.1 Using the structural mosaic as a strategy of Christian co-optation  
 
Throughout Sri Lanka, evangelical agency is not diminished or nullified by the 
repressive structural context within which Christian organisations operate. Instead, the 
structural context forces different, often less immediate, expressions of agency and 
less religion-centric strategies of evangelism. Religious objectives are given a secular 
veneer, which enables evangelical organisations to subvert the Buddhist structure. 
Rather than competing on religious terms, Christian groups commonly meet a non-
religious need of society that brings them ‘closer to local communities and allow[s] 
different ways of interacting’ (McGregor 2010: 737), enabling the articulation of 
otherwise suppressed religious agency. In doing so, evangelists are able to co-opt 
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themselves into society and, over time, ingratiate them with the political (often 
Buddhist) hierarchy of the locality. Co-opting therefore gives way to influencing, 
which enables Christian groups to create a space within which they can evangelise: 
“you need to be able to go in, blend… after people accept you, then maybe you can 
start [evangelising]” (Evangelical Church, Galle). Many studies embrace the 
importance of Christian inculturation (recent examples include Collins 2007a; Stanley 
2007), yet recognition of how social ministries enable evangelical groups to operate in 
a less distinctive, or religiously obtrusive, way is lacking.  
 
Social engagement plays a salient role in downplaying religious alterity. When 
establishing a Christian presence in a new village or locality (termed “frontier” 
evangelism), pastors begin by disguising their religious motivations. They live in situ, 
interact with their neighbours on a social level, and start a secular job or provide a 
secular service that enables them to play a visible, yet non-threatening role in society. 
As one Colombo-based pastor responsible for a network of churches in the Southern 
Province put it: “we encourage our pastors increasingly to be bi-vocational and to 
wear a couple of hats; to be operational in society provides you with a different entry 
point, and a different identity”. Acceptance into the social structure foreshadows 
acceptance into the religious structure, with the evangelical motives of frontier pastors 
permeating their behaviours and actions. In the Southern Province, for example, one 
such pastor established a foothold in a non-Christian village by first establishing a 
small English and music school. Over time this “entry point” led to the realisation of 
his evangelical ambition; he now has an established church and large congregation, 
and is able to be more candid about his proselytising motivations: “still we are 
teaching people English, and music. Still we are continuing, but my main purpose 
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here is not to teach English and music. My primary focus is that people should know 
their God. So English and music was the means, the way to approach people” 
(Evangelical Church, Matara). This shows an expansion of acceptance over time; 
from meeting a narrowly focussed structural need (education) to the eventual 
formalisation of Christian presence within the village.  
 
Besides the process of establishing a ministry in a new area, Christian groups that are 
looking to change a community’s perception of Christianity also do so by leveraging 
the structural mosaic. Non-religious engagement is necessary to generate religious 
acceptance. Figure 13, below, provides one of many examples of how processes and 
acts of “giving” or “providing” are often ‘more concerned with strengthening the 
social capital of the… donors [i.e. Christians]’ (Hollenbach and Ruwanpura 2011: 
1299) than has currently been recognised. Provided by the international Christian 
NGO, Water Missions International, the tap not only provides a clean and free water 
source that is for the community to use, but it is also strategically located on the 
perimeter wall of Christian children’s home. The fact that the children’s home is 
located in a village in Hambantota district – a place of violently anti-Christian opinion 
and activity – further emphasises the value of such subtle forms of engagement. 
Villagers have become dependent upon the tap as a reliable water source that helps 
them meet their daily cooking, washing and drinking needs. Not only that, but the tap 
also draws villagers close to the children’s home, serving to reduce the physical 
distance between the Buddhist community-at-large, and the space of Christianity that 
the home represents. It forces Buddhists to visit a Christian space regularly, and in a 
positive light; it encourages them to see and hear the children playing and laughing 
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Figure 13: A clean water source in Hambantota district 
Located on the perimeter wall of a Christian children’s home, the tap is available for 
use by the community-at-large, and helps to reduce the physical distance between 
Christian and non-Christian. 
 
Christian responses to the 2004 Asian tsunami in particular provide a clear example of 
how churches operating in the southern coastal areas of Sri Lanka managed to 
consolidate their position of religious precarity, instead transforming it into one of 
relative acceptance, even gratitude. In the Southern Province, the dominance of the 
Sinhala-Buddhist identity stifles religious alterity, and evangelical groups typically 
struggle to establish themselves via evangelism and church planting. The 
establishment of churches is dictated by the Buddhist hierarchy of a locality, as 
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explained by an elder of an established evangelical church: “the law doesn’t prevent 
you from having a church, but the structure of it [society], the local structure can stop 
you”. The effect of the “local structure” meant that churches struggle to find 
acceptance and grow with any sort of continuity. Notwithstanding, the 2004 tsunami 
provided an opportunity for evangelical organisations around the world to distribute 
aid, proselytise (a practice that was widely condemned – see Matthews 2007), and 
otherwise engage with Sri Lankan society during a time of immense, and immediate 
need. For one church located in a highly resistant village along the southern coastline, 
such engagement enabled it to shift from a position of vulnerability – it was 
frequently attacked and evicted from various premises – to one of relative acceptance 
and spatial fixity. As the pastor of the church told me: “they [the local structure] 
wouldn’t give me any place because they have been brainwashed into thinking that 
this is a foreign religion… people refused to rent houses to us; not the people at large, 
but there is a small group who is against [us]”. In the aftermath of the tsunami, 
however, the actions of the church and its network of collaborators made the shift 
possible. Regarding the distribution of aid and supplies (which, incidentally, were 
provided by South Korean missionaries), the leader of the church told me how:  
 
We made it certain that they knew all these supplies [distributed to those 
afflicted by the tsunami] are coming from Christian people with a Christian 
mind. That’s it, that’s all. And very few people converted through that; but it 
made an impact on all of them. They view us with different eyes; they 
wouldn’t give us any [permanent] place, but then we saw this place and we 
bought it. The month we moved in then these Buddhists, they had their 
meetings [which are often a precursor to acts of resistance] and they talked to 
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those people again. The people came and told us, we are not going for those 
meetings. Means they view us with different eyes; their perspective changed.  
 
In this instance, the indirect effects of social ministry (“they view us with different 
eyes”) overshadow the direct effects (“very few people converted”). Subtle, and less 
overtly proselytising approaches like this have become the norm in light of growing 
scrutiny surrounding the allegedly “unethical” conversion activities of evangelical 
groups. A Colombo-based representative of an international Christian NGO clearly 
explained the linkages between social ministry and evangelism: “the question has 
been asked, ‘why do you do this work?’ But it would be nice if people, the 
communities, even go beyond and say, ‘who is your God?’ So then that becomes an 
opportunity for us to talk about God; [we] create the opportunities where they will ask 
about our God”. As this, and the preceding examples show, evangelism is never far 
removed from the day-to-day practices of social ministry. Playing an instrumental 
role in the upliftment of poor and marginalised social groups, evangelically motivated 
organisations are able to show people an alternative way of life that can encourage 
them to question the religious traditions into which they were born.  
 
The structural mosaic encourages evangelical groups to traverse categories of 
understanding, and in doing so creates possibilities to engage people on different 
levels in order to downplay the difference accorded by their Christian mantle. The 
relatively well co-ordinated (i.e. rapid and impactful) nature of the Christian response 
to the tsunami maximised the effect such support had on the local community. In 
Croatia, ‘the arrival of missionaries at the right moment in a region where there had 
been no churches helped many inhabitants of the area to bridge this [post-war] period 
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of existential uncertainty, and likewise helped the Baptist Church expand its 
influence’ (Henkel and Sakaja 2009: 50). The quick response of evangelical groups in 
Sri Lanka enabled a similar expansion of influence, and is a function of their highly 
networked, and mobile nature. A Colombo-based leader of an evangelical church 
explained how:  
 
As soon as the tsunami struck, we sent out teams to areas like Galle, which 
were heavily littered [with] debris and there was a terrible feeling of 
hopelessness – so many dead bodies and so on. Now this clean up, we sent out 
teams, and one of the teams cleaned the premises of the [Buddhist] temple. 
And the monk was, he had never seen… his understanding of Christians was 
very different… So when they introduced themselves as being from the 
church, he was very shocked, because most probably this polarisation concept 
had been established in his mind… I personally think that we have to actively 
dismantle those [artificial boundaries that keep religious groups distinct] by 
making people realise that we are part of their community as much as them.   
 
During the period of chaos wrought by the tsunami, the speed and scale of the 
Christian response served to destabilise the “polarisation” that previously existed in 
the minds of southerners, in particular the exclusivist claims of the Sinhala-Buddhist 
majority. By working with the community in ways that visibly bettered the 
surroundings (e.g. clearing the debris, especially that found in the temple grounds), 
evangelical teams were able to simultaneously engage with the community, creating 
situations whereby they could exert agency. As the leader of a Buddhist organisation 
in Galle commented, regarding the post-tsunami Christian relief effort: “they help[ed] 
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a lot; the first thing is they did a very good job”. That the help provided by Christian 
groups was received so positively foregrounds a degree of acceptance, providing a 
base from which evangelical groups can begin to consolidate their position (e.g. by 
purchasing a permanent church building, as above) and work on co-opting themselves 
into the religious and social structures of society. 
 
Like the southern coastal areas of the country after the tsunami, the widespread 
devastation resulting from the civil war has deeply affected the north, creating 
innumerable channels through which religious groups can operate and reach out to 
society. Long-term reconstruction projects provide opportunities for evangelical 
groups to establish themselves. One pastor in particular received recognition for his 
social work, enabling him to operate within the formal confines of the prevailing 
religious structure: “we have an inter-religion society; in that society [there is a] 
Buddhist priest, and Roman Catholic father, and Hindu priest, and Muslim priest. I 
[am] also a member in that committee. How can I go in that committee? I am a social 
worker” (Evangelical Church, Vavuniya). Being accepted by religious leaders on the 
grounds of his social work ensures his church a degree of protection: “we have not 
faced a problem, but [other] Christians have faced that problem, religious problem”. 
Renders (2002: 78; see also Bornstein 2005) similarly highlights the political 
(re)positioning of Muslim NGOs in Senegal by showing how ‘[a]ppropriating the 
‘development’ discourse provides them with the opportunity to access resources and 
networks they would otherwise not have access to’. This suggests that such practices 
are pervasive; whilst the actions of such groups may be social in nature, they often 
belie religious intent.  
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4.7.2 Using the structural mosaic to influence others 
 
Evangelical groups use the structural mosaic as a strategy of co-optation in situations 
where there is no prior Christian presence, or where the locality is exceptionally 
resistant to religious alterity, as it provides a means of disguising the evangelical 
motivations for engagement with the form of engagement itself (which is often non-
evangelical). In other instances, however, especially those where Christian groups are 
more established and typically secure, the structural mosaic is used as a strategy to 
influence others. It is often used when evangelical groups want to achieve a specific 
outcome, and usually involves more audacious strategies of engagement (i.e. those 
more focussed on secrecy or subterfuge) with those in positions of structural power or 
control. In such instances, the distance between outright evangelism and non-
evangelical engagement is reduced, meaning influencing is often higher risk, and yet 
more immediately aligned with the overarching evangelical remit. Such influencing 
was most evident in the former conflict zones in the north of the island.  
 
Post-war reconstruction projects have witnessed many evangelical groups returning to 
the Vanni region, especially those that were exiled to Colombo or elsewhere during 
the war. Vavuniya is the logistics hub for the Vanni region, and is replete with 
distribution warehouses, the offices of NGOs, and a sense of transition and change. 
Refugee camps surround it, and the headquarters of the Christian NGO that I used as 
a base for interviews was a locus of activity, with numerous staff workers co-
ordinating the delivery and distribution of dry rations, tents and bibles from Colombo 
to the Vanni region (see Figure 14, below). The manager of the centre networked 
vigorously with a range of personnel, from foreign representatives of international 
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NGOs (our interview was cut short as he was running late for a meeting with 
USAID), to government officials, not to mention the gamut of evangelical churches 
and other organisations seeking to take advantage of the opportunities for growth. For 
example, when the manager needed government permission to access a refugee camp 
in order to distribute aid to the inhabitants, he networked continuously with key 
military and government personnel in the area: “we have to keep the network strong 
and the correct way; if we do the wrong way… everything [is] going to close”. In 
order to establish a network “the correct way”, the NGO purposely remained silent 
about the work it does with evangelical churches in the area (“we cannot network 
with them otherwise”), thus offering extra-group personnel a blinkered view of the 
scale of their involvement with evangelical churches (cf. Henkel and Sakaja 2009). 
The breadth and vigour of such networking lends credence to the manager’s assertion 
that “really, we are sowing a seed everywhere”. Exploiting the opportunities 
presented by the structural mosaic in such a way enables the Christian NGO to plant 
such seeds by cultivating strong ties with key military and political stakeholders, 
whilst obfuscating the NGO’s overarching evangelical intent. 
 
	   158	  
	  
Figure 14: A Christian NGO in Vavuniya receiving a consignment of bibles 
The bibles were to be distributed amongst churches operating in the Vanni region. 
 
Exploiting the opportunities presented by the structural mosaic requires a conflation 
of goals that blurs the boundary between the religious and the secular, and between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Building strong ties with the local political 
structure in order to distribute aid to the refugee camps and resettlement villages in 
the north, a prominent Christian NGO used such influence to ingratiate evangelical 
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pastors with society. Pastors would provide an artificial fronting for the NGO during 
high-profile village ceremonies so that: “people can see pastor doing something for 
the development of the village; pastor not an evangelical person, pastor not [a] church 
building person, but he’s doing something for this village” (Christian NGO, 
Vavuniya). Such deliberate, and fallacious, attempts to disassociate pastors with 
evangelism enables otherwise marginalised religious leaders to disguise their 
evangelical mantle under the pretext of social work. Such attempts are typically 
widespread: 
 
Every way… we can involve the pastors into the society; you have to do social 
work also. Through the social work, one day, if you like [to] go to one family, 
I came from, ‘oh yes pastor, welcome’, they treat very well… In the 
underworld we are networking them [pastors] also in the society.  
The pastors? 
Yes. 
Bringing them up into society? 
Yes. In the society, whatever we are going to implement, pastors also we are 
inviting.  
So you provide channels through which the pastors can travel in order to 
bring them into society in an acceptable way.  
Yes, yes… But the community, they see us [and think] oh the churches are 
doing something, good thing. But they don’t know [our NGO] is a Christian 
organisation, but they, people saw the pastors and the youths and the believers 
are doing a lot of things for our purpose, it’s good. They are good people, they 
can see it (Christian NGO, Vavuniya).   
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The desire to use the positive influence of the NGO to “involve the pastors into the 
society” is self-evident, as is an element of subterfuge, given the frank admission that 
the community is not aware that the NGO is a Christian organisation and that “in the 
underworld we are networking them also in the society”. Such misrepresentation is 
necessary to gain the trust of the people. Whilst an invariably effective means of 
realising Christian agency in a context where it may otherwise be suppressed, the 
ethical boundaries of such actions are disputable (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
Whilst the networking of pastors is often an integral part of social influencing via the 
structural mosaic, in other instances, often those where social influencing gives way 
to religious influencing, the involvement of pastors is less critical. In such cases, the 
presence of pastors may complicate the message of unalloyed support that Christian 
groups are trying to communicate to the religious hierarchy. Organising ceremonies 
that are solely presided over by non-Christian religious leaders presents both a 
message of support, and one of control. As the Vavuniya-based leader of a Christian 
NGO told me: 
 
The GS [Government Secretary] and the temple priest, like Hindu and 
Catholic person and the Buddhist person, they are the people in that ceremony, 
chief guest. They are the people distributing these things [aid and other 
provisions], we are never going to distribute, we arrange the programme in 
this village, we [are] inviting them to that ceremony, the other people in that 
ceremony, the chief guests and the special guests and the VIPs, we are outside. 
We are giving opportunity; they are the people distributing everything.  
	   161	  
So you set the stage for them.  
The platform, yes, we are giving them a platform, but we are outside. We are 
taking these people, we are taking opportunity, or we are giving like treating, 
you are a very important person for us, we think you are very important in this 
village, you have to counsel us, you have to guide us, you have to lead us, 
come and do this thing. 
 
The obvious irony that the ceremony is a means of communicating a message that 
“you are very important in this village, you have to counsel us, you have to guide us, 
you have to lead us”, when in fact it is the actions of the organising (Christian) group 
that are guiding and leading those of their “guests”. The relative insouciance of the 
NGO in providing a public face to aid distribution (“we are never going to distribute”) 
belies the leverage they gain from establishing control over those that do the 
distributing on their behalf. Such control reflects the relative distribution of power (in 
terms of wealth and resources) at the micro-scale, with the NGO using its influence to 
indirectly strengthen the structural position of pastors and churches in the north. 
Collaborative arrangements between evangelical organisations mean the benefits of 




This chapter has explored the ways in which evangelical agency is realised in a 
structurally hostile environment. I started by explaining how The Great Commission 
provides a source of transcendental motivation that catalyses Christian 
competitiveness, and encourages invariance towards the state, religious hegemons, 
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and the territorial sovereignty claimed by each. The ensuing tension is a form of 
dissident geopolitics that contributes to violent outcomes. In the second section, I 
introduced the relational model of competitiveness. Such a model is based on the 
observation that, in Sri Lanka, the regulatory environment does not necessarily affect 
the competitive outcomes of minority religious groups, but the type of competitive 
action instead. Specifically, I argued that increased regulation encourages evangelical 
groups to operate in increasingly informal ways in order to avoid surveillance. In 
other words, there exists an inverse relationship between structural hostility and 
evangelical visibility.  
 
The third, fourth and fifth sections explored different facets of the relational model of 
competitiveness in more detail. First, I explored the patterns of secrecy and subterfuge 
that enable evangelical groups to overcome boundaries to growth. I focussed 
specifically on the invisibility of evangelical Christian presence (as shown by the 
house church, and the nondescript appearance of evangelical clergy), the mobilisation 
of the laity for evangelical purposes, and strategies of spatial diffusion (specifically, 
prayer walks and non-proximate strategies, such as telephone and CD ministries). 
Second, I explored how foreign catalysts contribute to growth. Drawing on the 
experiences of an American missionary in Nuwara Eliya, I examined the construction 
of relative need (i.e. where foreign needs are projected onto domestic circumstances, 
resulting in over-provision on the donor side and inflated expectations on the recipient 
side) and the ensuing spaces of parallel entitlement. Third, I explored the strategic 
extra- and intra-group networks of influence that generate growth. Extra-group 
networks are those forged with non-Christians and Christian groups based outside of 
Sri Lanka, and intra-group networks are those that bind the Sri Lankan evangelical 
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community together. Whilst such networks are often a source of strength, they can 
also result in competing ambitions, which serve to undermine the actors employed 
therein.  
 
The sixth section outlined the structural mosaic in action. First, I explained how the 
structural mosaic is used as a strategy of Christian co-optation. I showed that, whilst 
the religious structure of Sri Lanka makes evangelism difficult, the focus of 
evangelical groups on social ministry provides a considerable source of social agency, 
and can help generate religious acceptance. In religious terms, evangelical Christian 
groups are often marginalised, but in social terms they are embraced, often needed, as 
shown by evangelical responses to the Asian tsunami and post-war reconstruction. 
Second, I explained that once Christian groups had been accepted by society, the 
structural mosaic is used to exert influence over others. Drawing on examples gained 
from the north of the island, I showed how Christian groups would leverage the 
structural mosaic in order to generate a number of evangelically-motivated outcomes, 
which often resulted in the strengthening of Christian presence. 
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Whilst the previous chapter explored how evangelical agency is expressed within a 
structurally hostile environment, this chapter explores the spatial contingencies of 
evangelical praxis in Sri Lanka. I argue that strategies of evangelism are, to a large 
extent, determined by the locality within which evangelical groups operate, and 
reflect a degree of Christian reflexivity in responding to the external environment. 
The term “locality” is applied at various scales of analysis, from the macro to the 
micro. The two biggest differentiators of evangelical strategy at the macro-scale are 
the effect of operating in urban versus rural localities, and in public versus private 
locations. At the micro scale, the private domain of the house is the most common 
repository of evangelism in Sri Lanka, and stands in contrast to the church, temple or 
any other publically recognised religious building. Also at the micro-scale, some of 
the most specific, targeted and often contentious sites of evangelical activity are 
spaces of youth evangelism. More so than other population segments, youth tend to 
cluster in particular places, whether it is the school, the playground, the university 
campus or the cricket pitch. This brings to light the value of locating evangelical 
praxis in Sri Lanka, and provides a first, and fundamental, step towards realising 
space as a medium, methodology and outcome (Knott 2005a) of evangelical Christian 
growth.  
 
This chapter aims to explore the locational determinants of evangelical praxis in Sri 
Lanka. I start by exploring how evangelical groups determine where to establish a 
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physical presence, and in doing so argue that locations of evangelism are often 
divinely sanctioned as part of the transcendental order to which most evangelical 
groups subscribe. I go on to examine the macro-scale spatial determinants of 
evangelical strategy, before moving on to the more specific, micro-scale determinants. 
Two dichotomous pairings provide analytical foci – urban-rural and public-private – 
and the paradoxes contained therein are explored in depth. I then go on to examine 
three spaces of youth evangelism – the youth club, the youth camp and the university 
campus – that provide some of the most contentious examples of evangelical praxis. 
Finally, the conceptual frame provided by the structural mosaic is brought back into 
consideration; I focus specifically on how it enables the obfuscation of evangelical 
space, and the enactment of typically audacious strategies of evangelical outreach.  
 
5.2 Locational hierophanies 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Eliade’s (1959) conceptualisation of a hierophany is a 
place-bound eruption of the sacred, as evidenced in religious sites around the world. 
Such an essentialist standpoint has since been subordinated to the social 
constructionist paradigm, which argues that sacred spaces are places that are invested 
with meaning by humans. Despite such subordination, I argue that the concept of a 
hierophany remains relevant to the evangelical imagination. Yet rather than being 
restrictively place-bound, evangelical hierophanies are instead location-driven. In 
other words, rather than being a bottom-up channelling of the sacred, locational 
hierophanies are top-down prophecies received by pastors, and legitimise claims to 
different locations, whether it is a building or a locality. Locations are invested with 
sacred purpose, which encourages pastors to be more resilient and location-bound, 
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especially during times of resistance. Playing an important role in determining 
locational hierophanies, prophecy is one facet of the transcendental motivations that 
provide pastors with direction, and the conviction to believe that their actions are 
ordained. For example, the pastor of a family-run church in a southern Colombo 
suburb recounted how the location for his church was chosen:  
 
My mum went for a birthday party somewhere, and a foreign lady, seeing her 
across the room, while there is music being played and sandwiches and all that 
being eaten; she walks up to my mother, doesn’t know her from Adam, hasn’t 
seen my mother; this foreign lady walks up to my mum, introduces herself and 
says ‘God is speaking to me, that the place where you live, He has chosen it to 
become the light, and the lighthouse in that neighbourhood’… So the location 
wasn’t chosen by us… We didn’t build it, this church, unlike any man-driven 
organisation, this is very prophetic, this place is God-ordained. 
 
Sentiment like this was echoed throughout the island, with the “God-ordained” nature 
of the evangelical church being described in opposition to other, “man-driven”, 
organisations. This also explains, in part, the autonomous nature of evangelical 
churches – “my organisation did not send me here, or my main church did not send 
me here; it was clear guidance from the Almighty God to come” (Evangelical Church, 
Matara) – and also alludes to why such churches are difficult to control, often operate 
outside the law and are outwardly driven by transcendental motivations. In addition, 
such “guidance” is used to explain more wayward locational choices. One church, 
located on a (previously undeveloped) plot of land outside the centre of Colombo has 
since grown to become one of the country’s foremost evangelical institutions, and is 
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one of the most potent examples of the power of locational prophecy within the 
evangelical community:  
 
That time, if you saw [the plot of land] you won’t [sic] buy it, it was just a 
muddy paddy field. There was no road, proper road, to come there; there was 
no bridge to cross over [the river that runs in front of the church]. But I had in 
my mind that God was going to develop this place. You know you must have 
a vision for everything. If you don’t have a vision you can’t… Where there is 
no vision, people perish.  
 
Taking a high-risk decision to build the church in such a disconnected location has 
since paid off, and to the church leaders is an important source of affirmation: “we 
realised we were in God’s plan, because within a short time [of the church being 
built] a bridge came up, connecting our road… and the narrow track suddenly became 
a wide, tarred road. Hospitals came up here, and we have suddenly arrived in a fairly 
important centre of the city, being a hospital complex”. This, and other examples, 
reifies the role of hierophany in guiding pastors to a particular location (“we believe 
God gave this place to us” – Evangelical Church, Matara), or to a particular outcome 
(“for this church to be here, it’s a miracle” – Evangelical Church, Colombo). Location 
is therefore invested with divine meaning, providing pastors with strategic direction 
and legitimacy.  
 
Whilst locational hierophanies legitimise evangelical presence throughout the 
country, they play an especially poignant role in areas of greater resistance or 
hostility. Indeed, nowhere is such allegiance to a location more clearly illustrated than 
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a church operating in Hambantota – one of the most resistant districts of the Southern 
Province. Despite strong, and prolonged, resistance from the local community, the 
leader of the church expressed an inexhaustible mantra of immobility: “I used to get 
letters threatening death and asking me to go. So I used to tell the neighbours ‘today I 
got a letter threatening to kill me, but I am not going to leave this place, even if they 
kill me I am not going to leave this place’”. The refusal to move, despite vociferous 
opposition, forms a positive feedback loop, whereby Christian presence provokes 
resistance, with resistance entrenching commitment to a locality, which in turn 
provokes even greater resistance. Such a cycle self-perpetuates until either the church 
relocates, is destroyed (and sometimes rebuilt on the same plot of land), or resistance 
stops. In this case, resistance provided a paradoxical source of strength for the church, 
and it was eventually the resistance that crumbled:  
 
I started getting money. I put the foundations [for a new structure]; as I put the 
foundations the whole city started coming up against it. They came in a protest 
march… and they took bibles and started burning the bibles and there was a 
riot squad from the police, the riot squad had to come and stop all this. But 
even after all that, the following Sunday the same crowd of people came to the 
church, they did not abandon the church.  
 
Now the church is deeply embedded within the community and occupies a large, 
permanent structure. Being a form of transcendental motivation, locational 
hierophanies reify the importance of location in stimulating evangelical Christian 
resilience and growth. Location is invested with purpose and meaning, and is 
superimposed upon the spaces within which evangelism occurs.  
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5.3 Spaces of evangelism  
 
Whilst locational hierophanies are a form of transcendental motivation that stimulates 
Christian competitiveness, such competitiveness is enacted within a space of 
evangelism. This section explores how and why some spaces of evangelism are more 
amenable to Christian growth than others, and how Christian groups adapt their 
strategies of evangelism to suit the prevailing socio-religious context. Two 
dichotomous pairings have been identified – urban-rural and public-private – and the 
paradoxes that are inherent to each are explored. This leads on to a more specific 
focus on the spaces of youth evangelism that have become some of the most contested 
sites of evangelical Christian growth.   
 
5.4 The urban-rural paradox 
 
One of the clearest ways to distinguish between differences in Christian supply and 
demand in Sri Lanka is by examining the urban-rural divide. Such a divide segments 
the country along the lines of language (English versus mother tongue), ethnicity and 
religion (heterogeneity versus homogeneity – see Henkel and Sakaja 2009: 49), 
choice (individual versus group), mobility and wealth (high versus low). As a 
corollary to such segmentation, it also impacts the supply of, and demand for, 
Christianity in multifarious, and often contradictory, ways. Below I first explain how 
Christianity diffuses out from the country’s urban nodes and into the surrounding, 
rural periphery. Such patterns of diffusion bring to light some of the differences 
between evangelism in urban and rural locations, which are subsequently examined 
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by focussing on how the supply of, and demand for Christianity is determined by the 
location of evangelical praxis. In particular, I explain how urban areas are 
characterised by strong supply and weak demand, whereas in rural areas the situation 
is reversed (i.e. weak supply, strong demand). This contributes to a number of 
paradoxical outcomes that evangelical groups must continuously negotiate.  
 
5.4.1 Urban nodes and the spatial diffusion of evangelicals 
 
Colombo is Sri Lanka’s primary urban centre, and a nodal point that connects local 
and global, urban and rural, Christian and Buddhist. The clustering of Christians 
within capital cities like Colombo is not unique to Sri Lanka, as Christianity has long 
been recognised as a religion that thrives in an urban setting, where the forces of 
modernity serve to simultaneously alienate society whilst empowering Christian 
groups (see, for example, Giggie and Winston 2002; Yang 2005). As a result, the 
relative deprivation thesis provides a cogent explanation as to why Christianity thrives 
in an urban setting, particularly amongst migrants from the rural periphery. The 
physical movement from a rural to an urban setting exacerbates the anomie caused by 
modernisation, encouraging migrants to seek recourse in religion. The fellowship 
associated with Christian group worship styles provides comfort, and a sense of 
community that may otherwise be lacking in a Buddhist temple, for instance: “they go 
and worship and very rarely there is a fellowship, you see. I think among Muslims 
they have, that’s why you find it is very difficult to break into that group. But when 
you go to Hindus and Buddhists, they don’t have that fellowship, that is a Christian 
thing” (Mainline Church, Colombo; see also Nanayakkara 2006). The emphasis on 
anomie does, however, provide only one aspect of the relationship between rural-
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urban migration and conversion to Christianity. Another is the freedom from the 
socio-cultural bondage of village life, which is elucidated in more detail below. As a 
Colombo-based leader of a parachurch organisation explained: “in the city, what will 
happen… you have a person from very far, distant place, he’s here, and no-one knows 
that he has come to this church, and he’s very free, because his village doesn’t know 
anything about it, and no-one can object [to] him, he is very free in that sense”. Thus 
whilst anomie drives some individuals towards Christianity, it also releases them from 
the bondage of their previous religious affiliation.  
 
Being centripetal nodes within national, and international, evangelical networks, cities 
act as disseminators of evangelicals – both pastors and laity alike – around the 
country. Such dissemination of influence underscores the value of cities as engines of 
evangelical growth:  
 
If you take the Colombo city, all the people are from outside, from all these 
rural villages, you know, they all come to Colombo… cities are good places 
for evangelism because you can spread the gospel to every part of the 
country… from the centre everybody will go to their village and take the 
gospel there; then it is easy for you to plant churches in villages, because 
already you have some people there (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo).  
 
The movement of people to and from the urban centre facilitates the transmission of 
Christianity, and strengthens the networks upon which such transmission is based. 
Indeed, urban nodes are often part of a broader, more wide-ranging strategy of spatial 
diffusion and resource allocation, as recognised by one Buddhist agitator: “naturally 
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they [small house churches located in the periphery] belong to a network, with offices 
in Colombo, otherwise they can’t sustain [themselves]. So the Colombo centre is rich, 
and their strategy is basically to penetrate [the periphery]” (Buddhist Organisation, 
Colombo). The movement of people between urban and rural areas, and the 
opportunities for interaction and sharing that are inherent to such movement, 
strengthen relationships between churches and enables urban influence to permeate 
rural settings. As a Colombo-based leader of a network of parachurches told me: “if I 
am a pastor in a village… my influence is only there [in the village], but in the city, 
my influence, I know, may be very far”. For some, such influence can be an 
attraction, causing the urban to be a more desirable (and, perhaps, profitable) locus of 
evangelism than the rural periphery.  
 
That being said, the movement from urban nodes to the rural peripheries is not 
without problems. In particular, the diffusion out from urban centres can lead to the 
uncritical application of evangelism in rural settings. One southern-based pastor in 
particular lamented how “people without understanding, they have come to the village 
areas with dark glasses and flashy outfits and guitars and try to speak about Jesus; 
they have got stoned and chased away” (Evangelical Parachurch, Galle). In this 
instance, the great mismatch between supply and demand highlights the dichotomy 
that exists between urban and rural areas, and the often-paradoxical relationship 
between Christian supply and demand contained therein. It is this relationship that 
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5.4.2 The supply of Christianity 
 
In Sri Lanka, one of the greatest determinants of evangelical strategy is the distinction 
between the country’s urban centres (although it could be argued that there is only 
one urban centre – Colombo), and rural periphery20. Whilst Colombo is the heart of 
Sri Lanka’s evangelical community, the rural periphery presents the frontline of 
Christian-Buddhist tensions. As Goh (2003) recognises, cities are often sites of 
fragmented, conflated and occasionally conflicting identities. They are the ‘natural 
home of difference’ (Sennett 1990: 78), being spaces of destabilisation wherein the 
preponderance of split loyalties makes changing religious identity a less value-loaded 
choice than in rural villages. The city is the locus of modernity, and is largely 
antithetical to the assumption of religious longevity for which more rural settlements 
are renowned (see Molendijk 2010). Locating evangelism in each of these two 
settings is, however, beset with paradox. Rural areas are typically more resistant, 
whilst simultaneously more receptive to Christianity, whereas urban areas are 
typically more open and inclusive, yet society is less willing to embrace Christianity. 
In religious economy parlance, rural areas are defined by restricted supply but greater 
demand, whereas in urban areas supply is relatively unrestricted, yet demand is 
lacking. As one interviewee put it: 
 
The urban area, the people are more educated, busy, and you know, they have 
a lot of activities here, and sometimes they don’t have time for God. So in our 
experience, the villages are more receptive to the gospel than the urban 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The distinction between “urban centre/s” and “rural periphery” is problematic, not least because Sri 
Lanka’s is, by and large, still an agrarian economy. Notwithstanding, the fact that Sri Lanka’s 
evangelical Christian community is concentrated in Colombo underscores the fact that the capital is 
very much the “centre”.  
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people, because they have the hospital facility when they are sick… But when 
a villager falls sick, you know the first thing he will do is go to the village 
doctor and do something, and if that fails, he will become desperate. So he 
will become more open to the gospel… the village people are more receptive 
and easier to reach (Evangelical Church, Colombo).  
 
The idea that villagers are “easier to reach” is predicated on immobility. Urban areas 
have more mobile populations, which is manifested both in terms of day-to-day 
movements, and the freedom to experiment with new religious alternatives. Rates of 
conversion may be higher in urban centres, yet so is attrition, as it is harder to retain 
converts. The value of rural immobility for evangelists is that: 
 
In a village you’ve got the freedom of time, the freedom of meeting people at 
any time, that kind of thing is there… [in] Trincomalee the roads are almost 
bare most of the day, because people are in their homes, people are doing their 
small businesses and you can walk in and you can chat… it’s a more laidback 
place… you’ve got greater licence, a greater amount of time to work with the 
people, whereas in town you don’t, I mean they’ve got their work, they’ve got 
their after-work life, they’ve got their families (Mainline Church, Colombo).  
 
Being more place-bound than their urban counterparts, rural people are easier to 
locate, and easier to engage in conversation, whether it be “in their homes” or “doing 
their small businesses”. Such immobility can, however, be as much of a hindrance as 
it is help for some pastors. To leverage the benefits of rural immobility, pastors 
themselves must be mobile in order to bring Christianity to the people. Travelling 
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between the disconnected estate lines of Nuwara Eliya, for example, means a trade-
off between the quantity of possible interactions, and the (assumed) quality: “here we 
must commit our time; if we meet one person we must spend three hours back and 
forth. We can meet in Colombo in five minutes, or ten minutes; [here] sometimes 
entire day we must spend with one family, so that’s difficult” (Evangelical Church, 
Nuwara Eliya). Altogether the immobility of rural villages amounts to more privatised 
forms of evangelism, as opposed to more public engagement in urban areas. In rural 
areas the private space of the home is where the vast majority of evangelical activity 
takes place, whereas in urban areas it can occur in the street, on the bus or during a 
crusade rally held in a park or public auditorium. As Figure 15, below, shows, public 
proclamations of faith, and of religious communication, are more abundant in the city 
than they are in the provinces. The conformism of the rural setting means outward 
displays of alterity are restricted, making the home a sanctuary of experience that 
evangelical pastors can visit and influence whilst circumnavigating the structures of 
power and surveillance that serve to benefit from restricting change and preserving 
the status quo. This dynamic is addressed in more detail below.    
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Figure 15: Proclaiming a Christian message in an urban setting  
Located along Colombo’s main commercial thoroughfare, the Galle Road, 
proclamations of faith like this are rare, and often outlawed, in more rural settings. 
 
5.4.3 The demand for Christianity 
 
In terms of supply, evangelical groups typically find it easier to reach out to rural 
communities, as they are easier to locate and less mobile than their urban 
counterparts. In terms of demand, however, the rural setting is one in which demand 
for Christianity is suppressed as the group takes precedence over the individual. The 
rural mindset was commonly described as being more prejudiced than the urban, 
which is more used to, and accepting of difference and nonfixity. Paradoxically 
therefore, whilst the need for education, healthcare, jobs and other sources of 
upliftment is generally greater in rural areas, and the populations more accessible, the 
tolerance for otherness is severely restricted, and the use of stereotype more 
entrenched than in urban areas. Christianity is foreign and colonial, whereas 
Buddhism is Sri Lankan and serves the interests of the community, which means that 
“the more rural ones [people] might have more hang-ups about people suddenly 
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coming in and saying strange things that they have never heard of before, and maybe 
the ability to change, and to view objectively what a person is saying could be very 
challenging” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). Talking about Christianity, and other 
facets of evangelism, are described here as “strange things” that are seen as a threat to 
existing ways of life due to the inability of villagers to “view objectively what a 
person is saying”. Rural society is polarised along the lines of religion, ethnicity and 
territory, as one Christian convert from the Southern Province told me: “in my village, 
sometimes it’s only Sinhala [people], in other areas there’s Tamils, but they’re 
separated”. Such polarisation reaffirms the need for evangelical groups to downplay 
their religious otherness so as not to be seen as a threat to society.  
 
In addition, in rural villages people “like to maintain what they have been maintaining 
for centuries” (Mainline Church, Colombo), causing individual agency to often be 
subordinated to the interests of the group. Such subordination has important 
ramifications for the process of decision-making, especially regarding religious 
conversion. As one Colombo-based evangelical pastor explained:   
 
You go to the village, they are Buddhists, they are living with Sinhala or 
Tamil, language-wise, religion-wise, they are very strict. So they’re facing 
problems to come out from that. I will give you an example, their life [is] 
based on like a community base. So I am Andrew21, but Andrew can’t take 
decisions eas[ily]. Some decisions I take, that is going to affect our 
community, and I am also a part of the community, the village life I mean. So 
someone come to Christ [i.e. convert], he is going to immediately [be] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Not his real name.  
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isolate[d] from this community. Not only the family, full village, so the fear, 
that situation is a big problem. So he need[s] a family, he need[s] a 
community, you know. So [because of] that concept, [it is] quite difficult to go 
to the village. 
 
In the village setting autonomous action is frowned upon, and making the decision to 
move away from the majority religion can estrange the individual from the group. In 
Sri Lanka, the dominance of the Sinhala-Buddhist identity imposes a degree of 
religious intransigence upon individuals (another sort of immobility – explored in 
more detail in Chapter 7), given that “the main obstacle for the [rural] people is how 
others think about you, that’s the main issue” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). 
Whilst a problem for the individual, it also poses a strategic challenge to evangelical 
groups, who must negotiate their own alterity via either the structural mosaic, or by 
adopting practices associated with secrecy and subterfuge, previously outlined. Such 
practices commonly involve the private domain, and stand in opposition to the public 
place of religion in Sri Lankan society and culture.  
 
5.5 The public-private paradox  
 
Whilst differences in supply and demand beset the urban-rural paradox, it is 
differences in evangelical and non-evangelical conceptions of the place of religious 
activity that constitute the public-private paradox. Simply put, whilst Buddhist (and 
other religious) groups argue that religious worship and identity is a defining part of 
the public domain, evangelical Christian practices are overwhelmingly privatised, and 
often use the home for the purposes of worship and outreach. The paradox lies in the 
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fact that whilst the privatisation of evangelical Christianity galvanises suspicion and 
prevailing public discourses surrounding “unethical” conversion, evangelical groups 
claim that public displays of religiosity are often met with resistance, or outlawed: 
“very public… community-wide events and activities of outreach are becoming 
almost undoable” (Evangelical Church, Galle). As the Colombo-based leader of a 
representative body of evangelical churches told me, “it’s very, very advantageous if 
you have a church building, then people are… recognis[ing that] this is a church, we 
know this is a church… if you have in a house [then] they have a lot of suspicion; 
what [are] they doing here? What is this?”. Thus although the use of the private 
domain catalyses suspicion, many evangelical groups fear the repercussions that may 
arise from public forms of outreach. The south is where Christianity is most 
vigorously denied a public presence due to the homogeneity of society and religion 
along Sinhala-Buddhist lines, and the strength of nationalist (and often anti-Christian) 
sentiment. More than anywhere else in the country, this forces groups to privatise 
their evangelical practices: “public rally we don’t… we can’t, we’re not allowed. 
From beginning they stopped – no permission. So we have to go very private, 
personal… it’s not meant for here [public evangelism]” (Evangelical Church, 
Matara). 
 
This section explores this paradox in detail, examining it first in relation to public and 
private places of religion, with a particular focus on the house church, and second in 
relation to public and private forms of evangelical outreach. I also highlight how 
evangelical practice becomes more privatised as structural hostility increases – a 
dynamic that fuels suspicion of “unethical” evangelical practice.  
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5.5.1 The public place of religion in Sri Lanka 
 
In Sri Lanka, the formal place of religion is the public domain. Formal religious 
groups (previously outlined in Chapter 3) are located within temples, khovils, 
churches and mosques. Such places are imbued with sacred meaning, and are largely 
respected by Sri Lankans, irrespective of religious belief: “in our mentality a place of 
prayer is a sacred place… a place of worship is a place of worship, and it’s respected 
and it has its own special rights” (Mainline Church, Colombo). Indeed, such a 
“mentality” serves as a point of reference for inter-religious relations, with the church 
being a recognised symbol of Christianity that is understood to be equal to any other 
such symbol: “for a Buddhist, they respect places of worship, anywhere, even a 
mosque; church also is like that” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). Ironically it is 
the church building itself that is both a symbol of foreignness (and often a reminder of 
Sri Lanka’s colonial past – see Figure 16, below), but also a building of religious 
similitude that is understood by non-Christians, given that “the people’s cultural 
perception of a church is more in line with a temple or [any other] designated place of 
worship” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). There are two characteristics of religious 
places in particular that help to establish their position within the public domain: 
identity and access.  
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Figure 16: The Dutch Reformed Church in Galle Fort  
A historical relic and popular tourist attraction, it is derided by some of the town’s 
evangelical community for being more of a “museum” than it is a place of Christian 
worship. 
 
In the first instance, the ability to identify a place of religion is a key factor that 
differentiates the informality of evangelical groups with other religious groups that 
operate within Sri Lanka’s formal religious economy. The differences between 
mainline and evangelical churches are particularly striking in this regard. A pastor of 
a Colombo-based mainline church explained the importance of church symbolism: “I 
can’t build a Christian church like a Buddhist temple, I can’t build a Christian church 
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like a Hindu temple; each have their own building, and each has its own 
significance… Christ died on a cross; I cannot say that Christ died on a lamppost… a 
church must have an altar, it must have a lectern, the church must have a cover, and it 
must have a cross to signify it’s a church”. Symbols of Christianity – the altar, lectern 
and, most importantly, the cross – identify a church as a Christian place of worship, 
and in doing so serve to position it within the public domain. Many larger, more 
established, evangelical churches recognise this dynamic, and use the cross to 
encourage acceptance and resonance. A southern-based evangelical pastor told me 
how “we put the cross to identify [the church], otherwise they [the community] will 
think this is a hall… Buddhist temple they respect, even Hindu temple they respect, 
Muslim they respect. So at the same time, Christian church they respect, so we just 
put the cross”. The ability to identify the church as a place of worship generates 
acceptance amongst non-Christians, a dynamic that is recognised by some evangelical 
groups, but not all.  
 
A pastor of one of the country’s largest evangelical churches, for example, explained 
what sort of message having a physical, public presence sent to the community, 
saying how buildings “and localities, and physical property, and geographical 
locations, are also part of the process of sending a message to society that we are part 
of the national mosaic, and we are here, and we mean business”. The sense of 
institutionality associated with having an identifiable public presence has a positive 
effect on the Christian community – “the visible architectural style… is strength for 
the Christians” (Mainline Church, Kandy) – and deters resistance: “they can’t easily 
crush us [the larger churches] and stamp us out” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). It is 
for these reasons that churches (especially evangelical churches) often struggle to 
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obtain the permissions needed to register or build a “public” church, and explains why 
they so often resort to more private forms of worship and outreach. As the leader of a 
registered church in a particularly hostile village in the Southern Province explained: 
“a building denotes strength and stability. They have a massive fear of Christians; 
they look on the Christians as the enemy of the Buddhist. Now a building built by the 
enemy means they are going to be stable here… They thought now they have a 
building, they are going to stay here and literally take hold of all the others”. Thus 
whilst a church building is easily recognised by non-Christians, it can also threaten 
them, rendering the process of gaining the approvals necessary to build a church 
lengthy, and often problematic.  
 
In the second instance, accessibility sends a message of openness and transparency, 
and reifies the position of religion as a positive force for the community. This affects 
both existing congregations – “they [the congregation] know that right throughout the 
week, they can come here, they can talk, they can pray, they can get the advice they 
need to get” (Mainline Church, Colombo) – and adherents of other religions. Whereas 
clearly identified places of religion are described as being “open” – “the Catholic 
church and the traditional Christian church[es are] open place[s] where I can walk in” 
(Buddhist Organisation, Colombo) – the house is not. Such a distinction between 
“open” and “closed” places of religion affects not just the ability for non-Christians to 
enter a church, but the neutrality of the place itself: “I [can] walk into a Christian 
church, right, I mean any Buddhist place or anything, I can go inside, even have an 
argument with a Catholic, Christian, Buddhist priest on the Buddhist philosophy. But 
if I go to a house, I create offense. I can’t create a debate” (Buddhist Organisation, 
Colombo). Notwithstanding, the vast majority of Sri Lanka’s evangelical churches are 
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located in houses, causing the house church to be the country’s foremost location of 
evangelical Christian praxis.  
 
5.5.2 The house as church 
 
House churches are built on the New Testament precept that Christians are the church 
of God, not the buildings that house worship services. Rather than the sacred space of 
the house church being grounded in place, it is instead grounded in the constellations 
of sacred networks that are formed and consolidated when Christians are gathered 
together for worship, prayer and bible study. In this sense, house churches ‘could 
simply be described as locations of ritual’ (Davies 1994: 55; see also Norman 1990), 
whereby ‘the room itself [where worship occurs] has no special sanctity’ (Turner 
1979: 153). Given that the formation and articulation of sacred networks is based on 
the affective ties between believers and God, the place of the house church is nothing 
more than ‘a point in which [such] flows and relationships… become grounded’ (Bajc 
et al. 2007: 321). A house church can therefore be replicated anywhere that a sacred 
network is present, meaning the space of the house church is predicated upon the 
‘frequentation of places rather than a place’ (Augé 1995: 85, original emphasis), 
effectively rendering them placeless. That said, whilst the space of the church is 
predicated upon the construction of sacred networks, house church services are 
located within the house, meaning the house church remains, at a practical level, 
place-bound. As a result, I term house churches place(less) as they constantly have to 
negotiate the politics of being conceptually placeless, yet practically place-bound.  
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The house church represents a practical application of Christian doctrine. It serves to 
remind congregations about the relative (un)importance of place within a broader, 
biblical schema. As the pastor of a legalised house church in Colombo told me: “we 
are a little bit weary of ritualism, and the moment you have these gothic-type 
buildings the place becomes sanctified and the lives become unsanctified. So they 
[Christians] need to come to church to meet God, and when they’re out in the world, 
it’s as though God’s not there”. In contrast, the sacred networks upon which house 
churches are built are designed to sanctify the nodes – the individual Christian 
believers – that contribute to the formulation of Christian space (see Murdoch 2006: 
78). The desanctified nature of the house puts ‘the emphasis on to that nucleus of the 
holy people of God who themselves [a]re only sanctified insofar as they [a]re united 
with the Holy One of God in their midst’ (Turner 1979: 153). In theory at least, the 
sanctification of place is substituted with the sanctification of believers, which has 
important repercussions for the growth and longevity of the church.  
 
The place(lessness) of house churches serves not only a theological imperative, but a 
strategic one as well. Whilst pastors lament the difficulty in obtaining land for 
religious purposes via official channels, the marginal position of Christianity in Sri 
Lankan society reveals a more compelling rationale that brings to light the value of 
impermanence: “you never know, the government could take over once you have 
land, deeds, and so forth; you’ve got something that can be taken away” (Evangelical 
Parachurch, Kandy). In hostile environments, the anti-Christian bias of the 
government and civil society renders fixity dangerous; a place of worship can be 
“taken away”, attacked and razed, whereas sacred networks cannot. Providing no 
outward manifestation of the sacred, house churches are essentially invisible, 
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avoiding surveillance and reproachment. By foregoing traditional church symbolism, 
network-based churches reduce the risk of repression. They are a ‘strategy for the 
territorial administration of the religious’ (Hervieu-Leger 2002: 99) that enables the 
continuation of worship, evangelism and growth, despite hostility. The value of 
place(lessness), therefore, is that it renders Christianity indestructible; it cannot be 
subdued by force, or restricted to place: 
 
You can meet anywhere, and that has become a reality if you take the north 
and east, where due to other reasons [i.e. the civil war], many churches were 
displaced, their structures were destroyed, but the church body continued to 
meet under culverts, under trees, in tents, behind barbed wire, you cannot 
restrict the body of Christ to meeting anywhere; you don’t need a building 
(Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). 
 
Such an agnostic treatment of place has important, and paradoxical, repercussions for 
the church (which are explored in more detail below), and those groups that oppose 
the church. The fact that “you cannot restrict the body of Christ to meeting” means 
that the church is an autonomous player in the religious arena of Sri Lanka, one that 
operates independently of the legal and political structure.  
 
Indeed, the autonomous nature of the house church is further enhanced by the 
mobility that comes with being place(less): it can be planted anywhere, and is often 
embedded within densely populated residential space that enables it to impact as 
many people as possible. As a Colombo-based leader of one of the country’s largest 
networks of house churches told me: “we have a concept like take the church to where 
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the people are and don’t bring the people to the church… [house churches are] easy to 
grow because you are not limited; the boundaries are not limited to a building”. 
Whilst a church building, or any other place-centric site of religious expression 
“limits you in spreading” (Evangelical Church, Colombo), the articulated nature of 
the house church means it can quickly and easily penetrate areas that are untouched 
by Christianity, whilst remaining largely invisible to the religious factions that oppose 
its growth. As Figure 17, below, shows, the fact that many evangelical pastors are not 
restricted to a single building means they have the freedom and mobility to frequent 
multiple places in succession. This enables them to inject a sense of Christian 
presence, no matter how ephemeral, into disparate locations that, in turn, become loci 
of Christian growth.  
 
	  
Figure 17: A mobile pastor (centre, with umbrella) in Nuwara Eliya  
Armed with just a bible and maraca, the pastor visited and conducted worship 
services in five different estate lines over the course of one afternoon. 	  
Bringing the church to the people is essentially a reversal of the centripetal logic by 
which many religious sites are constructed, and is a key reason for growth, as 
identified by one Colombo-based mainline pastor:  
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I think by building the churches and getting the idea that the church means the 
church, that you have to go and worship there, that has some kind of a 
negative thing, because we try to bring the people into a particular church 
building, and we don’t really go to the place where the Christians are. So in 
that sense, I think Christianity is also getting isolated from the village, from 
where Christians are living. And [evangelical] churches [a]re successful in that 
because they have this New Testament style; they are among the people in the 
villages. 
 
The effect of being “among the people” is palpable, and is made possible by the 
sacred networks upon which house churches are built. Such networks grant churches 
an almost unlimited degree of mobility; the church can be immersed within Buddhist 
space, from villages to houses, and is an aggressive means of introducing Christianity 
to communities. As Megoran (2010) argues, close geographical proximity encourages 
more intimate forms of encounter, with house churches encouraging more informal, 
often convivial, forms of interaction that differ markedly from those experienced in 
“official”, place-centric sites of religious worship. Whilst the house plugs the church 
into residential space, the opaque boundary that demarcates inside from outside, 
church from house, house from community generates curiosity and acceptance. As 
one evangelical pastor of a Colombo-based church explained:  
 
When you go into an area where the non-Christians are and have a house cell 
meeting, you are surrounded by houses filled with non-Christians, who would 
see, who would hear what’s happening, and then you can actually be more 
	   189	  
aggressive in entering into a non-Christian area… you are expecting them to 
come there. When you have a house cell, the first of the outsiders will be the 
kids who peep in through the door, then they would come to the doorway, then 
they will come and sit at the back, and then they will come and sit in front, and 
the same way, following them, the parents will also come and look, and that’s 
how they come into the house. 
 
Here the boundary of the house – the door – is not only open, but also a source of 
enchantment. The space of the church is not restricted to the house, but flows out, 
finding movement and expression in sound and social interaction. Although sacred 
networks mean the church is not restricted to the house, the fact that they originate 
from one provides the informality needed to enable people – children first, then their 
parents – to enter and experience a space of Christianity. Whilst Kong’s (2002: 1581; 
see also Chivallon 2001; Baird 2009) case study of a house church in Singapore 
draws a clear distinction between the ‘external façade of secularity and an internal 
presentation of religiosity’, as shown by rows of chairs to replicate pews, and even the 
installation of stained glass windows, the Sri Lankan house church typically 
downplays internal displays of religiosity as much as it does external. The space of 
the house is resolutely private, yet the church stands to gain from making it a non-
privatised, non-differentiated space by ensuring that the boundary between inside and 
outside remains as porous as possible. Given that “walking into a church is like a 
taboo” (Evangelical Church, Galle) it is necessary to prevent the house from 
becoming an overtly “Christian” space as doing so renders it inaccessible to non-
Christians, and can therefore compromise the growth of the church.   
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5.5.3 Evangelism in the public domain 
 
Public forms of evangelical outreach are more prevalent in some parts of Sri Lanka 
than others. Two sites in particular are recognised as being more conducive to public 
forms of engagement: sites of degradation and urban sites. In the first instance, sites 
of degradation are those that have experienced some form of social, political or 
environmental upheaval, and in Sri Lanka are most commonly associated with areas 
in the north and east that are worst affected by the civil war, and to a lesser extent the 
coastal areas affected by the Asian tsunami in 2004. The refugee camp in particular 
became an important site of public evangelism during, and after, the civil war. Pastors 
explained how the cramped conditions, the relative immobility of the inhabitants and 
the sense of fear and mortality that pervaded the camp meant that the supply of 
Christianity become a more public event: 
 
When the people are collected together, all those people are, the non-
Christians, the other denomination people, and all the people are in one place 
and they’re together. Then they show, then they view how this small group of 
people is praying, by seeing the faith of them, how they are believing a God, 
that is very much helpful for the [non-Christian] people, not to convert [them], 
they themselves will convert… The believers, the Christians, even during that 
crucial time they had the belief in God, they were praying to God. But non-
Christians, they were crying, they were scared and saying ‘oh, our life has 
gone, our god has forsaken us, we can’t do anything now’ (Evangelical 
Church, Vavuniya) 
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Of particular interest is how the public supply of Christianity served to create 
demand. The distinction between the ability of Christians to cope with camp life and 
the relative inability of non-Christians created a situation whereby “they themselves 
will convert”. Indeed the disruption caused by the war, whereby homes were 
destroyed, families were dispossessed and friends and relatives killed, encouraged 
people to resort to transcendental solutions to their problems. Coming to the 
conclusion that “our god has forsaken us” encourages people to embrace new 
religious alternatives, with the layout and structure of the camp making Christianity 
very accessible to the masses: “that place [the refugee camp] is very open… people 
are seeing, there are five people or ten people, they are praying, they are listening. 
Everybody is listening… They listen and change the mind and come to the way [of 
Christianity]” (Evangelical Church, Vavuniya). Whilst the camp presents a 
concentrated focus of evangelical activity, the repatriation of inhabitants to towns and 
villages after the war causes the public to become more dispersed and unyielding, and 
evangelism more targeted (see Figure 18, below).   
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Figure 18: The handbag of an evangelical pastor’s wife in Trincomalee 
Filled with gospel tracts and other evangelical literature, the pastor’s wife would 
distribute such leaflets in buses, shops and on the street – something that could not be 
done in the Southern Province, for example, without repercussion. 
 
In the second instance, the religious plurality and weakening of traditional power 
bases associated with urban sites means public forms of evangelical outreach are 
more likely to be permitted than in the rural periphery. Of these, the crusade rally is 
one of the most pervasive, yet contested, forms of outreach. As Heuser (2009: 75) 
shows in Ghana, ‘crusade activity lives in th[e] urban environment and seeks to 
manipulate it’. Manipulating the urban environment is not only a strategy of territorial 
conquest, but an effective means of engaging with non-Christians as well. Like in the 
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refugee camps, Christianity is easier to propagate when it can be seen and heard by 
non-Christians and, in this vein, the most successful crusade rallies are typically those 
held outdoors: “if you do it [a crusade] in the open air non-believers will come, and 
that’s our purpose of course, and doing it indoors only Christians will come… No 
matter how much, like even if you go and invite them personally, they [non-
Christians] won’t come” (Evangelical Church, Nuwara Eliya). Holding a crusade rally 
outside enables evangelical groups to attract the attention of non-Christians whilst 
disrupting their daily routines as little as possible. No threshold has to be crossed (e.g. 
walking through a door) and therefore no transgression is committed. In addition, 
some groups rely on their extra-group networks to gain approval for such public 
rallies, which is not always immediately granted: “we invite a government servant 
who’s in a good position so those people, they don’t make problems, they don’t mind 
that we have this [crusade rally] here” (Evangelical Church, Trincomalee). Sensitivity 
to such a dynamic pervades all stages of the planning process, from advertising a 
crusade rally to its eventual execution. The leader of an evangelical church in the 
Nuwara Eliya told me his rationale for not publicising a rally that was held during the 
Christmas period: 
 
In December we didn’t do any kind of advertising, we didn’t do anything at 
all. Because if we [did], people may not come. So we just, right in, we went 
there, put up a stage and did all the things, people just came in [to an open-air 
theatre where the crusade rally was held].  
So it disrupts them as little as possible… 
Because if you had given advertisements, they know it’s a Christian thing, and 
that’s why they won’t come in. But if you just go in and people like to listen to 
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songs and, of course, everyone likes music, so that’s one way that we use all 
the time.  
 
In this instance it is the presentation of Christianity – particularly in terms of music 
and singing – that attracts non-Christians, rather than any prior advertising. The 
spontaneity of such events prevents attendees from having to make a conscious choice 
as to whether to attend or not, encouraging more impulsive responses to the 
immediate visual and audio disruptions to the everyday banality of the street. Such 
strategies of attraction are not, however, without negative consequence. Despite there 
being a generally positive relationship between crowd size and social influence (see 
Newton and Mann 1980), the moment of engagement is often fleeting and reactive, as 
recognised by one Colombo-based evangelist with extensive experience conducting 
rallies and other such outreach throughout the island: 
 
I think such a strategy simply appeals either to the emotion, or there is the fact 
of peer pressure… It’s very easy to get people to respond to the gospel [during 
a crusade rally], and accept Jesus, but it’s very difficult to disciple them, and 
to keep them in the fold (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo).  
 
Such a frank admission of the superficiality of the crusade rally – one which “appeals 
either to the emotion, or… peer pressure” – is, in many respects, a reification of more 
sweeping criticisms pertaining to Sri Lanka’s evangelical community. A relatively 
shallow engagement with Christian tenets (on the part of both clergy and laity) is 
replaced by a preoccupation with healing, prophecy and miracles; a process of giving 
people a tangible experience of Christianity that is designed to elicit a specific 
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response (in this case, “raising their hands, or coming for prayer, or filling in response 
cards”). Indeed, the focus on tangibles – whether it be number of converts, quantity of 
aid, size of congregation or the number of churches in a network – all contribute to 
rhetoric surrounding the “market mentality” of Sri Lankan Christians; something 
much bemoaned by (mainline) Christians and Buddhists alike.  
 
5.5.4 Evangelism in the private domain 
 
As the earlier sub-section on the house church argues, evangelical Christianity is a 
largely privatised religion in Sri Lanka. As a result, evangelical worship and outreach 
has become a highly targeted practice, focussing specifically on engaging people 
within the home, where they are typically “more open” (Evangelical Church, Nuwara 
Eliya) and free from community surveillance. It is the single-most important site of 
evangelism in Sri Lanka, and is used to deflect attention from the workings and 
encroachment of Christianity: “my home is a little sanctuary; you come and I treat 
you with a cup of tea or some food and we have fellowship, I share with you. Nobody 
can object to that, you know, I’m not having a church service here” (Evangelical 
Church, Colombo). People do, however, “object to that”, largely because the 
boundary between house and church is so indistinct. Such indistinction lowers the 
barriers to entry for non-Christians. As one Colombo-based evangelical pastor 
explained: 
 
Most of the people here [in the church] are Buddhists and Hindus. Usually 
they are not interested to come to church. We train the people to preach the 
gospel and distribut[e] tracts and mak[e] house meetings. Then one of our 
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house meetings, we are doing [at] our believer’s house. Then we invite 
neighbours to come to that house meeting… The Hindus and the Buddhists, 
they’re not willing to come to church, they’re a little afraid to come to church 
because the Buddhist temple is close by and the Hindu temple is close by: if 
they come to church, all the people will know… They [will] lose everything; 
they lose their community, they lose their friends, everything.  
 
This example clearly juxtaposes the stigma associated with visiting a church against 
the relative freedom of attending a “house meeting”. Whilst this does not explain why 
a Buddhist or a Hindu would choose to convert to Christianity, it does show how they 
become exposed to a new religion, and provides a point from which conversion 
processes can begin.  
 
The house church is a nondescript articulation of Christian space, representing what 
Henkel and Sakaja (2009: 49, original emphasis) term a ‘reduction of symbolism’. It 
exists in contradistinction to Buddhist symbolisations of space, whereby ‘all places 
are potentially ‘sacred’ or, at least, to be treated with some respect’ (Boord 1994: 9). 
The house church model impacts the religious mobility of non-Christians in two 
ways, both of which highlight how “it’s much more easier for someone to come into 
the house church, to walk into a house, than to actually walk into an established 
church” (Evangelical Church, Galle). First, the type of respect expected when 
entering a house is different to when entering a Buddhist temple, for example. When 
entering a house, deference is granted to the owners of the house, and not the place; 
when entering a temple it is the place that is revered, with people having to 
symbolically purify their bodies through washing, dress, and custom. Entering a 
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house church is recognised as being “easy access… [people] can come as they are” 
(Evangelical Church, Colombo); there are no restrictions or even expectations 
regarding dress and behaviour. One story shared by an evangelical pastor makes the 
point well: 
 
One time I was preaching in a home meeting… and this particular house has 
the bathing [i.e. a common well shared by a few houses]. So I saw two ladies 
walking from the neighbourhood, you know, they have this cloth around their 
chests, you know, and a bucket, a soap and a towel… So they were walking 
and they heard me preach, so they came, put the bucket on the side and sat on 
the doorstep. And they were listening; they were there throughout the service. 
So if it [were] a church, they wouldn’t have been able to come there. So it’s 
very convenient for people and they don’t see it as a threat and a disgraceful 
thing because they are not stepping into a Christian church; it’s [just] a 
neighbourhood gathering for them.  
 
The fact that the two ladies did not see the house church “as a threat” highlights the 
second way that the house church impacts the religious mobility of non-Christians. 
The power of the house church model is that, in the cultural context of Sri Lanka, it is 
not a church and is not, therefore, outwardly associated with a religion that is often 
construed in a negative light: “you can invite people, [and] they are comfortable to 
come to a house [rather] than the church… you can invite a friend, you can say that 
we have a meeting in a home, please come, then he will come because he’s coming to 
your house, not to a church” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). Visiting a church 
building holds certain negative connotations that the presumed secularity associated 
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with the house circumvents: “[non-Christians] are thinking to go to [a] church, they 
are thinking that I am changing my religion. So even their parents, relations, friends, 
they [will] say that you have gone to that religion; so when you go to a house, [that] 
doesn’t happen” (Evangelical Church, Trincomalee). This not only highlights the 
close surveillance of religious behaviour in Sri Lanka, but also shows how churches 
are negatively associated with religious conversion, which deters non-Christians from 
entering them: “when I invite [to] the church, they are frightened. If I go, surrounding 
people will say ‘your son is going to church’, so big problems” (Evangelical Church, 
Galle). The fact, therefore, that the house church is borderless enables non-Christians 
to experiment with Christianity without suffering the adverse consequences and social 
outcasting associated with attending “normal” church services. 
 
Given that Christian space is not readily accessible to most non-Christians, the house 
church provides options, choice and a means of overcoming the religious 
intransigence of Sri Lankan society: “we bring it to them; they won’t come to the 
church, that is the problem” (Evangelical Parachurch, Nuwara Eliya). The seemingly 
benign space of the house church is an enabler of religious mobility for non-
Christians as it involves experiencing a sacred network, and not a sacred place. As 
Augé (1995: 103) explains: ‘a person entering the space of non-place is relieved of his 
usual determinants’; the house church provides an opportunity for non-Christians to 
‘taste for a while… the passive joys of identity loss and the more active pleasure of 
role playing’, enabling them to experience Christianity without commitment, or 
repercussion. Instead of competing directly against Buddhism and other religious 
alternatives for ‘presence in space’ (Hervieu-Leger 2002: 101), the house church is 
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one of the most potent symbols of the effectiveness of the structural mosaic as it 
occupies a different spatial register that subverts normative conceptions of sacredness. 
 
Being a private space, using the home as a strategy of evangelical outreach is also 
more targeted, and often more successful as well. Pastors can interact with inhabitants 
in a more individualised way, which means their application of Christian teachings 
can accurately address the needs of the individuals. The more relational nature of 
private evangelism is described below, and juxtaposed against the public emphasis on 
performance: 
 
When we go to their house, we will know their pain… we will come to know 
everything, they will share with us… it is easy for us to have a chat and then 
finally to pray, and we can say that ‘yes, you believe Lord Jesus, then he will 
help you to come out of your problem’… But in open air, in public places, we 
cannot do that. So individually when we go and meet them… for example, if I 
see that he needs something, I have that, so I can give to him. So like that, so 
we can just build up our relationship with them: that is the difference 
(Evangelical Church, Trincomalee). 
 
Here, the needs of the individual are described as “pain”, with the pastor using 
conversation, prayer and other forms of provision as an ameliorative force. It is the 
targeted nature of the home that is a cause of contention, with agitators arguing that it 
suppresses debate and circumvents the need for transparency. That being said, the 
main problem pastors face when evangelising in the private domain is that of access. 
Turning up unannounced (or via “door-to-door” evangelism) is often less likely to 
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elicit a positive response than if an introduction is first made (although the use of 
foreigners, or wearing a uniform, can obviate this need). In this sense, the laity plays 
an instrumental role in generating and managing channels of access through which 
pastors can evangelise. The value of the private space of engagement is that it can 
have a snowball effect, and is often the most effective way of reaching out to a 
community: 
 
We have one strong believer there [in a mostly Buddhist village in Nuwara 
Eliya], he’s a Hindu convert… we started a small prayer group in his house; 
he has a lot of friends around so we don’t go to those houses, we ask him to 
invite them in… It’s easy to go through another person who lives there, who 
knows the community, who’s well known amongst everyone; he invites them. 
He’s like an agent of our church… He takes us to their houses so then they’re 
more welcoming… If we go in [without him] we won’t be welcome at all 
(Evangelical Church, Nuwara Eliya).  
 
Three important factors therefore underscore the use of the house as a private space of 
engagement. The first is its effectiveness in communicating Christianity in a specific 
(as opposed to general) way to a captive audience, thus making it more relevant and 
resonant with non-Christians. The second is the ease of access granted by the house, 
as discussed above, which is in contrast to the social stigma and surveillance that 
comes with frequenting a church or another designated place of religion. The third is 
the important role of the laity in providing access to Christian and non-Christian 
homes alike. Yet whilst the private domain of the home is the preferred means of 
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reaching the community at large, there is a more specific subset of the community that 
often comes under the intense focus of evangelicals: children and youths.  
 
5.6 Spaces of youth evangelism 
 
Children and youth are a particular focus of evangelical groups throughout the 
country. Most, if not all, churches have designated youth groups or youth ministries, 
and there is a range of international organisations catering specifically to Christian 
youth in Sri Lanka. Given the dependent position of many children and youth, spaces 
of youth evangelism are typically more clearly defined and contentious than those that 
target adults (see Baird 2009). Contention surrounds the ethics of targeting youths 
(and, indeed, any other “dependent”) for the purposes of proselytisation. The fact that 
the youths targeted by Christian groups are often underprivileged exacerbates such 
tensions. Agitators condemn the fact that children and youth ministries are “a very 
unobtrusive intrusion into the family life of an innocent crowd” (Buddhist 
Organisation, Colombo), whereas Christians maintain that “we try to make sure that 
there won’t be the sense of them [youths] coming into a pressured situation where the 
environment drives them to a sort of commitment” (Evangelical Parachurch, 
Colombo). As this section shows, the construction of spaces of youth evangelism is 
based on the logic that “to win them [i.e. to get children and youths to convert], you 
have to be with them” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). Spaces of youth 
evangelism are not so much about forcing commitment, but about dislocating youths 
from the everyday banality of their existing lives, which, in doing so, creates a space 
of engagement that encourages receptiveness to Christianity. As Zhang (2006) 
recognises, youths provide an entry point to the family (“they change the mind of the 
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kids, they change the mind of parents” – Buddhist Organisation, Colombo), meaning 
they are a significant focus of evangelical attention and resources around the world. 
 
	  
Figure 19: A house church service in an estate line in Nuwara Eliya  
The close quarters within which worship services are conducted make for an intense 
experience, one that encourages synchronous behaviours. 
 
Being more impressionable, receptive, and more easily manipulated than adults 
explains the evangelical focus on children and youths. Figure 19, above, portrays the 
ease with which children often unthinkingly follow the actions of their elders, and are 
liable to both religious and cultural conditioning. In doing so, it also shows how 
‘religious identities are embedded within other cultural formations and reproduced 
through everyday practices’ (Harvey et al. 2007: 25). Targeting youths during their 
formative years is a practice that is grounded in specific places. It is also a practice 
that is contingent upon the effectiveness of Christian youths engaging and interacting 
with non-Christian youths, often through play and other social activities (cf. Hopkins 
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et al’s 2011 discussion of intergenerationality in the formation of youthful 
religiosities). A Colombo-based pastor recounted a strategy of encouraging the 
members of his youth ministry to go and play cricket with other youths, the value of 
which is that “they will, at their level, speak to them, and their own struggles they can 
identify” which has the cumulative effect of being able to “break down the barriers, 
initial barriers, because you are willing to befriend them”. The following sub-sections 
explore how ‘sacred and secular meanings and relations are differentially contested in 
the construction of space’ (Harvey et al. 2007: 25). In doing so, they stand to 
contribute to an understanding of how evangelical groups create a space of 
engagement that can lead to religious acceptance, and conversion, outside of formal 
religious space. 
 
Below, I examine in detail three different spaces of youth evangelism. First I explore 
proximate spaces of youth evangelism (the Christian youth club), followed by 
detached spaces of youth evangelism (the Christian youth camp) and finally non-
Christian spaces of evangelism (the university campus). Whilst the youth club and 
camp are clearly owned and operated by Christian groups, the university campus is 
not; meaning Christian groups must find more innovative ways to engage with 
students. This section aims to elicit an understanding of where Christian engagement 
with youth begins, and how space is used to fulfil the purposes of evangelical groups.  
 
5.6.1 Proximate spaces of evangelism: the youth club  
 
Proximate spaces of evangelism are those that are an integral part of the everyday 
lives of the youths that frequent them. They are often embedded within residential 
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areas, and provide sites of engagement that enable frequent, regular, religious and 
non-religious interactions that, over time, serve to influence the values, beliefs and 
understandings of youths. Youth clubs can either be embedded within churches, or 
physically separated from them, and often focus on one or more of a range of 
activities, whether it be sports, tuition, music, English classes or crafts. Past studies 
have shown how sports and other activities that facilitate group interaction can 
encourage church involvement amongst youth and adolescents (e.g. Carpenter 2001), 
yet close consideration of how such activities can facilitate, or provide a pretext for 
conversion processes is lacking. The boundary between the sacred and the secular is, 
in the context of the youth club, decidedly ambiguous, and can encourage the 
(re)negotiation of religious identity (see Harvey et al. 2007). Christian principles often 
underscore the ethos of such clubs, even if the activities themselves are devoid of any 
overtly Christian message. Removing more overt (and therefore visible) symbols of 
religion in general and Christianity in particular is a source of appeal, as conveyed by 
one of the managers of a large youth club based in the centre of Colombo: “they [the 
youth that frequent the club] don’t see it as a place with a lot of rules, so it’s very 
different to your Sunday church, and I think that’s what makes it so appealing”. 
Whilst such clubs are a space of engagement that is distinct from the normative 
Christian premises of the church, they also offer experiences and activities that cannot 
be found in the homes of many attendees as well. Nowhere is this more true than for 
the children living in refugee camps in the north, with the youth club providing an 
opportunity for them to dislocate themselves from camp life (however temporarily), 
and regain a sense of normalcy:  
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If they are in the refugee camp, they feel that we are displaced children; the 
feelings are there. If they come out and come together with other children, 
after that they will be interested with their programmes and they will forget 
those feelings. Their mentality will develop. They will forget everything and 
come… They know this is what is out there [outside the refugee camp], they 
are not prisoners like this, then they will develop their psychological side and 
to develop their studies also (Evangelical Parachurch, Vavuniya).  
 
A focus on underprivileged youths means that the club provides an experience, and a 
space of expression, that is distinct from the home or refugee camp. As the 
abovementioned manager of the youth club in Colombo told me: “many of them [the 
youth] come from very different homes, very difficult homes… I see this as an outlet 
for them to come and get away from some of the pressures at home”. By removing the 
rules, boundaries, expectations and pressures of the Sri Lankan home specifically, and 
Sri Lankan society more generally, the clubs provide space for youths to forge an 
identity and build relationships in a setting that encourages attendees to, above all, 
have fun: “sometimes they rebel at home and then come to [a youth club] because 
they feel there is more space for us here” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). A 
“philosophy of fun” is the guiding principle of the Colombo club, and is reflected in 
the bright, multi-coloured walls, the range of activities on offer and a relatively 
laissez-faire approach to rules, boundaries and discipline. Here, the structural mosaic 
is evoked in the blurring of the boundary between religion and play: the space of the 
youth club is one of fun and distinction from the everyday pressures of Sri Lankan 
life, one that is, at face value, entirely “un-religious”, yet at the same time the club is 
grounded by Christian principles and values such as care, compassion, and often 
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evangelism as well. It is a taste of Christianity that is as far removed from the church 
– and, indeed, the temple, khovil, or mosque – as possible, but is operated with the 
intention that all youths should experience, if not accept, a new religion. Thus by 
taking Christianity out of the church, the aim is that: 
 
They [youths] need to see that knowing Jesus can be fun; it’s not a matter of 
more rules and a duller life, but it’s about living your life to the full and you 
can still have fun, you can still have friends and you can still stay out of 
trouble… people see that you still have friends who are, whom they used to 
consider religious, but who are not as bad as they thought they were, and once 
you really get to know them they are really quite fun (Evangelical Parachurch, 
Colombo). 
 
In this sense, the space of evangelism of the youth club is more about changing 
perceptions than it is religious instruction. It engages with youths on a different 
register – that of having fun, playing and socialising – that may or may not mislead 
those participating in such activities. As the wife of a youth club leader in the north of 
the island told me: “he [the husband] is a good football player, so he will go to the 
football grounds and reach the youths. One by one they will talk… If you give an 
invitation, come, we can play like them, they enjoy that; and then they will come [to 
the youth club]”. Here, the use of football is brazenly used as an invitation to join the 
youth club, and is often a precept for more religiously-motivated intentions: “a lot of 
what we do, like sports and all that, our desire would be that one day people come to 
know Jesus. But there is no compulsion in what we do; they are free to come and go. 
We do share the Good News [i.e. evangelise] in the clubs that we run” (Evangelical 
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Parachurch, Colombo). Such an admission of the sharing of “Good News” reflects the 
conflation of goals that is a point of contention for Buddhist protagonists.  
 
5.6.2 Detached spaces of evangelism: the youth camp 
 
Whilst youth clubs present proximate spaces of evangelism – those that are embedded 
within communities, used regularly, and focus on providing much needed social 
services, such as education or sport – youth camps are, in many respects, the opposite. 
They are detached from the day-to-day lives of camp attendees, ephemeral and 
infrequent, and often have a more overtly religious purpose. Most evangelical 
organisations run such camps, and they are clearly positioned as places of Christian 
learning, where Christians can become stronger in their faith, and non-Christians can 
learn more about Christianity. Thus, detachment catalyses commitment to 
Christianity: “when we really separate them [the camp participants] for a few days 
you will see the difference in them” (Evangelical Church, Nuwara Eliya). Whilst 
detachment enables more concentrated teaching and activities to take place, it also 
ensures that, for the duration of the camp, the attendees are dependent on the camp 
organisers for food, entertainment, transportation, activities and so on. Such a 
dependent relationship translates into the camp being a space of controlled freedom:  
 
If they are taken out from the comfort zone, and to another area, all their 
attention is on us, and we have all the control… Plus, it gives them the 
freedom… every time they go for a youth camp… the kids, the teens love to 
dance, you know… That’s why they go to nightclubs on weekends: to booze 
and to dance. So what we show them is hey, you know, dancing is good, but 
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it’s who you dance for, and their mind is borrowed by that. And since it’s a 
dance towards God, they accept that in that area, because they’re isolated 
(Evangelical Church, Colombo). 
 
The fact that the camp organisers are in control (as opposed to parents, teachers, or 
other religious leaders) means they are able to create a situation whereby attendees are 
free to explore outside of the rigid socio-cultural parameters of everyday Sri Lankan 
life. The absence of normative authority figures decouples attendees from the 
everyday setting, opening their minds to new possibilities for engagement. Indeed, the 
notion of dislocation and of taking youths “out from the comfort zone” is extended to 
personal friendships as well, with camp organisers seeking to disrupt existing 
friendship groups in order to make each individual as socially vulnerable as the 
others: “if I’m moving with the same person [when at the camp], then that’s not good, 
so we try to divide the friends, you know, break the friends… so that really helps 
them to make new friends and know other people” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). 
Altogether, this ensures that youths are dislocated from their existing ways of being: a 
relational process that catalyses new friendships, new behaviours and new 
possibilities for alternative religiosity (see Hopkins et al 2011).  
 
Drawing a distinction between old and new, home and camp, there and here, is 
entirely intentional, with the cumulative effect of such dislocation being that it: “gives 
them the opportunity to define themselves, as well as explore themselves” 
(Evangelical Church, Colombo). The youth camp, being spatially detached and a 
space of detachment, puts youth in a position whereby they are encouraged to think, 
question and ultimately disrupt normative patterns and understandings of society, 
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culture and behaviour. Such disruption creates a void that is filled by Christianity: 
“we spread the gospel through and in the youth camps, through the youths” 
(Evangelical Church, Colombo). Like the youth club, the youth camp is therefore 
about communicating a religious message in decidedly non-religious terms, by non-
religious actors (i.e. other youths), the net effect of which is to make Christianity a 
more attractive religious option than perhaps otherwise thought.   
 
5.6.3 Non-Christian spaces of evangelism: the university campus 
 
The final space of youth evangelism is one that is uniformly non-Christian: the 
university campus. Hopkins (2011: 158) has recently argued that ‘critical geographies 
of the university campus are curiously absent from research within human 
geography’, despite the important role-played by the university in shaping ‘the 
production of knowledge, students’ lifecourse trajectories and politics and power 
relations’. Such importance is not lost on evangelical groups, some of which (e.g. 
Campus Crusade for Christ and FOCUS – the Fellowship Of Christian University 
Students) focus specifically on evangelising in and through the campus. In Sri lanka, 
whilst the university campus is an ostensibly “non-Christian” space, I was told in 
general terms how it holds unique value insofar as: 
 
A university is like a mini Sri Lanka, a microcosm… it’s like a sample of what 
Sri Lanka is like, so all the tensions, all the trends in society, the clashes, the 
discriminations, all that you find in a smaller way within the university. And 
in a sense we can almost predict what Sri Lanka will look like in twenty years 
time by looking at what is happening in the university today, so it is an 
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important place for us to understand even Sri Lankan ministry for the future22 
(Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo).  
 
Each campus typically reflects the prevailing social, religious and politics dynamics, 
and tensions, of the locality in which it is situated. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
Christians, and Christianity, often face resistance on the campus. Despite such 
resistance, the university campus is also an important focus of Christian activity. Like 
the urban nodes described above, a multiplier effect is at work, given that the 
“campus is going to bring the leaders for tomorrow. So if we influence them [the 
students], then the influence is greater” (Christian Convert, Colombo). Such influence 
is, however, difficult to impart upon non-Christian students, and underscores the need 
to understand ‘the different ways in which university campuses are constructed, 
contested, managed and experienced in a range of exclusive, marginalising or 
empowering ways’ (Hopkins 2011: 158). The boundary between the campus and the 
outside world is clearly demarcated and often enforced, rendering it an exclusive 
place, and meaning “the outside world can’t do anything in the campus, because the 
campus, only the student can enter the campus” (Christian Convert, Colombo). 
Students are key agents of evangelism within the campus, whereas adult evangelists 
find ways to interact with students once they leave. As one such adult evangelist 
explained: 
 
When the students come out [of the campus], and they are very free, and they 
can go and have a cup of tea, and they will have time. They will be willing to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Incidentally, beyond the lingering effects of the ethnic conflict, another key source of tension within 
the campus is the rural-urban divide (previously discussed), which is manifested particularly strongly 
in terms of language (i.e. English versus mother tongue), and the knock-on effect this has in terms of 
securing employment. The stereotypical Christian (i.e. one that is more “Westernised” than his or her 
counterparts) fuels allegations of inequality and unethical practice.   
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meet, you know, they like to share. And inside the campus they are frightened 
of who will see us, you know, kind of like when I meet some students now, 
others will ask who I am; why do you want to meet with us, you know? So 
they will be questioned, but outside, no problem (Evangelical Parachurch, 
Colombo). 
 
In an ironic reversal of logic, extricating the student from the campus results in them 
opening their minds and being susceptible to new ideas and influences (similar to the 
youth camp, but in reverse). This runs contra to Nagata’s (2005: 111) understanding 
of school and university space in Malaysia, which, she argues, have become sites of 
‘some of the most vigorous religious experimentation, competition, and membership 
“poaching”’. Instead, away from the surveillance of their peers, and outside the 
campus boundaries, Sri Lankan students become more receptive and pliable than 
inside the campus, akin to the effect of taking youths outside of the home, the refugee 
camp, or their everyday surroundings and to the youth club, or the camp.  
 
The campus is not, however, devoid of evangelism. Because of the strong surveillance 
by non-Christian students, evangelical activity fills a different spatial register, taking 
the form of prayer walks that enable Christianity to permeate the campus in a low-key 
and non-suspect way. As the same adult evangelist cited above told me: “we prepare 
ourselves and we go around the campus, praying, asking the Lord to bring the peace 
to the campus; the student will experience the unity and the love, and at the same time 
the campus will [be] open[ed] to the God’s word and, you know, the gospel”. Thus 
whilst outward expressions of evangelism are rendered unsafe (and have resulted in 
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physical attacks on outside evangelists), prayer walks provide a spatially embedded, 
yet concealed means of fulfilling an evangelical agenda.  
 
Another form of spatial embeddedness that evangelists use to reach the student 
populace is to engage faculty in evangelical work. Using Christian faculty members 
as spatially embedded agents (what Buddhist agitators call “brokers”), they are able to 
engage Christian and non-Christian students in ways that other students, or outsiders, 
may not be able to do. They are particularly useful in situations where “there are not 
too many Christians in university, but we have a Christian staff worker… it’s a more 
informal kind of approach” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). The hierarchical 
nature of university faculty means that they circumvent many of the issues and 
restrictions faced by other, non-faculty evangelists on campus, and become an 
important source of influence that can be used to evangelise the non-Christian student 
body. Indeed, by bringing the structural mosaic back into consideration, it is clear that 
locations of evangelism are often imbued with mixed meaning, whether it is the 
home, the youth club or the campus. Spaces of evangelism leverage the structural 
mosaic by integrating different forms of engagement and influencing, which often 
leads to a conflation of goals. This contributes to an understanding of how evangelical 
space can be obfuscated, and the locations of evangelism can become more 
audacious.  
 
5.7 Obfuscating evangelical space using the structural mosaic 
 
Whilst the preceding sections have examined how evangelical groups react to 
different spatial environments (i.e. urban-rural), and use different spaces for different 
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evangelical purposes (i.e. public-private), with a specific focus on the house church 
and the spaces of youth evangelism, this final section examines how Buddhist spaces 
in particular (i.e. the temple) have been appropriated as sites of evangelical practice. 
The structural mosaic presupposes multiple layers of spatial ordering that obfuscate 
the distinction between structure and agency; it creates niches that enable new 
religious options to flourish (Henkel and Sakaja 2009). This contributes to the 
emergence of ambiguous places that integrate both religious and secular, or different 
religious meanings and identities in one site (see Massey 2005; Hopkins et al. 2011). 
The ensuing two sub-sections examine two distinct types of spatial ordering that 
engage with the structural mosaic: spaces of subordination and spaces of subversion. 
In the first instance, spaces of subordination exist when evangelical groups embed 
themselves within the Buddhist space of the temple, expressing deference to the 
prevailing religious structure. In the second instance, house churches are widespread 
spaces of subversion, as they are used to disguise evangelical presence. Both are 
typically aggressive forms of evangelical outreach, and highlight how the structural 
mosaic is used to help obfuscate evangelical space.  
 
5.7.1 The Buddhist temple as a space of subordination 
 
Evangelical groups practice strategies of subordination by using space to obfuscate 
the distinction between structure and agency. Such strategies involve deference to the 
Buddhist structure, manifested by Lefebvre’s (1991) representations of space. In Sri 
Lanka, the temple plays a centripetal role in villages throughout the country; it is the 
political centre of the community, and is traditionally used to meet the social, and 
religious needs of the village: “in every village you will have a Buddhist temple, there 
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is a Buddhist… structure there” (Christian NGO, Colombo). Evangelical 
organisations embrace this fact, regularly using temple grounds as a base for social 
ministry projects: 
  
We have a [medical] clinic once a month: one in the [Buddhist] temple, the 
second one in the municipal council, the third in his [the pastor’s] church, so it 
rotates. So when we go there they know, OK, it’s a church, but it’s [also] a 
community service (Evangelical Church, Colombo). 
 
The apparent trade-off between “church” and “community service” shows an 
expansion of the sites of community provision, from just the temple to the church as 
well. Such a substitution is especially contentious when it comes to children’s 
education, given that “in ancient Sri Lanka the education was completely on the hand 
of [i.e. provided by] the priest and in the temples; the temples were the schools” 
(Buddhist Organisation, Kandy). Christian Montessori’s are often located within both 
Christian churches, and Buddhist temples, and reflect the spatial possibilities afforded 
by non-religious engagement with society. Such engagement is the beginning of a 
process of religious acceptance: “in a place called Ratmalana [a southern Colombo 
suburb], in a Buddhist temple, we have a children’s ministry, and the monk is so 
happy… And we work closely with the monk… and he knows we are Christian, but 
he is trusting us, he knows, and works very closely with us. So we have kind of built 
that rapport, that trust” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). Operating within the 
confines of the Buddhist temple reflects an encroachment of Christian influence into 
the traditionally sacrosanct confines of Buddhist space; a process that enables 
multifaceted forms of competition to exist within the same spatial register.   
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The motivations for locating evangelical ministries within temple grounds are, 
apparently, benign. It is argued that the temple is “a base for the community, it’s a 
place that the community recognises as reaching out to the community, and as long as 
you can keep both actions [social ministry and evangelism] distinct, I think it’s valid 
[to operate within the temple precinct]” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). For 
evangelical groups to “keep both actions distinct” is, however, rarely possible in 
practice. Given the transformative potential of close geographical proximity and 
association, a veneer of distinction belies what religious agents have to gain from 
embedding themselves within Buddhist space. Whilst Megoran (2010: 383, original 
emphasis; see also Gerhardt 2008) shows how personal encounters can lead to an 
ostensibly positive reframing of self and other, in this instance the fact that Christians 
minister to society within Buddhist space foregrounds a politics of proximity that 
adds an extra layer of meaning to the ‘ways of being in certain places’. Whilst the 
reframing of self and other is positive, interrogation of the multivalent state of 
“being” suggests that space-bound encounters are perhaps more value-laden than 
otherwise recognised. In this instance, evangelicals use Buddhist space to 
circumnavigate suspicion, and speak to people and groups in ways that both enforce 
and yet challenge structural norms.  
 
The traditional role of the temple in Sri Lanka as dispensary of Buddhist values and 
guidance, and as symbol of identity (Southwold 1983: 18), means that a focus on 
social ministry enables the recognition of evangelical pastors within everyday spatial 
registers of religious power and influence. Buddhist monks are authoritative figures 
that can easily mobilise the population against elements that are seen as foreign, or as 
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threatening the “interests” of the village. As a result, evangelical groups often express 
deference to monks, using them as channels through which aid can be distributed to 
villagers. In many instances: “money [i]s distributed by the monk; it [i]s given to the 
monk, and it [i]s done in the temple; because the monk is the civil authority of many 
places, we respect that, and we will work under a system that recognises the authority 
of the monk” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). Apparent subservience to the 
religious structure (“we will work under a system”) masks the fact that Christian 
groups have their own system of operation that strives to influence the existing 
hierarchy23. As a point of comparison, in post-tsunami Aceh, Indonesia, some 
Christian NGOs used donor funds to rebuild Islamic infrastructure, showing 
awareness of the fact that “if you want to have an impact here you have to do it 
through Islam” (cited in McGregor 2010: 741). In Sri Lanka, as in Indonesia, 
evangelicals cloak religious difference in the garb of religious fixity by operating 
within temple boundaries, complicating the normative assumption that ‘identities are 
constructed by establishing difference, by the drawing of boundaries, by defining 
what they are not: there is always an Other, and ‘othering’ is always a power relation’ 
(Vincent and Warf 2002: 46). The structural mosaic leads to the complication of two-
dimensional constructions of religious boundaries and difference, instead showing the 
multi-dimensionality of evangelical agency. The verisimilitude of the temple grounds, 
along with the place-bound actions of evangelism within the temple boundary, 
contributes to an expansion of people’s spatial frame of reference along new axes, 
creating new possibilities for evangelical engagement and alterity.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 It should be noted that allegations of corruption within Sri Lanka’s monastic community are 
rampant, and stem from both the academy and civil society.  
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The temple grounds also create opportunities for more subversive forms of 
evangelical engagement. The desired outcome of the strategies of spatial 
subordination, previously outlined, is not just to gain the acceptance of the temple or 
community; it is a necessary first step in the sequencing of the structural mosaic. 
Spatial subordination translates into spatial subversion, just as Christian co-optation 
translates into religious influencing over time. One pastor of a Colombo-based church 
told me how his regional church-planting strategy does, in the early stages, have little 
to do with the actual planting of churches: “if I come in [to a village] and say, ‘you 
know, I’m going to build a church’; they [the village] will compare and say ‘what’s 
going to happen to the temple?’” In lieu of a church, a strategy of spatial 
subordination is used to gain the acceptance of the temple first, before adopting a 
more formal evangelical presence: “if I come in and say ‘OK, we’re going to have a 
mobile clinic in the temple’, then they will say ‘OK, this is OK’”. Here the position of 
religious polarity (i.e. church in opposition to temple) is substituted for one of 
cohesion and subordination (i.e. medical clinic inside temple). The mobile clinic 
provides a pretext for Christian engagement; the temple grounds not only enable the 
obfuscation of evangelical space, but the obfuscation of evangelical intent as well. In 
a similar vein, using the house as a church not only deflects suspicion, but is also an 
effective way of attracting non-Christians. For these reasons, the house church is a 
clear and pervasive example of a space of subversion.  
 
5.7.2 The house church as a space of subversion 
 
The house church is a highly politicised space of subversion. The outward articulation 
of the house church as being a “non-threatening” space deflects suspicion and attracts 
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non-Christians, but the very fact that it is so innocuous is, paradoxically, a 
destabilising force that threatens the prevailing religious structure. As Baird (2009: 
459; see also Appadurai 1996) recognises in the context of the highlands of 
Cambodia, house churches ‘are spaces where highlanders can regain agency in the 
face of increasingly losing political and economic power’. The same is true in Sri 
Lanka, where Christians are often denied public expressions of agency, resorting to 
more privatised expressions instead. In this vein, the house provides a pretext for 
Christianity, to the consternation of one mainline pastor who argued “if they go and 
establish themselves as a church somewhere, there can be a lot of opposition. So they 
pretend to be very innocent tenants and then they use it [the house] for another 
purpose” (Mainline Church, Colombo). Church buildings can be seen, mapped, and 
surveyed by all; house churches cannot. As a result, Christians are actively 
encouraged to realise a situation whereby “every home becomes a church in the 
neighbourhood” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). Indeed, when asked what the value 
of the house church model is, one representative of an evangelical parachurch 
organisation with extensive experience planting churches throughout the island 
highlighted the irony of the situation well: 
 
It does not stand out; it is part of the community. And I think that is the main 
thing – it fits in. The minute a pastor who is having maybe twenty families 
meeting in his home, the minute he attempts to put up a larger, official, 
structure, there is something in the mindset of the villagers which, even 
though they have accepted him or even tolerated him so far in his home, 
would react to that. They feel that [the temple] is part of the established 
structure, and people don’t want to change, they don’t want to rock the boat. 
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So conversely, the same thing, they don’t want the church also to rock the boat 
and disturb the established society too much. 
 
The house church is inherently contradictory: it “does not stand out” because it 
constructs Christian space within a house, not a church, and in doing so subverts 
cultural norms regarding religious place; pastors are “accepted” or “tolerated” 
because their church is not “official”; when it is “official” such goodwill is seen to 
dissipate; and finally, “people don’t want to change” and they don’t want the church 
to “disturb the established society too much”, yet the very fact that the house church 
operates covertly is because its aim is to disturb established society and change the 
prevailing religious order. It is this sense of subversion that antagonises some 
Buddhists, who object to the house being converted into a place of religious worship: 
“the house belongs to a person, don’t convert that to a church” (Buddhist 
Organisation, Colombo). The contradictions that are inherent to the space of 
subversion of the house church are hidden by the fact that “the sacred” is, as 
Chidester and Linenthal (1995: 18) stipulate, an ‘empty signifier’, yet ‘by virtue of its 
emptiness could mean anything or nothing, its emptiness is filled with meaningful 
content as a result of specific strategies of symbolic engagement’. House churches 
capitalise on the fact that the sacred is an “empty signifier” by contravening the 
prevailing assumption that the sacred is place-bound and static. Instead, they create 
sacred networks, “filled with meaningful content” (and associations), that enable the 
house church to become a space of subversion in and of itself.  
 
Scaling up the logic of the house church, and as a precursor to Chapter 6 (which 
explores, amongst other things, the politics of church registration), the structural 
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mosaic is also employed as a means of church assimilation, and acceptance within the 
public domain. The popularity of the house church model of worship is, in part, due to 
the fact that it enables Christian groups to gain a modicum of acceptance before 
expanding into a separate, officially registered, church building. More aggressive 
strategies of physical expansion also require the subterfuge that is a necessary 
condition of the structural mosaic. One pastor of an established (i.e. officially 
registered) evangelical church explained his vision for church growth, and his 
implementation strategy:  
 
You can build a building and use it for commercial purpose[s] Monday to 
Saturday. [If you] have an air-conditioned building, you can hire it for 
seminars and stuff like that, Sunday use it for your church service, in which 
case you don’t have to register it as a church. You can have it as a, maybe as a 
community centre, right? … Kandy doesn’t have a youth centre, we are going 
to build a youth centre where you will have badminton, squash, weightlifting, 
a gym, a coffee shop… We will not register it as, in a sense, as a church. We 
will say it is a, it will be designated like any other community centre or hall. 
 
In its simplest form, this strategy of spatial expansion reflects a scaling-up of the logic 
of the house church. Using a definitively non-religious space – in this case a 
“community centre” that offers activities such as “badminton, squash, weightlifting, a 
gym, a coffee shop” – for religious activity – enables the church to circumnavigate the 
religious framework imparted by the state. The range of activities planned on being 
offered ensures access to a broad cross-section of the population, and will enable the 
“church” to become an important centre of and for the community, and a base from 
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which Christianity can become more entrenched, and empowered. The fact that many 
churches struggle to gain the permissions needed to formally register a church 
building underscores the power of the structural mosaic in providing new, often 
radical possibilities for Christian acceptance and expansion in and through different 




This chapter has explored in detail the locations of evangelical praxis in Sri Lanka. To 
begin, I identified the importance of locational hierophanies in binding pastors to 
particular locations, and encouraging resilience in the face of adversity. Following 
that, spaces of evangelism were explored, focussing in turn on the rural-urban 
paradox and the public-private paradox. Regarding the rural-urban paradox, I first 
identified urban nodes (in particular, Colombo) as the engines of evangelical 
Christian growth in Sri Lanka. Urban nodes are spaces in which conversion is most 
likely (due to the effects of anomie and lower levels of socio-cultural bondage), and 
contribute to the spatial diffusion of evangelicals. I then explored the supply of 
Christianity, showing how in rural areas people are typically immobile (which makes 
them easier to engage) and resistant, whereas in urban areas people are typically 
mobile (which makes them harder to engage) but more open to religious alternatives. 
Finally, I examined the demand for Christianity, showing in particular how, in rural 
areas, the group has an overbearing influence upon individual religious choice.  
 
The following section explored the public-private paradox, focussing specifically on 
how formal religious groups occupy the public domain whilst, in contrast, informal 
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(e.g. evangelical) groups operate in and through the private domain. First, I examined 
the public place of religion in Sri Lanka, highlighting how identity (e.g. a cross) and 
access are two defining characteristics of formally recognised religious buildings. 
Second, I explored the network-based formations of the house church, showing how 
the lack of boundaries enables a form of organisational mobility and autonomy. Third, 
I examined public sites of evangelism, focussing specifically on the refugee camp and 
the crusade rally. Finally, I examined the house as a more pervasive, private site of 
evangelism that has proven to be an effective way of engaging people and reducing 
the stigma associated with religious experimentation.  
 
Following that, I explored three spaces of youth evangelism: the youth club (as a 
proximate space of evangelism), the youth camp (as a detached space of evangelism) 
and the university campus (as a non-Christian space of evangelism). Whilst the youth 
club encourages regular, everyday engagement with a space of Christianity, the youth 
camp is detached from the everyday lives of the participants, creating a space of 
controlled freedom that is recognised as being conducive to religious experimentation. 
The university campus was identified as being typically resistant to evangelical 
activity, with the university perimeter providing an important boundary that dictates 
the openness of students to religious alternatives. Finally, I explored the obfuscation 
of evangelical space using the structural mosaic, focussing first on the Buddhist 
temple as a space of subordination, followed by the house church as a space of 
subversion. In the first instance I showed how Buddhist spaces are appropriated as 
sites of evangelical praxis, and in the second, how the house church deflects suspicion 
whilst simultaneously contributing to Christian growth.  
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Having explored some of the spatial paradoxes that beset evangelical groups in Sri 
Lanka, this chapter examines the politics associated with Christian growth. The 
argument throughout is that the politics of evangelical Christian growth is, to a large 
extent, driven by different interpretations and uses of space and place by Buddhist and 
Christian groups respectively. Whilst Buddhist groups seek to control the use of 
public space by religious minorities, evangelical groups focus on avoiding public 
engagement and instead operate in and through the private domain of the house as 
much as possible. This creates a dialectic of competing religious interests and actions, 
and contributes to a number of religious outcomes that are often the unintended 
consequences of converting space, and converting people. In addition, the structural 
mosaic aids and abets religious conversion, and fuels (mis)conceptions of unethical 
practice. It is these differences and (mis)conceptions that catalyse tension and 
misunderstanding, and provide a platform that underpins the unethical conversion 
discourse. Indeed, recognising and articulating such differences is a necessary 
precursor to any sort of inter-religious dialogue and understanding.  
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections, and explores the various politics 
associated with evangelical Christian growth. I start by examining the place-bound 
politics of growth, in particular the strategies of spatial buffering and the politics of 
permission that restrict the establishment and enlargement of a formalised (i.e. public) 
Christian presence. Whilst spatial buffering refers to a range of measures taken by 
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Buddhist groups to isolate and contain the spatial growth of place-bound Christian 
groups (i.e. those that have a church building, or a recognised house church), the 
politics of permission refers to the problems that Christian groups face when trying to 
formally register a church and, thus, become place-bound. The inability of many 
churches to become formally registered fuels the growth of the house church 
movement and, in this vein, the following section examines the politics of converting 
a house into a church. In particular, I focus on the politics of place(lessness) 
associated with the house church, and how such politics contributes to church fission 
and encourages dualistic religious behaviours (i.e. whereby Christian “converts” 
retain their previous religious practices and beliefs). Following that I examine the 
politics of converting people. I show how the market mentality of evangelicals can 
encourage unethical action, and explore some of the spatial modalities of the unethical 
conversion discourse (focussing specifically on how evangelism in and through the 
private domain is reconstituted by Buddhists as “unethical”). I also highlight the 
relationship between the structural mosaic and “unethical” practice (whether real or 
perceived), and show how leveraging the structural mosaic encourages pastors to 
engage in activities that can be interpreted as forceful, fraudulent or alluring. Finally, 
I end the chapter by exploring different understandings of “unethical” conversion, the 
aim being to add counterbalance to a debate that is currently (and unfairly) dominated 
by Buddhist allegations of unethical Christian practice only.   
 
6.2 Place-bound politics of growth 
 
This section focuses specifically on the place-bound politics of formally registered 
churches. It is based on the observation that being formally registered does not 
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exempt churches from resistance, or association with their unregistered counterparts. 
To this end, some formally registered evangelical churches even prefer to remove any 
outward markers of religiosity that may attract resistance from the community. For 
example, one evangelical church located in a Colombo suburb did not, until relatively 
recently, put up a signboard to identify itself, despite being well established within the 
community, and formally registered. The leader of the church explained his initial 
intentions to forego the signboard, and why he changed his mind:  
 
They [the local Buddhist opposition] were saying that we were hiding it that 
we were a church, and so we said ‘OK, we’re not hiding, we will put up this 
board’, so we put it up. Our main reason was not to upset the village, I mean 
why do you want to upset the feelings of your neighbours? If it means putting 
a cross is an obstacle to them, it doesn’t help. I mean, it doesn’t increase our 
faith or decrease our faith if we don’t have a cross.  
 
The lack of a signboard reflects an attempt to decouple the church from prevailing 
understandings of Christian place, which are associated with church architecture, 
crucifixes and signboards that reveal the identity of the building. In doing so, they are 
met with suspicion by Buddhist agitators who feel that such privatised religious 
practices are a form of deception that mask the subversive intentions of evangelical 
groups. One such agitator explained how “in our country, if it is a religious worship 
place it has to be displayed. It has to be a public place… If it looks outside like a 
house, you can’t practice religious worship inside. If you are doing that, that is 
wrong… They are trying to play [the] fool with the people” (Buddhist Organisation, 
Colombo). Yet whilst some churches choose to adopt a non-public veneer, others are 
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unable to establish a public presence, and have to resort to alternative (i.e. house 
church) models of meeting and worship instead. Below I examine in detail two 
examples of place-bound politics of growth. The first examines established churches, 
and how practices of spatial buffering, such as the appropriation and veneration of 
Bodhi (“Bo”) trees by Buddhists, and the construction of Buddhist statues, are 
employed as ‘spatial strategies of purification and exclusion’ (Henkel and Sakaja 
2009: 40). The second examines the politics of permission associated with gaining the 
legal approvals necessary to convert a house church into a registered church. 
Recognition of the difficulties faced by evangelical groups in obtaining the 
permission needed to formally register a church leads into the second part of the 
chapter, which explores the politics of converting a house into a church – the spatial 
modality within which most evangelical churches operate.  
 
6.2.1 Spatial buffering as a strategy of resistance 
 
Throughout Sri Lanka, the planting and growth of evangelical churches does not 
occur unabated, and Buddhist groups often employ strategies of spatial containment 
to restrict or control such growth. In this vein, the spatial buffering of evangelical 
Christian expansion is where measures are taken to isolate and contain Christianity 
whilst simultaneously articulating very visible, and overt expressions of Buddhist 
hegemony. Two examples prove the point well: one is the appropriation and 
veneration of Bo trees by Buddhist adherents; the other is the construction of 
Buddhist statues.  
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In the first instance, Bo trees are a distinct, and sacred, point of spatial reference for 
Buddhists. Tambiah (1986: 60) argues that they have become a ‘cult object’ amongst 
Sri Lankan Buddhists. His argument is brought to life by the conflict described by 
Yurman (1967: 322-3) in his ethnography of Ceylon, whereby the location of a Bo 
tree prevented the construction of a Hindu khovil in a village in the country’s interior. 
In many respects, Bo trees are a natural form of Buddhist hierophany that are 
appropriated by Buddhists as a symbol of the sovereignty that they claim over Sri 
Lanka, and can potentially cause problems for the spatial establishment of other 
religious groups. As one Colombo-based evangelical explained:   
 
Bo trees are supposed to be a venerable thing, so they [Buddhists] can anytime 
come and sit around it and make it a place where they worship, and then it can 
cause problems; to quickly eliminate it is better. Normally if there is a Bo tree, 
a wild Bo tree even, monks setup an abode there, they claim it… [in] the south 
there are many places like that, so that is the reason why people [Christian 
pastors] are scared [of Bo trees]… In a rural area, if it is state land, they 
[Buddhists] will definitely claim it.  
 
This excerpt further enforces the division between rural and urban areas: whilst Bo 
trees will “definitely be claimed” in rural areas, in urban areas they are commonly 
used as a pragmatic buffer to stop people from illegally dumping rubbish on 
seemingly unclaimed land. Moreover, the reference to Christian pastors being 
“scared” of Bo trees is grounded in the reality that “if you have a Bo tree [on church 
premises] it’s a problem because the next thing there is a Buddhist statue and then a 
temple” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo – see Figure 20, below). Indeed, one 
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church I visited in a Colombo suburb had a sapling of a Bo tree growing on the roof 
of an outside toilet cubicle. Whilst the pastor removed and disposed of it in front of 
me with good humour, in other places the maintenance of religious boundaries can be 
more problematic, as one leader of a parachurch organisation told me: 
 
One church I know in Kandy, which was directly opposite the office of an 
[Buddhist] organisation, directly opposite, and a Bo tree was growing, a 
sapling was growing on top of the roof. So they had to very strategically 
remove it, not during the daytime, because if [they had not removed it] it 
would have given them a very valid reason to make this Christian church, or 
part of it, a focal point for Buddhist worship. 
 
Not only does this draw attention to the sensitivity with which Bo trees must be 
treated in order to avoid offense (i.e. removing it “strategically” at night, rather than 
during the day), but it also highlights the practical necessity of defending Christian 
space against Buddhist encroachment. Whilst evangelical Christians commonly 
eschew the sacred dimensions of church space, they readily recognise the threat posed 
by the sacredness of Buddhist space, and go to lengths to defend the physical 
boundaries of Christianity. As the same representative of the parachurch organisation 
commented: “you fence your property, you close your doors, you distinguish your 
identity, so it is the need for distinguishing your identity which causes you to react to 
the other object” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). Such a need to distinguish self 
from other serves, I would argue, more of a political purpose than it does a religious 
one. Whilst Christian space is not necessarily sacralised, it is representative of 
religious alterity and, as such, stands to benefit from erasing and defending itself 
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Figure 20: A fully-grown Bo tree and adjoining Buddhist shrine, Colombo 
 
Whilst the removal of Bo trees represents the protection of Christian space, the 
planting of Bo trees is also a strategy of resistance that is used to prevent the 
establishment of a Christian presence. A leader of one of Sri Lanka’s largest 
evangelical churches told me a story that illustrates the point well: 
 
We had a pastor in the southern area who faced opposition. They [Buddhists] 
did everything they could to prise him out of the place where he was staying, 
and ultimately he moved out and stayed somewhere else. Then in the next 
[plot of] land, which was bare, they came and planted a Bo tree so that he 
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won’t be able to make this [his house] into a church. It was just a device, it 
wasn’t a place of worship; it’s about the perceptions. 
 
Here, the Bo tree is used as “a device” to restrict expressions of Christian religiosity; 
it is a form of regulation that draws on community perceptions of the spirituality of 
the Bo tree. To remove the Bo tree is to remove a barrier to Christian acceptance and 
growth – a form of spatial resistance and counter-resistance that churches must 
constantly negotiate.   
 
In the second instance, the construction of Buddhist statues and shrines reflects 
human attempts to counter, compromise, or otherwise contain Christian assertions of 
spatial sovereignty. Figure 21 (below) provides a clear example of Buddhist 
containment. Depicting the perimeter wall of an established evangelical church 
located in a residential Colombo suburb and, adjacent to it, a (relatively) new 
Buddhist shrine, the aggressive visual and auditory positioning of Buddhism relative 
to the church perimeter is revealing. As the founder of the church told me: “this 
Buddhist statue came about two to three years ago, whereas we have been here for the 
last, almost twenty years”. The shrine, I was told, is a symbol of local-scale Buddhist 
revivalism that seeks to counter, in a physical sense, the encroachment of Christianity, 
and is therefore construed as part of a broader “anti-Christian movement”. Before 
anybody enters the church they must first pass the Buddhist statue, and the chanting 
that is relayed by the opportunely positioned loudspeakers located above the shrine 
(with one facing the church) frequently interrupts church services and prayer 
meetings. In this instance, the counter-colonisation of space takes material, visual and 
aural forms as well. The pastor went on to add that “at least outwardly they are trying 
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to practice their religion, to some extent, by having all these statues all over the 
country”; a statement that reflects the marked differences between Christian and 
Buddhist conceptualisations of sacred space. Whilst Buddhists conceive space in a 
way that enables it to be fixed, venerated and potentially exclusionary, evangelicals 
adopt a more fluid approach that is detached from the places that they inhabit. Thus 
whilst the construction of Buddhist statues contributes to a place-bound politics of 
growth, such politics are compromised by different understandings of sacred space.  
 
	  
Figure 21: Spatial crowding in a Colombo suburb  
The wall and signboard on the left are the outer limits of the premises of an 
evangelical church, whereas the Buddhist shrine, and the loudspeaker above it, is a 
more recent addition. 
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Statues are a form of spatial buffering that provide visible, even if sometimes 
meaningless, attempts to invigorate Buddhist religiosity: “now in Sri Lanka, every 
street having a Buddhist statue; why? This is Buddhist country!” (Evangelical 
Church, Nuwara Eliya). The construction of statues is especially concentrated in the 
southern coastal town of Galle, with one evangelical pastor pointing out to me where 
different statues are located, and why their numbers have grown in recent years: 
“even you can see if you go there and look the other side, you see another shrine, 
statue, you go there, statue, you look up the hill, you will see a peace pagoda, if you 
go this way there is a temple… before there was not that much of statues, but they 
[Buddhists] saw what’s going to happen. They are trying to challenge; they want to 
protect their authority [which] they feel that [they are] losing”. Yet whilst such statues 
are often a source of annoyance, the challenge they pose to Christians goes largely 
unnoticed. Instead, the motivations behind the construction and utility of such statues 
is often questioned: “we are not challenged by the statues much, because they have no 
influence. They have not influenced the society… But like I said, one person, he will 
like to gain merits by building” (Evangelical Church, Galle). Here, the value of the 
statue is believed to be a relatively quick and easy way for wealthy benefactors to 
gain individual merit, rather than a reflection of more wide-ranging Buddhist 
revivalism. In other words, they are believed to serve individual, rather than public 
need: “the thing is if they are effective, all these people need to gather around to 
worship; [but] they just stand there and the crows come and eat the things that they 
have, they are not worshipped, you know?” (Evangelical Church, Galle). This final 
comment reflects, in many respects, the paucity of Buddhism in responding to the 
perceived threat of evangelical Christian growth, with the statues being interpreted as 
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a meaningless distraction rather than a meaningful necessity that are needed to meet 
the religious demands of Buddhist society.   
 
6.2.2 The politics of permission 
 
Whilst spatial buffering is a strategy employed to contain the spread of place-bound 
Christian groups, the majority of evangelical churches are informal, and struggle to 
gain the permissions needed to formalise their presence and become place-bound. In 
many instances, a public presence is something that evangelical churches aspire 
towards, but is difficult to attain. In theory a public presence would appease many of 
the groups that are resistant to evangelical Christianity, yet in practice there are 
structural restrictions that prevent many churches from adopting a more public, and 
formalised, position in society. The official position adopted by the government is 
that “there are no restrictions for any religious practices in Sri Lanka; this is a free 
country” (Urban Development Authority, Colombo), with one representative of the 
Urban Development Authority (UDA) going on to state how “a religious building is 
taken as a public space, so when you want to have a public place you need this much 
access, you will need this many parking bays [and access to utilities, etc.]”. 
Converting a house to a church is permitted, as long as you “obtain approval from the 
local government authority and the Urban Development Authority” (Buddhist 
Organisation, Colombo). Obtaining such approvals is what drives the politics of 
permission.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of such functional prerequisites (i.e. access, parking 
bays, and so on), the ideal that “there are no restrictions for any religious practices in 
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Sri Lanka” is relative to the location and context in which it is applied, with the 
prevailing sentiment being that “a house is not a proper place to have a religious 
meeting, so if there is a conversion [i.e. from house to church], then UDA will have to 
take action and stop it” (Urban Development Authority, Colombo). Such sentiment 
imposes a degree of intransigence upon the legislative system to approve the 
conversion of a house to a church. As was told to me repeatedly throughout the 
fieldwork, “it [the ability to get planning or building permission for a church] depends 
on the area and the way that you move with the people and the authorities” (Mainline 
Church, Colombo), with one southern pastor adding that “there is a provincial council 
that governs each area; to get a building permit you must get their permission… they 
won’t give, they will keep delaying it, or they can even stop it, saying that the peace 
of the area is disturbed”. This reifies the importance of the strategic extra-group 
networks of influence, previously discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Civil society often dictates which religious groups are allowed a public presence, and 
serves to complicate the religious neutrality claimed by the government. State 
neutrality is an ideal used by anti-Christian groups to further restrict the activities and 
presence of Christianity. It is widely acknowledged amongst the Christian community 
that: “if people oppose [the church], even the government cannot do anything. If my 
surrounding says we don’t need a church here, then even if the government wants to 
give me the permission, they have to stop it, they will stop it” (Evangelical Church, 
Matara). Even the leader of a mainline church admitted that “today there is almost 
complete restrictions in putting up a so-called church, complete restrictions 
throughout the island for any church, whether mainline or not”. Discretion is deemed 
a necessary corollary to the “complete restrictions” Christian groups face, forcing 
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evangelical groups to disconnect themselves from the confines of the formal religious 
economy. It is this disconnection that renders regulatory constraints on growth 
ineffective, as it undermines the demand-side logic upon which land is allocated for 
religious purposes. A Buddhist explained:  
 
If the people want a church there, they will give the land… They can’t buy the 
land because the people doesn’t want to… establish [a] church in their village. 
If I go to any village… I say I want about 2-3 perches24 to put up a worship 
place, they will give to me. Only thing is that I have to practice, I have to 
follow the rules and regulations (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo).  
 
Simply put, whilst top-down systems of land allocation are designed to ensure that the 
supply of religion meets the demand, many evangelical groups use the house to 
supply Christianity to communities first, and then create demand to meet the supply. 
This practice is contentious. Until the house church is large enough to be absorbed 
within the official structure of society, and to reify its presence with a publicly 
recognised church building, it subverts the “rules and regulations established by the 
state to build up the worship places” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). It also causes 
an inflation of Christian supply, forcing the house church to become an underground 
movement. Although the house often foreshadows the church, the transition is long 
and frustrating for some – “[sometimes] pastor is trying to build a church without 
winning the acceptance of people, they are impatient… When I came here to build a 
church, I already had 200 people” (Evangelical Church, Matara) – and can encourage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 1 perch = approximately 25 square metres.  
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situations whereby Christian supply outstrips demand, contributing to an image of 
Christian insensitivity and aggression. 
 
6.3 Converting houses into churches 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, evangelical Christian groups are defined by a heavy 
reliance on house church patterns of worship (although some mainline churches also 
use the house church model, especially in rural areas). The reasons for such reliance 
are twofold. One, as I argued in the preceding “politics of permission” sub-section, 
the approvals needed to legally register, build or expand a church are notoriously 
difficult to obtain, even for mainline churches. Compounding this is the fact that 
evangelical churches, by virtue of their theological orientation, pursue an aggressive 
remit of growth that encourages worship to be less place-contingent, and therefore 
less sensitive to the restrictions (and formalities) associated with establishing a 
religious presence. Two, house churches are a cheap, informal and flexible alternative 
to place-bound patterns of Christian worship. They are easy to establish and grow 
because, visually, they do not symbolise the encroachment of Christianity. As such, 
the house church ensures that evangelical Christianity remains an underground 
movement that is amorphous, subversive, and almost impossible to contain. 
Notwithstanding, the conversion of space that the establishment of the house church is 
predicated upon is replete with politics, which often serve to undermine the house 
church as an arbiter of evangelical growth.  
 
In the three sub-sections that follow, I explore the politics of converting space that are 
an inextricable part of establishing a house church. First I return to the point made in 
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Chapter 5, that house churches are simultaneously place-less (i.e. the construction of 
the “church” is predicated upon sacred networks, not sacred place), whilst remaining 
place-bound (i.e. they are located within a house). The dialectic of place-lessness and 
place-boundedness compromises the stability and longevity of house churches, and 
renders them susceptible to processes of church fission. I go on to focus specifically 
in the second sub-section on the volatility of sacred networks; the third sub-section 
focuses on religious dualism. For many Christian converts, house church patterns of 
worship do not provide an adequate substitute for the religious experience provided 
by the temple or khovil, encouraging them not to discard, but to retain their previous 
religious affiliation as well.  
 
6.3.1 The politics of place(lessness) and church fission 
 
Place can compromise the validity of the sacred networks upon which house churches 
are built. Whilst the place(lessness) of the house church enables it to be embedded 
within non-Christian residential space, the use of the house as a place of worship is as 
foreign as the church itself to many Sri Lankans: “for the non-Christian, the place 
matters more than the people who come there, because the place itself is where they 
consider their god or the power of their god to be present” (Evangelical Parachurch, 
Colombo). Enabling non-Christians to experience Christianity is one thing, but 
getting them to accept it is another. One convert to Christianity gave an accurate, if 
sardonic, insight into the problems that exist at the intersection of religious place and 
place(less)ness: “the religious centre is a separate holy place; Muslims enter the 
mosque washing their feet and their face, right? Buddhists go with the white dress and 
remove their slippers… But then the house church pastor [comes] with a t-shirt like 
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this, and denim, and a motorbike; so this is a church? This is a Christian religious 
temple? This place?”. Such disdainful treatment of the house church reflects the fact 
that, as Ingold (2000; see also Eade and Sallnow 1991) argues, the world is layered 
with inscriptions, symbols and, in general, significance that informs, dictates, and 
corrupts an individuals’ perception of the environment. As much as the house church 
represents a new, place(less) approach to worship, and a new spatial register, 
mainstream Sri Lankan society remains imprinted with, and guided by, the religio-
cultural topography of venerated places of worship.  
 
Thus whilst the place(lessness) of evangelical Christianity makes it indestructible, 
networks render it fallible: place cannot be dismissed. It influences sacred networks – 
and the ensuing spaces of Christianity – in ways that are different, and often counter-
productive, to the intended constructions. Place(lessness) is an idiosyncratically 
Christian ideal, one that is articulated in opposition to the reverence for religious 
place in Sri Lanka: “we have the concept of a holy place… it’s there in their mind, 
you can’t erase that which has been there for generations” (Evangelical Church, 
Galle). Seeking ‘the dismantling of traditional bonds between belief and belonging to 
a local community’ (Hervieu-Leger 2002: 103) is frustrated by the staid, place-bound 
framing of religion in Sri Lanka. The success of the house church movement in China 
weighs heavily on the minds of many of the pastors interviewed, yet given De 
Rogatis’s (2003: 9) assertion that ‘space [i]s a point of cultural and religious contact, 
exchange, and sometimes conflict’, it becomes apparent that a more nuanced 
application of the house church model is needed. Speaking of Sri Lanka’s house 
church movement, one Colombo-based pastor correctly stated, “we can’t impart, or 
import, the strategies from other countries” (Evangelical Church, Colombo), showing 
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how the model must be applied in a cultural reflexive way if it is to serve the purpose 
for which it is intended (i.e. to enable Christianity to flourish), and not for individual 
gain.  
 
As a result, the place(less), network-centric model of the house church exists in a state 
of tension with the place-bound practices of religious worship in Sri Lanka. Whilst 
pastors strive to subvert such logic through an emphasis on the relationship with God 
and commitment to the sacred network rather than commitment to place, it is a slow, 
and nonsensical transition for many. Mainline Christians can be particularly attuned 
to this dynamic, given that Christian patterns of worship cut across denominational 
divisions, and therefore provide a point of comparison. A young, Colombo-based 
Methodist was particularly clear in her repudiation of the performative nature of 
evangelical worship, which forms an integral part of the construction of sacred 
networks: 
 
Sometimes it feels a little bit, how do you say, artificial? A little bit unreal? 
Kind of more like a performance than a time of worship? And that’s why I 
think I found it [an evangelical worship service] creepy… But actually other 
times you really feel the presence of God, and it depends, I suppose. But for 
that programme I thought they were so focussed on getting people [to convert] 
that I felt at times there’s a tendency for it to be a performance. Because I 
know that people convert because of the miracles they see and all that, and 
then it becomes a very momentary sort of conversion… I think in the free [i.e. 
evangelical] church you do sometimes experience God, but then again you get 
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worked up to an absolute high, so when you go back [down], it’s a different 
kind [of experience]. 
 
The sacred networks upon which house churches in particular are built create a form 
of collective effervescence (see Durkheim 2001; also Heuser 2009) whereby people 
“get worked up to an absolute high”. Such a “high” can reify the presence of God, and 
thus encourage conversion, but it is also recognised as being a “very momentary sort 
of conversion” that relies more on emotion than it does reason. Thus, the place(less) 
nature of the house church does, I argue, encourage such behaviours as part of the 
process of breaking the mould of existing sites and styles of religious worship, and 
generating acceptance for the house church instead.  
 
That being said, as cultural norms problematise the legitimacy of Christian 
place(lessness), the domestic space of the house can also problematise the legitimacy 
of the sacred networks upon which the church is built. Whilst geographers have 
addressed the sacred dimensions of domestic space (e.g. Mazumdar and Mazumdar 
1999; Tong and Kong 2000; Dwyer 2004), an exploration of the domestic dimensions 
(specifically, politics) of sacred space is lacking (see, however, Kong 2002). The 
“non-place” of the house church is ‘only indirectly connected with [its] purposes’ 
(Augé 1995: 94) as a space of worship, yet it is directly connected to the space of 
domesticity that it represents. The politics of the home can, and often do, 
problematise the legitimacy of the sacred networks that are built during house church 
meetings. Whilst sacred networks are built upon the relationships between a collected 
group of believers and God, the owners of the house, or those that “host” sacred 
networks, often hold undue influence over the efficacy of such networks in forming a 
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church: “[if] the believers [do] not like the house owner for some reason, they [do] 
not come to the church; or if the house owner does not agree with some of the 
believers’ behaviour, then they would object [to certain people coming]” (Evangelical 
Church, Colombo). Alternatively, Buddhist antagonists bemoan the fact that the 
house, being a private space, is one that encourages conformity, rather than debate: 
“house means personal beliefs of mine, it’s my kingdom, my personal beliefs. Now 
you can’t convert a house into a religion, common religious place” (Buddhist 
Organisation, Colombo).  
 
The behaviours, attitudes and actions of hosts are also subject to intense scrutiny. If 
they contravene Christian principles, then their “lack of testimony [c]ould be a 
hindrance” (Evangelical Church, Colombo) to the development of the sacred network, 
and can compromise the validity of the house church as an impartial meeting place for 
Christians. Moreover, the mundane operation of the house can disrupt services, and 
detract from the experience of religious worship: “there are normal, everyday 
happenings of the family going on whilst the service is going on; they will be eating, 
drinking, they might even be fighting, and the atmosphere is not so conducive to 
really worshipping” (Evangelical Church, Matara). Thus whilst place itself is 
impartial and can be invested with multiple meanings by different actors and 
agencies, humans are inherently partial, and can easily complicate the production of 
sacred space. Put differently, the sanctification of church is a much more 
straightforward process than the sanctification of the home; the house church 
conflates domestic and sacred spaces, causing the former to be scrutinised, and the 
latter compromised. House churches are therefore based on ‘a structure that is 
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susceptible to easy fragmentation’ (Wilson 1971: 10), leading to schisms within the 
church, and eventually, fission.  
 
Fission is a problem endemic to house churches, and is a function of both their 
precariousness, and the volatility of the sacred networks upon which they are built. 
Indeed, house church fission is symptomatic of the ‘schismatic, fissiparous 
tendencies’ (Gerlach and Hine 1968: 26) of Pentecostal groups in general. Yet whilst 
fission can be a natural outcome of growth (i.e. when a growing house church reaches 
a certain size or carrying capacity, it may split in order to remain discreet and 
maintain the same levels of intimacy, and affective energy), it can also be a function 
of the politics of place, or as a result of the capitalising behaviours of some Christian 
clergy and laity (see the “Market mentality” section below). In this sense, the ease and 
flexibility with which a house church can be established reflects in equal measure the 
ease with which they can be deconstructed, and reconstructed in order to serve 
different, often self-fulfilling, purposes (see Wielander 2009; also Warf and Winsberg 
2010). It is widely recognised that “the churches are easy to split; the [non-Christian] 
people ask why you worship together and some people learn something there and 
split, and take two or three or half of the members with them; why this?” (Evangelical 
Church, Trincomalee). A pastor of a mainline church in the northeast lamented the 
fact that fission has led to there being “so many churches around my church; there are 
so many small, small churches”. These observations add empirical weight to 
Chidester and Linenthal’s (1995: 15) argument that sacred space is ‘claimed, owned, 
and operated by people advancing specific interests’. The sacred networks upon 
which the house church is constructed lower (almost nullify) the entry costs to starting 
a church, enabling them to proliferate. Yet in creating space for Christianity to grow, 
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sacred networks also (ironically) create an intra-Christian space of subversion that 
empowers believers to not only compete against Buddhism, but against other 
churches as well. The same mainline pastor in the northeast was candid in his 
assessment of growth via the house church: “they are not thinking about God, they 
want to put up their own kingdom”. He went on to identify the fact that “money is the 
problem. What they [evangelical pastors] want [is] they want to buy a land in their 
own name, they want to put up their own [church]”. This calls into question the 
viability of sacred networks as the foundations, and catalysts, of evangelical Christian 
growth.  
 
6.3.2 The volatility of sacred networks   
 
Whilst sacred networks are invariably effective arbiters of evangelical growth, they 
render the evangelical movement volatile, and liable to achieving short-term growth 
at the expense of long-term accretion. One of the key supply-side problems of the 
house church model is that it encourages reactiveness; sacred networks enable the 
construction of a footloose, underground church movement, but they can also be 
broken and re-formed in response to more secular, and corrupting, stimuli such as in-
fighting, ego and wealth production. One pastor from an established evangelical 
church in Kandy shared a telling, and very representative, story that outlines the 
dangers of church fission:  
 
When you go and split and you take twelve people and you go and start in 
your home, and you are having all this loud music and all that, you are asking 
for trouble. And you don’t have good relationships with other churches 
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because you have split up and gone, you are an easy target… There is one guy 
who comes and has a service right in front of my church, in one of those shops 
just across the road… I don’t know what idea he has, maybe to get a few 
people from my church, maybe? So things like that pose questions to 
Buddhists, now why should you have one in front of another? Those are things 
that add to persecution. 
 
That being said, church fission is a defining characteristic of Sri Lanka’s evangelical 
movement. For many pastors, the lure of establishing an independent church 
outweighs the risks associated with being an “easy target”. The entrepreneurial nature 
of many evangelical pastors suggests a reframing of risk. Fission, and relatively 
aggressive strategies of growth (like starting a service in front of an existing church) 
present risks that need to be managed rather than avoided. Avoidance means lost 
opportunities for growth, whilst managing them (or not, as the case often is) can drive 
conversion whilst antagonising Christian and offering opportunity for Buddhist 
groups to criticise.   
 
On the demand-side, sacred networks present an insufficient substitute for religious 
place in the eyes of the non-Christians to which the house church attempts to reach 
out to. To the non-Christian, religious place is important because “people have an 
identity with that, that gives them a security… they want to see something visually, 
like we belong to this place” (Evangelical Church, Kandy). Identity formation is 
predicated on the formation of socio-cultural boundaries that help to demarcate 
difference; something that is inherently place-based, yet socially constructed 
(Newman and Paasi 1998; Vincent and Warf 2002; Anttonen 2005). Religious 
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buildings symbolise difference, permanence and fixity, and are juxtaposed against the 
sacred network, which is predicated on fluidity in order to ensure mobility across 
space. The place(lessness) of the house church impacts people in different ways; 
whereas it enables people to experience a religious alternative in a low-risk way, it 
also struggles to provide a viable substitute for the quality associated with the 
permanence and symbolism of the Buddhist temple, or any other “official” place of 
worship. For one convert to Christianity, the fact that “identity comes with the 
building” severely compromises the ability of Christian groups to connect with non-
Christians, explaining: “that’s why the huge issue: the Buddhists can’t understand 
Christianity”. This suggests that the house church is a more self-fulfilling, yet 
problematic, arbiter of growth than has otherwise been recognised. Indeed, one of the 
main symptoms of the fragility of the house church model is the problem of religious 
dualism – a situation whereby Christian converts do not make a clean break with their 
previous religious affiliation, and instead retain both old and new affiliations in 
tandem – that is encountered by pastors throughout the country.  
 
6.3.3 House churches and religious dualism 
 
The “placelessness” of house churches often fails to convince non-Christians of the 
viability of Christianity as a religious alternative. The spatial register of the house 
church – that which expresses ‘indifference to [the] spatial environment that is 
postulated by the strictly voluntary bond uniting individuals in faith [i.e. sacred 
networks]’ (Hervieu-Leger 2002: 102) – is a source of misunderstanding that enables 
dualistic religious behaviours to flourish. This is a problem that pastors operating 
amongst the Tamil Hindu tea estate workers in the Central Province in particular 
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bemoan. Echoing the sentiment articulated above, Christian house meetings are 
described as being met with confusion: “the main obstruction for Christianity to 
spread in these [tea] estates is that they don’t understand, they think that this [Jesus 
Christ] is also one of the [Hindu] gods, and [that they] can treat every god equally” 
(Evangelical Parachurch, Nuwara Eliya). “Converts” would retain Hindu shrines in 
their homes (see Figure 22, below), conduct daily pooja25, and continue to attend 
Hindu events whilst simultaneously attending Christian house meetings. The 
borderless church does not draw ‘distinctions between spaces, mark them for specific 
uses, create visible and invisible boundaries, and establish cultural conventions of 
behaviour to deal with those boundaries’ (Anttonen 2005: 198), leaving non-
Christians confused and unguided. “Placelessness” therefore makes it difficult for 
converts to break with their past religion as it does not nurture clearly demarcated 
expressions of faith, and encourages dualistic patterns of religiosity to evolve instead.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Pooja is a Hindu ritual practice, which involves daily offerings being made to Hindu deities via a 
small shrine located within the home.  
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Figure 22: Hindu shrine located in the line room of a recently converted 
“Christian” family  
Pastors operating in the upland areas of Sri Lanka tolerate dualistic behaviours for a 
period of time, after which, Hindu idolatry is banned, sometimes by force. 
 
In some instances, pastors stage symbolic interventions, the aim being to force 
commitment to Christianity. Attending a church is a clearly demarcated place that 
encourages clearly demarcated displays of Christian religiosity, or, as one pastor put 
it: “when the place is permanent it has a positive influence on people to make a 
decision” (Evangelical Church, Galle). The impermanence of house churches, on the 
other hand, does not encourage religious exclusivism and instead leaves room for 
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dualistic religious behaviours to flourish. To overcome this problem, some pastors 
attempt to induce religious commitment through various means, most prominently the 
removal and destruction of “idols” (often statues and pictures of Hindu gods). Indeed, 
whilst Gerlach and Hine (1968) draw attention to the importance of acts of 
desecration (e.g. the burning of Voodoo objects) used to induce commitment amongst 
Haitian Pentecostals, discussion of the full ramifications of such bridge-burning acts 
is, unfortunately, lacking. One Nuwara Eliya-based pastor clearly described the 
process of claiming Christian control over a Hindu house: 
 
[We] went to a place [i.e. house] in Pedro [estate]. They have a big wall full of 
idols… And both of us [the pastor and assistant pastor], we removed 
everything, we brought it to the church and we burnt it… Then we pray in that 
area, we ask the Lord to cleanse it with His blood. We pray within the home, 
inside the home, and that’s all. Sometimes we even use water, because people 
have more faith when you use something that they can see, instead of just 
close my eyes and pray, they will say where, we can’t see anything, but if I get 
a bottle of water, pray over it and just sprinkle it… In the beginning we have 
to tolerate them a lot, then at some point we have to say [that] now there 
should be a difference.  
 
Not only is the home symbolically purified by the removal and destruction of Hindu 
idols, but the boundary between the Christian home and non-Christian community is 
also demarcated. Prayers and water are used to ritually cleanse the home in a bid to 
prevent the inhabitants from returning to their previous, dualistic religious behaviours. 
The actions required to show the “difference” between being a Hindu and being a 
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Christian can antagonise anti-Christian groups, who bemoan the disrespect evoked by 
such actions and use examples that are similar to the one cited above to justify their 
case against Christian aggression. These examples are, I argue, an outcome of the 
house church model of worship, and threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the 
evangelical movement by calling into question the sustainability of the house church 
model and the durability of sacred networks.  
 
In creating opportunities for growth and diffusion, therefore, the longevity of the 
house church movement is a problem: “you have to find ways to root it [Christianity], 
you have to find ways to make pastors accountable; often that is one of the biggest 
problems, when you have all these free-floating loose cannons on deck with very little 
accountability” (Evangelical Parachurch, Kandy). The reference to pastors as “free-
floating loose cannons” suggests that place plays an alternative role in the 
construction of sacred space; whilst the sacred space of the house church is predicated 
upon the construction of sacred networks, pastors, and the actors responsible for the 
creation of sacred networks, must remain accountable to place. Such accountability is 
needed to create a sense of permanence, as recognised by the leader of one of the 
country’s largest evangelical denominations: “people feel a sense of belonging when 
they can identify with a certain place; that is not absolutely essential, but it is 
necessary if one has some sense of progress in mind for the institution itself”. The 
frank admission that “you can’t maintain a house church for a very long time” 
(Evangelical Church, Kandy) formalises the delicate balance that exists between 
Christian growth and acceptance. Place generates acceptance, yet it also foments 
resistance, whereas networks are more experience-based, enabling Christianity to 
diffuse, but not necessarily settle. Place, in this sense, is not the physical 
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manifestation of the sacred, but it does represent a form of spatial integrity that causes 
churches to ‘leav[e] the shadows’ (Henkel and Sakaja 2009: 52), and is therefore 
imperative to the sustainability of Sri Lanka’s house church movement over time.   
 
6.4 Converting people 
 
Alongside the conversion of space, throughout the world one of the key drivers of 
evangelical Christian growth is the conversion of people. Religious switching is the 
apex of a considerably more wide-ranging discourse, with conversion representing an 
‘unyielding form of conquest’ (Mills and Grafton, 2003: ix) that intersects with 
problems surrounding the co-existence of different religious groups in manifold ways. 
In Sri Lanka, conversion has become both the apex of inter-religious tensions, and, 
for some, a symbol of Christian aggression. The head of a Colombo-based parachurch 
group explained how religious conversion has become a matter of suspicion that can 
implicate both the converter, and the converted, within public debates surrounding 
unethical conversion:  
 
Conversion has gotten so deep into people [of] all religion[s that] the moment 
you say I have become a Christian, no-one, absolutely no-one is going to 
believe that you did it solely out of your personal experience, your personal 
feeling. They’re all going to think no, somebody forced him; somebody put 
some wrong ideas into his head, somebody gave him some money, or 
somebody gave him this, somebody did that.  
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Ulterior motivations to conversion – on both the supply and demand sides – are a 
source of considerable suspicion, with assumptions of unethical practice being 
widespread. In Sri Lanka, as in many other countries throughout the 10/40 Window, a 
key problem facing evangelical groups is that “the real hostilit[y] is to conversion… 
They [Buddhist agitators] are opposed to conversion per se, and what they consider to 
be unethical [conversion], we [the evangelical community] would not consider to be 
unethical” (Evangelical Church, Galle). It is the different interpretations of 
ethical/unethical practice that are the focus of this section. 
 
In what follows, I first introduce one of the key drivers of unethical practice, that is, 
the market mentality of evangelicals. As the earlier sub-section on church fission 
shows, the actions of some evangelicals can contribute to the (mis)perception that 
they treat religion as a business to be pursued for individual gain. The privatised 
nature of evangelical outreach contributes to such (mis)perceptions, and is the focus 
of the second sub-section, which explores the politics associated with competing 
understandings of public and private religious practice, and some of the strategies 
used by evangelists to gain access to the non-Christian home. The third sub-section 
examines Buddhist understandings of “unethical” conversion within the framework 
provided by the structural mosaic, and in doing so highlights how the structural 
mosaic can encourage “unethical” practice by conflating religious and secular goals. 
The final sub-section seeks to expand the debate by considering Christian 
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6.4.1 The market mentality 
 
In Sri Lanka, Buddhists and mainline Christians alike criticise evangelicals for 
treating religion as a business, and Christianity as a commodity that can be sold to 
non-Christians for a profit. Such religious economy rhetoric was repeated again and 
again during interviews. For example, a Kandy-based pastor argued that “this market 
mentality that some evangelicals have taken – that you just go and somehow try and 
sell your product, the numbers game – I think has brought a lot of damage to this 
nation”. A Colombo-based Buddhist made a similar argument: “they [evangelical 
pastors] are marketing executives: they have targets, they have monthly targets, they 
are paid monthly salaries, and they have monthly targets for conversions; we thought 
that selling Christianity as a commodity is an insult to Jesus Christ”. Ironically, the 
last sentence highlights the (not unfounded) position that the Buddhist right take 
responsibility to protect Christianity from its own representatives, with the Prohibition 
of Forcible Conversion Bill being a restorative move to that effect.  
 
Whilst Christian groups of any denomination express a biblically mandated remit of 
evangelism, it is the overwhelming focus on conversion that differentiates evangelical 
groups from their mainline counterparts. After interviews with evangelicals I was 
sometimes asked to “accept” Christ or to read a prayer that would solidify (in words 
at least) a commitment to Christianity – practices that I found to be shallow and trite. 
Indeed, the process of conversion described by one Trincomalee-based mainline 
pastor is, in many respects, the polar opposite of the hurried strategies employed by 
many evangelicals:  
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We are not in a hurry [to convert]; we didn’t ask them [converts] to come [to 
church], we didn’t force them to come and join our Christianity, we didn’t ask 
them… They are coming for not one, they are coming for, I think, six months, 
one year so after that they say, ‘Father, I want to become a Christian’, and 
then I will baptise [them]. I won’t ask [them to be baptised], I won’t tell them 
‘why don’t you take baptism?’ I won’t tell them. 
 
The process of conversion described here – that which lasts between six months and a 
year – is in contrast to the impatience that I experienced with some interviewees: “I 
think the interest is in the new [i.e. evangelical] churches to have quick results… you 
want numbers [i.e. converts] immediately, you want to do things quickly, so that is 
where the problem starts” (Mainline Church, Colombo). This contrast brings to light 
the reality that some pastors “use the people for their gain instead of uniting the 
people for God’s gain” (Evangelical Church, Nuwara Eliya); with “their gain” being 
manifested in terms of converts, solidarity, more income from tithes and improved 
chances of garnering overseas support if church growth can be proven.  
 
That being said, the market mentality of evangelicals is not just prevalent amongst 
Christian pastors, but the laity as well. By mobilising and deploying the laity, 
evangelical pastors are also empowering them, and removing the barriers to entry 
(e.g. training, dress, place, conduct) that come with being formally recognised 
“clergy”. House church fission, previously explained, is one example of Christian 
opportunism amongst the laity, as is the religious dualism that is so pronounced 
amongst the estate Tamils of Nuwara Eliya. Indeed, one pastor lamented the lack of 
seriousness, or the informality, with which many Christian converts (or not, as the 
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case may be) treat their new faith, explaining how “there are Christmas Christians, 
Hindu Christians, wedding Christians; there are Christian members of the church 
[but] we can see them only for Christmas service, New Years service” (Evangelical 
Church, Nuwara Eliya). It is this sense of opportunism amongst the laity that drives 
conversion via the structural mosaic (in particular), and is discussed in more detail 
below.   
 
6.4.2 Negotiating public and private spaces of evangelism 
 
As argued in Chapter 5, Christian and Buddhist conceptions of public and private 
spaces of evangelism exist in a state of paradox. Christians are criticised for using 
private, instead of public, spaces for evangelical purposes, yet it is argued that public 
forms of evangelism are essentially outlawed. Restricting the possibility of public 
engagement has been exacerbated since the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill 
was first drafted in 2004. Indeed, as an evangelist from a mainline church told me, the 
Bill has had repercussions that extend beyond unethical conversion, and has served to 
further privatise Christianity by restricting the public tolerance for evangelical 
outreach. In the excerpt below, we discuss the impact of the Bill on street evangelism 
and the distribution of tracts – once a primary means of Christian outreach: 
 
 Why can’t you distribute tracts [on the street] anymore? 
 Because of this government law.  
 What would happen if you did? Are there laws against it? 
 Yes, because you cannot propagate the gospel here now.  
 In the public areas? 
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Yes, yeah. And you will be persecuted. Actually they have not passed the 
legislation yet, it is in the cabinet, only the vote is to be taken now.  
About the propagation of… 
Yeah, that’s right. So you are giving a tract to a Buddhist person means you 
are openly [proselytising], and in that tract maybe you have your address, so 
you are openly saying, you are openly propagating the gospel, so you cannot 
do that now.  
Is there a name for this piece of legislation? 
Anti-conversion bill.  
Oh, the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill? 
Yes, that’s the one.  
So it includes propagation? Really? 
Yeah – have you read that Bill? 
Yes.  
It clearly says that you cannot propagate26.  
So even though it hasn’t been passed yet, there is still this sentiment. 
Yes, because all the Buddhist people, Buddhist monks and police, all these 
people, they know that there is a Bill like this, so although it is not properly, 
100% passed by the parliament, it is already, like, implemented.  
 
As the excerpt above suggests, the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill has evoked 
two (premature) responses that contribute to the ongoing tension between public and 
private spaces of evangelism. The first is the belief that it is a Bill that seeks to restrict 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill does not say this, although the similar Freedom of 
Religion Bill does seek to make it an offense to accost “a person in a public place or the intrusion into 
the privacy of a person either at home or at the place of work” (cited in Owens 2007: 338). See 
Appendix 1 for a copy of the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill. 
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all evangelical activity, not just practices of “unethical” conversion. This encourages 
Christian groups to further privatise their outreach, and acts as a source of legitimacy 
for punitive action to be taken against Christians. The second is that although the Bill 
has not yet been passed, “it is already, like, implemented”. This underscores the 
symbolic nature of the Bill, showing how it has consequences that extend beyond the 
reorientation of individual belief, instead effectively serving to force Christian groups 
to operate more and more exclusively in and through the private domain.  
 
Evangelising through the private domain of the home can, however, often be as 
problematic as more public spaces of engagement. Making house visits to non-
Christians is a high-risk, and polarising, strategy given that “people are suspicious… 
even these days they don’t open the door” (Mainline Church, Colombo). In the hostile 
context of the Southern Province, for example, it is recognised that “going door-to-
door will not create the opportunities; they will close the door of their mind before 
you go there… They’ll be starting from a prejudiced viewpoint, so there is no point” 
(Evangelical Church, Galle). Whilst more pronounced in the Southern Province, 
throughout the island evangelicals run the risk that access may be denied to both the 
home and “the door of their mind”. In response, sub-strategies have been developed to 
gain access to the non-Christians. The distinctive attire of Salvation Army 
representatives, for example, is one means of gaining access: “if you go in a uniform 
then they see this person, a person whom we can trust; so then they open the door and 
just talk to us… they have sort of respect for clergy” (Mainline Church, Colombo). As 
explained in Chapter 4, however, the idea of a “uniform” is a symbol of Christianity 
that is rejected by the vast majority of independent evangelical pastors.  
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Another highly successful, and contentious, sub-strategy is the use of foreigners when 
making house-visits: “when people see foreigners they are more welcom[ing] as well; 
that’s a good way of bringing in [Christianity]” (Evangelical Church, Nuwara Eliya). 
In this vein, the American missionary in Nuwara Eliya, first introduced in Chapter 4, 
recounted an interesting experience:  
  
Last time when I was there [in the estate], we would go through the village, to 
the different houses and pray for people. You see, there were some that I 
would pray for that were Hindus. 
How did it work, did you just knock on the door? 
Sure, I mean they wanted us to come [in].  
Is that just because you’re a Westerner?  
It’s possible… The willingness to let a person come in, I’m sure it helps.  
 
This exchange brings to light two issues; the first is the use of the home as a space of 
evangelism, especially when the home being used belongs to a non-Christian, and the 
second is the use of a Westerner to gain access to such homes. Some perceive the use 
of foreigners as a tool to gain access to the home as a form of “allurement”, with a 
Colombo-based member of the Buddhist right explaining how: 
 
They [evangelicals] might use foreigners as an allurement. When a foreigner 
comes to your house, as I said, because of that colonial mentality… a white 
skinned person [is treated with] more special regard than a brown or dark-
skinned person. So Sunday early in the morning, when they knock at the door, 
they look through the peephole, then [if it is] another Sri Lankan, they say 
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‘hey, today is Sunday, early in the morning, don’t disturb us’, because that 
person has no prior appointment. But if you find a Westerner: ‘yes Sir, come 
Sir, sit Sir, what do you want Sir’ and that type of treatment.  
 
I can attest to the utility of being a “white skinned person” in gaining access to people 
and places, as my racial position does, to a large extent, explain the ease and rapidity 
with which I could gain access to some of the country’s senior religious leaders. 
Notwithstanding, the use of foreigners to gain access to hitherto inaccessible locations 
(such as the non-Christian home) requires closer consideration by the academy, not 
least because of issues surrounding culture, privacy and choice. Not only that, the use 
of foreigners creates a fleeting space of transnationalism that engages with a putative 
stereotype of interaction surrounding the Western invader and the local subaltern. I 
have previously argued that in Sri Lanka (in rural areas especially), individual 
autonomy in decision-making is secondary to the broader interests of the group: an 
aspect of culture that suppresses conversion out of the majority religion. Yet the 
culture of hospitality – the opening of doors and receiving of visitors into the home – 
can exist in a state of tension with the interests of the group. Cultural rejection of 
evangelism at the level of conversion exists in parallel with a state of cultural 
acceptance of visitors into the home, causing the private domain to be a site of 
contestation in and of itself. As one Buddhist put it: “if you are a pastor, if you come 
to our house we [Buddhists] don’t like, but we give you food, we invite, welcome. 
This is our culture: when you visit our house, then we invite you [in]” (Buddhist 
Organisation, Kandy). Whilst such a dynamic is more prevalent in rural, rather than 
urban, areas, it does highlight how micro-scale cultural nuances are taken advantage 
of in order to help overcome macro-scale cultural barriers to growth.  
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The exploitation of such cultural nuances also creates an inviolable tension between 
strategies of evangelical engagement (many of which originate in the West and are 
aped by non-Western actors, of which the house church is a good example), and the 
local settings in which they are practiced. As one Buddhist put it:  
 
This concept of door-to-door canvassing [originated] in the Western world, 
because you all have doors. If you go to our villages, our houses don’t have 
doors… If you go to a village they [Christians] just get into the house, and 
especially in an Asian culture, you don’t have the initiative of driving people 
away and scolding people away, out of your house. That’s against our culture, 
so I am against this concept of captive audience (Buddhist Organisation, 
Colombo).  
 
Here, “door-to-door canvassing” is presented as an invasion of the Sri Lankan home, 
one that results in a “foreign” religious belief being forced upon a naïve and 
vulnerable local. As a point of comparison, one interviewee put forward the Buddhist 
approach to religious engagement: “we think if the people want to know something 
about Buddhism, he has to come to our temple… The Buddhist priest will never go to 
the unknown parties and give them Buddhism” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo), 
and another adding that “if I want to learn Christianity, I know where a church is, I 
can go and ask the father, the priest, please teach me. But you have no right to knock 
at my door, intrude into my privacy and say hey, you must listen to this [Christian 
rhetoric]” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). Needless to say, the use of foreign 
evangelists to gain entry to the Buddhist home merely exacerbates the contrast 
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between Buddhism as being located within the temple – a local religion – and 
evangelical Christianity as being located (predominantly) in the house and, therefore, 
foreign. Moreover, using the private domain for religious outreach means that 
Christian groups avoid surveillance, creating a space of confusion wherein rumours, 
stereotypes and anti-Christian sentiment can develop.  
 
6.4.3 Unethical conversion and the structural mosaic 
 
The various social ministries and projects that define Sri Lanka’s evangelical 
community are enforced symbols of religious neoliberalism that evoke invidious 
responses from the Buddhist right. Traditionally, as previously explained, the temple 
is the repository of education, aid and welfare support in Sri Lanka. The inability of 
the temple to continue to meet such need (in many instances) creates a void that is 
readily filled by evangelically motivated groups. This dynamic is prevalent 
throughout the 10/40 Window, but is one not adequately accounted for by existing 
understandings of faith-motivated social engagement, which tend to uncritically 
presuppose that ‘charity can be reproduced as love and friendship, a gratuitous and 
creative giving of existence practised in relational service rather than with 
proselytizing in mind’ instead of ‘a continuing pursuit of control of, and power over 
the socially excluded other’ (Cloke 2010: 233, 235; see also Molendijk et al. 2010). 
Indeed, the acts of charity associated with social ministries are often underwritten by 
‘an expectation and an implicit demand for acquiescence from the beneficiaries’ 
(Hollenbach and Ruwanpura 2011: 1299), with such expectations and demands 
contributing directly to the allegation of “unethical” activity.   
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In this sense, irrespective of whether or not the intentions of evangelical groups are 
the pursuit of control and power, popular perceptions dictate that almost any non-
religious form of engagement with society is a guise for unethical conversion. This 
highlights the ‘inherent difficulties in differentiating between acts of charity and 
benevolence and acts designed to convert through force, fraud or allurement’ (Owens 
2007: 350), and has caused some groups to be more reflexive in their actions: “even 
when we do social service now, we are very careful that we don’t do social service in 
an area where we want to start a church… If you do that, then they [the community] 
consider it unethical conversion” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). That being 
said, many other groups operate through the structural mosaic by using social ministry 
as a pretext for more subversive evangelical practices, many of which fall under 
Buddhist definitions of “unethical” practice. Put differently, using the structural 
mosaic as a strategy of evangelical growth directly feeds into and, in many respects, 
supports the Buddhist case against “unethical” conversion as it presupposes the 
conflation of religious and secular goals. Below I explore this dynamic further by 
comparing three determinants of unethical conversion – fraud, allurement and force – 
with the corresponding strategies of evangelism that are pursued via the structural 
mosaic.  
 
Fraud is one vertex of the triad that, according to the Buddhist right, constitutes 
“unethical” conversion. It also drives Christian growth via the structural mosaic, by 
using social ministry to disguise evangelical practices. A mainline pastor, for 
example, explained how “before we start a [medical] clinic we just pray with the 
people, say ‘this is God who provided all these things’, but we are never [asking them 
to become Christians]”, before going on to disclose that “there are so many 
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community activities through which also we evangelise, but very indirectly”. Using 
“community activities” to mask, and detract attention from, evangelical intent is 
fraudulent, especially seeing as in some instances the focus is more on conversion 
than it is social amelioration. In a similar vein, Figure 23, below, shows a feeding 
centre run by a Christian NGO in a north Colombo suburb. Catering primarily to 
disadvantaged children from Tamil-Hindu backgrounds, the saying of prayers before 
lunch is believed to be a concession to the charitable act of giving. That being said, 
such acts also instigate a cultural transformation of a subset of the population. The 
feeding centre is not only a space of provision, but also a space of experience that 
encourages those inhabiting it to make an association between what they are receiving 
(food/education) and from whom they are receiving it (“God”). The fact that the 
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Figure 23: Disadvantaged children queue up for a free lunch at a feeding centre 
in a north Colombo suburb 
Run by a Christian NGO (which itself is an offshoot of an evangelical church), the 
structure pictured was funded, and built, by a team of Christian volunteers from the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Moreover, evangelical intervention during times of crisis is often immediate, yet 
fraught with tension between the provision of relief and the opportunities that present 
themselves for proselytisation. One mainline pastor described how a group of 
evangelists working in a flood-stricken area “distributed meal packets to the flood 
victims with the gospel message inside. Naturally when a Buddhist priest or a 
Buddhist leader sees it, they will get very angry. I mean, here you have a disaster-
ridden, helpless situation, and these people are helping them in order to proselytise” 
(Mainline Church, Colombo). The idea of “helping them in order to proselytise” 
clearly captures the possibility for fraud that is associated with strategies of 
evangelism enacted through the structural mosaic and, therefore, the politics 
contained therein.   
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A second vertex of the “unethical” conversion triad is allurement: an ‘offer of any 
temptation’ (Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion 2004: 3). Allurement is 
the most common accusation meted against evangelical groups, and occupies a central 
place in anti-conversion discourse. The willingness to give is a defining characteristic 
of evangelical outreach, especially when it is done through the structural mosaic, such 
as the giving of gifts to children at Christmas time. In Nuwara Eliya, for example, a 
confederacy of evangelical churches held a Christmas rally in the town hall, which 
involved a nativity show, carols, prayers and the giving of gifts to all the children that 
attended, with the gift giving in particular being an overt “way to draw some of these 
[people from] other religions over there [to the town hall]” (Evangelical Church, 
Nuwara Eliya). Indeed, examples of allurement pervade nearly all strategies of 
evangelical engagement via the structural mosaic, and range from the giving of free 
medicine, to free lunches, and free English classes; all of which serve to draw people 
into a Christian space of engagement. The act of giving is a form of allurement that 
fuels inter-religious tension, as meeting the material needs of people can be a 
precursor to meeting their religious needs as well: 
 
A t-shirt or a wristwatch, or money for your medicine or expenses, when he’s 
not getting it from the Buddhists, and a Christian priest is ready to give your 
medicine or your dinner everyday, I mean, what is the net result? That is 
conversion. You see you can theorise by saying I am not forcing you, but here, 
these are the goodies that I am going to give you… We are talking of the 
predicament that you are putting these people in (Buddhist Organisation, 
Colombo).  
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Allurement is a cost-intensive strategy of outreach that is an effective, and relatively 
easy, way of gaining acceptance within the structural mosaic, and driving conversion. 
Conversely, the inability to attract converts can minimise the desirability of 
allurement as a strategy of evangelism. A medical clinic setup in a tea estate in 
Nuwara Eliya, for example, was used as a front for church growth, and was 
discontinued when the desired results were not produced: 
 
I have help from a few of my friends from Kerala [India], they pay for all the 
medicine and everything was given free, so lots of people came, they stand in 
a queue. But sad to say, we haven’t had a single conversion… 
Do you still do it? 
No, no, we don’t do it because there is no point.  
 
Thus despite being able to draw crowds, the fact that “we haven’t had a single 
conversion” means the clinic was an ineffective tool for growth, and was therefore 
discontinued. In this instance, the agency of demand overcame the agency of supply, 
rendering the medical clinic an alluring, yet ineffective, form of Christian outreach.   
 
The third and final vertex is force. Being the most belligerent form of “unethical” 
conversion, examples were difficult to elicit from the evangelicals that I interviewed, 
yet were forthcoming from the Buddhist right. One example did, however, come 
across as a particularly forceful process of conversion, with religious healing being 
withheld to non-Christians. It should be noted that this was a solitary example 
amongst Christian interviewees, with all others proclaiming to offer prayer and 
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healing irrespective of religious belief. Nonetheless, it clearly intersects with 
unethical conversion debates: 
 
When a non-believer [i.e. non-Christian] comes to us asking for prayer, I just 
explain the situation. I’m not a man who is doing a mantra thing, I am not a 
person doing witchcraft: I am a servant of God. If you want healing you must 
accept Jesus Christ as your personal saviour, and if you believe Him you will 
be healed, because everything is done by faith – without believing or having 
faith we are unable to be healed. So first of all you accept Jesus, you believe. 
You might not know who is Jesus, but… you are here because you have some 
kind of faith, you are asking us to pray… If they say ‘no’ I say ‘no use praying 
for you’, because the reason I said I’m not ready to pray, when you pray… 
there is an evil spirit in your life [that] just goes off, but… when you don’t 
stand in your faith continually, the spirit that left you, it will come back to you 
with more strength and more power with seven more spirits. So life will be 
worse than what you had before, so I don’t want to put you in a bad situation, 
so it’s not that I don’t want to pray, I like to pray, but this is the bible truth 
(Evangelical Church, Nuwara Eliya).   
 
Here, not only is healing and prayer withheld from non-Christians, but the pastor 
justifies his actions by claiming that praying for non-Christians will make life “worse 
that what you had before”. Force is presented as altruism, and conversion is presented 
as a necessary precursor to being healed. Whilst not ubiquitous, this example does 
highlight how the structural mosaic enables pastors to meet need in a variety of 
different ways, one of the most forceful of which is by presenting relief as being 
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contingent upon religious switching. Given the central position of superstition and 
spirits in Sri Lankan society and culture, such strategies reflect an unethical 
manipulation of people’s emotion and reason, and the superficial nature of 
“unethical” conversion activity. Exploring such superficiality in more detail reveals 
the need to situate “unethical” conversion debates within a more transgressive 
understanding of religion in general, and Christianity in particular. Doing so will 
relativise the existing (rather linear) complaints meted against Christian groups (i.e. 
that unethical conversion is a result of fraud, force or allurement), and bring into 
focus new registers of unethical praxis.    
 
6.5 Debating “unethical” conversion 
 
As the preceding sections have shown, conversion is the apex of inter-religious 
tensions, and transcends individual religious switching. In addition, understandings of 
what constitutes “unethical” conversion are largely determined by religious 
worldview, and interpretation of religious doctrine. This fits into broader discourses 
regarding the language of conversion, in particular how it has often failed to adopt 
perspectives that are broad or inclusive enough to cover the full gamut of conversion 
processes and outcomes. Such restrictiveness lends credence to Rambo’s (1989) view 
that conversion should be treated as a descriptive, rather than normative enterprise. It 
should be observed, understood, interpreted and explained as it is practiced in various 
local contexts and not, as some may argue, relative to an all-encompassing canon. To 
varying degrees, this is apparent in all fields of study that rely on, whilst call into 
question, the: 
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Transferability of culturally loaded concepts and keywords, usually from 
Western sources, to other traditions… The most powerfully evocative terms 
have some meaning for almost everyone but on closer inspection, turn out to 
mean substantially different things to different people, varying by context and 
audience… Meaning thus unfolds through action and debate and hence should 
not be expected to be completely consistent, to conform to an easy 
“definition” or set of prescriptions, either within or across cultures (Nagata, 
2001: 492-3).  
 
Given the range of stakeholders involved, and the politics embedded within, 
“unethical” conversion discourses exacerbate this dynamic further. As an instructor at 
one of the country’s theological colleges pointed out: “as far as most of us are 
concerned it [“unethical” conversion] is a contradiction in terms, because no Christian 
can convert anybody as far as we’re concerned; that’s a work of God and somebody’s 
heart, and we offer that [conversion] as an option, something to think about, a 
worldview change, but that’s nothing that can be forced upon [someone]”. He went on 
to add that “if people are involved in conversion for the sake of the material benefits 
[i.e. allurement] that they get, we would simply call that a false conversion: it’s not an 
unethical conversion, it’s not even a conversion”. Extending this line of thought 
further, it is apparent that the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill is based on a 
different ontological understanding of what constitutes “unethical” conversion to 
those it seeks to penalise. Buddhists argue that individuals can be bought, bullied or 
deceived into converting, whereas Christians argue that conversion itself is not a 
matter of human interference, but is instead an outcome of an individuals’ relationship 
with God. Thus, “unethical” conversion is a misnomer that has been designed to 
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further the political agenda of the Buddhist right. One evangelist from the Southern 
Province went on to explain how: 
 
No government, no religious leader can rob an individual of his decision [to 
convert], that is entirely your private matter. So there’s nothing called 
“unethical” conversion, it is you. But if you try to suppress it, that is unethical. 
If you, by your religious authority, by saying that we will not [allow] you to 
buy goods from this shop, that is what happens in Sri Lanka if you become a 
Christian, the shops close on you, the three wheeler guy will not take you to 
town, probably the policeman will not entertain your complaint, and probably 
you will be deprived of so many legal things which a normal villager would 
enjoy because you became a Christian. Now that is really unethical… but 
nobody talks of that… How do you treat me? How does the government treat 
me? Why don’t they give us land to build a church? Why do they say in the 
Constitution there is freedom of expression of religion, and they are telling 
[the] UN we are a very free country, we don’t suppress our citizens, they can 
practice: that is the religious garb to the world. Underneath there’s another 
jungle law, which deprives the person who gets converted. 
 
According to this interpretation, therefore, the “unethical” conversion discourse is 
reversed, and instead used to implicate the government and the structure of society in 
its treatment of Christians and Christian converts. Beyond these two polarising views 
of conversion (i.e. that presented by the Bill, and that presented by Christians who 
argue “there’s nothing called “unethical” conversion”), however, there is a middle 
ground. This middle ground is occupied by pastors who are driven by the market 
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mentality outlined above, and who concern themselves not with the “worldview 
change” described above, but instead with the pursuit of numbers of converts, 
whatever the cost. It is this subset of the evangelical population that fits with the 
definition of “unethical” conversion proposed by the Buddhist right, but in doing so 
implicates the whole of the Christian community and undermines the Christian 
position in the debate. Minimising the impact of this unrepresentative subset of 
Christianity is, in my view, not going to be resolved by addressing the symptoms of 
what is a far more wide-ranging, and deep-rooted, problem that afflicts inter-religious 
relations in Sri Lanka. Most notably this includes Sri Lanka’s relationship with the 
West in particular (especially given the historical – or colonial – contingencies that 
have such a strong bearing upon contemporary religious discourse), and its ongoing 
struggle to exert local religious sovereignty in a context of mounting Christian 
globalism.  
 
Finally, public discourses surrounding “unethical” conversion have so far focussed on 
the individual, but have ignored the conversion of space. As this, and the preceding 
chapters, have shown, the conversion of space – such as houses into churches – is an 
issue of equal contestation that deserves recognition and its own separate dialogue. 
Christians commit a structural transgression by using private spaces for ostensibly 
public purposes, yet implicating them on such terms again fails to take into 
consideration differences in worldview. As one leader of a network of house churches 
in the south told me: 
 
I know the government [is] trying to say that the house church is illegal, it has 
to be registered, and I don’t think that’s fair. I think a proper lobby, a proper 
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documentation is difficult because you have to recognise one’s religious 
beliefs to outlaw or to approve something based on their beliefs, so what 
they’re [saying] is we need to register all religious places of worship… But I 
think meeting in a home to worship God, to study the bible, to pray and all, 
there’s absolutely nothing wrong with it, and you can… because then, when 
the Buddhists hold their plate ceremonies27, they should register the house. 
When [Hindu’s] do their pooja’s, they should register the house, because that 
means every religious act should be registered, and that’s impossible. So it’s 
actually, what is a church? That’s the question.   
 
To understand “what is a church” would be a first step towards understanding the 
theological divisions that represent the fault lines that exist between Christian and 
Buddhist factions. The Christian spatial register treats the house church as a legitimate 
place of worship, similar to the house as a site for “plate ceremonies” and “pooja’s” 
in the Buddhist and Hindu traditions respectively. Yet what exactly the conceptual 
differences between regular, collectivised Christian meetings in the house, and 
irregular, or individualised Buddhist and Hindu ceremonies in the house needs to be 
expounded in order to be reconciled. Doing so will not only enable greater inter-
religious understanding to develop, but will also engender a scholarly appreciation of 
different religious uses of the same place, and how the interpretation of use forms part 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Plate ceremonies form a part of Buddhist weddings and funerals.  
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6.6 Summary 
 
This chapter identified and discussed the salient issues that politicise the growth of 
evangelical Christian groups in Sri Lanka. First, I explored some of the place-bound 
politics of growth. I argued that the claiming of Bo trees and construction of statues 
by Buddhists are forms of spatial buffering that affect formally registered churches, 
and that informal churches looking to “formalise” their presence through government 
registration are subjected to a politics of permission. Following that I explored some 
of the politics associated with converting houses into churches. I began by looking at 
the politics of place(lessness) associated with the house church, highlighting how 
“placelessness” encourages religious experimentation, but it struggles to generate 
lasting commitment to Christianity. “Placelessness” also encourages processes of 
church fission, which is symptomatic of the capitalising behaviours of many 
evangelical pastors. Then I examined the volatility of sacred networks, showing how 
“placelessness” is an evangelical ideal that is, practically speaking, unsustainable in 
the long-term. Finally I showed how house churches struggle to gain credibility 
amongst existing place-bound religious institutions, with many “converts” pursuing 
dualistic religious practices instead.  
 
The next section engaged specifically with the politics of converting people. First, I 
explored the market mentality of evangelicals (and, sometimes, the laity), showing 
how processes of conversion can be corrupted by the capitalising behaviours of 
pastors. Following that I examined how evangelicals must constantly negotiate 
competing tensions surrounding the use of public and private spaces for evangelical 
purposes. Specifically, I showed how anti-Christian sentiment forces evangelical 
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groups to further privatise their strategies of outreach, and how the privatisation of 
evangelical praxis often galvanises Buddhist suspicion of “unethical” activity. The 
final sub-section sought to integrate prevailing understandings of “unethical” 
conversion with the opportunities for evangelism afforded by the structural mosaic. In 
doing so, I argued that leveraging the structural mosaic encourages “unethical” 
behaviours. The final section sought to disrupt the prevailing understandings of 
“unethical” conversion in Sri Lanka (which are dictated by the Buddhist right), by 
articulating Christian understandings of religious freedom and choice.   
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Whilst the preceding three chapters have explored the various processes, patterns and 
politics of evangelical Christian growth, this final empirical chapter focuses on 
Buddhist responses to such growth. Understandings of the impact evangelical 
Christianity has on indigenous, often anti-Christian groups, is generally lacking (see, 
however, Bautista and Lim 2009). Such an oversight is unwarranted, given that 
responses to Christian growth are typically reactionary, violent, and often based on 
various essentialisms that implicate both groups in discourses that go beyond religious 
praxis (see Fox 2004). Given Christianity’s associations with the Western colonial 
project, alongside the globalist ambitions of contemporary evangelical groups, the 
inter-relations between local growth and global contingencies are necessarily complex 
and worthy of attention. In the case of Sri Lanka, the fact that Christian groups pose a 
threat (both real and imagined) to Buddhist sovereignty, and challenge primordial 
assumptions of identity, allegiance and togetherness, causes them to trigger 
disproportionate reactions from local religious hierarchies. Indeed, the fact that 
Christianity is still equated with the arrival of modernity exists in a state of tension 
with the search for, and articulation of primordial identities that remain constant 
through space and time (Harvey 1989; also Blackburn 2010). Such tension is 
pronounced in Sri Lanka, where being Sinhala-Buddhist means being bound to a 
lineage that has constantly sought to defend its sovereignty in the face of foreign 
invaders, from ancient history to the present day. The Buddhist right enforce such 
	   275	  
bonds, using them as justification for strategies of religious protectionism and the 
often-violent rebuttal of Christian groups.  
 
In contrast to the preceding three empirical chapters, this final chapter resides at a 
predominantly macro scale of analysis, and explores Buddhist responses to 
evangelical Christian growth. Divided into three sections, in the first section I explore 
a fundamental antagonism that has contributed to the development of a hegemonic 
Buddhist, anti-Christian discourse in Sri Lanka; that is, the destabilisation of 
primordial Buddhist power structures that is an invariable outcome of Christian 
growth. In the second section I examine how Buddhist groups construe Christian 
growth in terms of being a “threat” to Sri Lanka, focussing specifically on the 
construction of Christianity as a foreign religion (and a pernicious symptom of 
Western imperialism), the strong (and negative) associations with international NGOs 
(non-governmental organisations), and the ensuing impact on Buddhist insecurity. In 
the third section I examine the strategies of Buddhist protectionism that have arisen as 
a result of such a threat. I expound the self-Orientalising nature of Buddhist 
hegemony, focussing specifically on how Buddhist protectionism serves to not only 
control the actions of Christian groups, but the religious mobility of the Buddhist 
masses as well. Finally, I show how violence (both symbolic and physical) is an 
outcome of both self-Orientalism and Buddhist hegemony, and argue that both 
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7.2 The destabilisation of primordial power structures 
 
Evangelical Christian growth challenges the “foremost place” of Buddhism in Sri 
Lanka, as granted by the Constitution. The divinely sanctioned remit for growth, 
previously outlined in Chapter 4, encourages aggressive, and often secretive, 
strategies of religious practice. The ensuing attrition of Buddhism on account of 
Christianity serves to destabilise primordial power structures, which are religiously 
guided and culturally entrenched. Derived from ancient Buddhist hierarchies (see 
Tambiah 1976; Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988), such power structures find 
strength in the village setting in particular, where society is typically more 
homogeneous, communalised and untainted by the “corrupting” influences of 
globalisation. As one Colombo-based pastor reflected:  
 
There is this cultural bondage, culture is very strong [in the village]. Buddhist 
culture, they have this thing called the village, the temple and the school, those 
three… They have this concept, so they think that [when] these three are inter-
dependent, and when they are strong, then the village is moral[ly] uplift[ed] 
and all that… So there [i]s a kind of binding of people and he [the monk] [i]s 
consulted for everything, and that is quite strong in the village, and they see 
the Christians coming in and disrupting that unity.  
 
The fact that “moral uplift[ment]” is contingent upon the strength and pervasiveness 
of Buddhist power structures reveals the threat posed by evangelical groups. By 
“disrupting that unity” and weakening the Buddhist structure, the evangelising and 
proselytising activities of Christian groups, whether intentionally or not, subvert the 
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control and influence of Buddhism. In addition, the monk is the judicial authority of 
most localities: “in Sri Lanka, the most power is in the Buddhist monk; the Buddhist 
monk say anything, the people will listen” (Evangelical Church, Galle). The monk is 
often instrumental in dictating village opinion and attitudes, particularly regarding 
religious matters. This has important consequences for churches when facing monk-
led opposition: “you can have police, you can have President, you can have anybody, 
but the village priest [i.e. monk] has the say, the final say, you know, what they say is 
the final decision made” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). The agency of Christian 
groups is not only an affront to the authority of the monk, but also threatens the 
cultural foundations upon which most of Sri Lankan society is based. Whilst such 
authority is pronounced in the rural, village setting, it reduces considerably as 
localities become more urbanised:  
 
In the village, the village monk has become the chief person there… whenever 
the Buddhist monk get to know that the Christian activities are happening then 
they organise all kinds of rallies and all kinds of opposition activities. But in 
the urban area, it is not the Buddhist monk who is the main person of this 
urban area; they have no kind of authority in the urban area (Mainline Church, 
Colombo).  
 
The diluted authority of the monk in the urban setting provides one explanation for 
the relative clustering and success of churches in urban areas, especially Colombo, 
where modernising forces have already weakened such power structures. This also 
explains why rural areas are typically higher risk, and relatively more impenetrable, 
spaces of evangelism than their urban counterparts. In rural areas especially, 
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expressions of evangelical agency threaten the prevailing dominance of Buddhist 
thought and lifestyle, leading to a rigid demarcation and defence of the boundaries 
that separate religious groups. Indeed, in rural areas the actions of evangelical groups 
are most likely to ‘pose a challenge to the religious monopoly, domination, and/or 
ideals of the majority group, thereby provoking discrimination as a response’ (Fox 
2000: 427). Such actions challenge the hitherto sacrosanct legitimacy of Buddhism in 
Sri Lanka, destabilise primordial power structures, and contribute to a “crisis of 
legitimacy” that resonates throughout much of the Third World (see Sahliyeh 1990; 
Juergensmeyer 1993; Haynes 1994). As one southern-based pastor reasoned: “when 
you speak about the Good News [i.e. evangelise], people who… keep a certain 
segment of the people under their authority and rule [i.e. monks], they lose their grip”. 
This accords with Fox’s (2000) assertion that religious legitimacy (articulated in the 
form of primordial power structures) is used to sanction religious discrimination 
against minority (in this case, evangelical) groups.  
 
The destabilisation of primordial power structures by Christian groups contributes to 
an erosion of Buddhist sovereignty. As a response to such erosion, Christian growth is 
typically reconstituted as being part of a more wide-ranging “threat” to Sri Lanka; a 
realignment that, in turn, serves to legitimise expressions of Buddhist hegemony.  
 
7.3 Constructing the Christian “threat”  
 
In Sri Lanka, Christian growth is depicted as being a “threat” to the stability and 
longevity of Buddhism. The appropriation of postcolonial discourses that construe 
Christianity as a religion at the ‘frontiers of [Western] hegemony’ (Nederveen 
	   279	  
Pieterse 1992: 13; Wallace 2006) serves an important, if paradoxical purpose in the 
development and justification of Buddhist hegemony. In this sense, the construction 
of the Christian “threat” both reflects (and deflects) a number of insecurities that arise 
when Buddhist hegemony is situated in a global schema. It reflects the fear of the 
weakening of the Buddhist power base as a result of Christian growth, whilst 
simultaneously focussing attention on Christian aggression instead of the 
shortcomings of Sri Lankan Buddhism. In particular, the Buddhist right draws 
evidence and strength from associating Christian groups with the (neo-) colonial 
West, and the strong associations between Christian groups and international NGOs. 
In the sub-sections that follow, these two characteristics are explored, followed by 
consideration of how Christian globalism exacerbates Buddhist insecurity, thus 
contributing to the formation and justification of Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka.  
 
7.3.1 Christianity as a symptom of the (neo-) colonial “West” 
 
Christian discourses in Sri Lanka are heavily tainted by the country’s colonial past, 
and often struggle to shed the mantle of foreignness that is popularly associated with 
the religion. The fact that ‘the past is not past, but alive and kicking… the enemy is 
prefabricated and available on order’ (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1990: 120) presents an 
enduring problem for Sri Lankan Christians. Colonial antecedence, despite its 
anachronism, continues to be a powerful “enemy” against which Buddhist groups are 
able to mobilise society. The unethical conversion discourse, for example, is 
presented as a contemporary extension of a problem that has afflicted Sri Lanka for 
centuries: “we have a 500-year history of forceful, forcible, unethical forms of 
conversion” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). Such reactionism has morphed into 
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more contemporary understandings of Christianity and the West, and is fitting with 
King’s (1999a: 187) warning about the need to remain sceptical of the presupposition 
that ‘the period of domination of ‘the rest’ by the West has now come to an end and 
that scholars who have taken the post-Saidian ‘postcolonial turn’ can now claim to be 
free from complicity with regimes of domination’.  
 
For the Buddhist right in particular, the growth of Christianity is symptomatic of a 
neo-colonising “West”. Christian growth triggers “a certain paranoia about Western 
imperialism and grand Protestant evangelical Christian schemes to destroy Sri Lanka 
and Buddhism” (Evangelical Church, Galle). Whilst this may appear a little 
embellished coming from an evangelist, it does reflect the prevailing Buddhist logic 
that “the only way to get this country today is by religion” (Buddhist Organisation, 
Kandy). As a result, the Buddhist right has reframed Christianity in broader terms that 
go beyond religious difference: “we found that there [i]s a hidden invasion in the 
country, a cultural invasion” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). Expounding the term 
“cultural invasion” reveals the supposed linkages between Christianity and Western 
exploitation, and the insidious outcomes of such a relationship: 
 
We label this as a cultural invasion, because not only [do] they [evangelicals] 
change the religion, they change the entire mindset. After Western people left, 
people began thinking about the country, having self-pride, self-confidence, so 
when Third World become independent, that is a big problem for the Western 
exploitation and the postcolonial exploitation process… So they’re making a 
hidden army of the Western forces inside the Third World, through this 
conversion. That’s why Western countries have funded these churches. That’s 
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why they have stood by these churches when they’re in trouble. All these 
[Western] embassies, if there’s a very minor incident to these churches, they 
make a big noise because they know this is their hidden army of the cultural 
invasion.  
 
Construing Christians and Christianity as the “hidden army of the cultural invasion” – 
one that enlists people via conversion – encapsulates the full scale of the perceived 
threat posed by evangelical Christianity, as well as the crisis of insecurity that 
undermines the transition from colonial, to postcolonial nation-state. Converting to 
Christianity problematises such a transition by providing a contemporary reminder of 
the colonial past. Moreover, according to such logic, religion is the conduit through 
which Western governments continue to exert power and control over Sri Lanka’s 
domestic affairs at both the macro scale – “what the Christian, Western governments 
are doing in this country is to create chaos in this country… the only agenda they 
have is to Christianise the rest of Asia” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo) – and the 
micro: “even the police have been bought over, they have been silenced by the 
church” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). Altogether, this has contributed to an 
understanding that “there was a postcolonial ruling by the West; they were not in Sri 
Lanka physically… [but] they had the capacity to rule us… until 200528, our Sri 
Lanka was a Western colony” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). Western colony or 
not, the associations made between Christianity and contemporary forms of 
colonisation are clear, and often exacerbated by the actions of evangelical groups. For 
example, leveraging the structural mosaic encourages evangelical churches to align 
themselves with NGOs and other development organisations and, in turn, for faith-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 2005 was the year incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected to office. Such a specific 
understanding of change is, perhaps, due to the fact that this interviewee is a senior civil servant in the 
Rajapakse administration.  
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based NGOs to be implicated in the unethical conversion discourse. Such alignment 
contributes to broader suspicions surrounding the activities and objectives of NGOs 
operating in Sri Lanka. 
 
7.3.2 Connecting Christianity and the NGO conspiracy 
 
In 1990, an unpublished government report identified a significant rise in the number 
of NGOs in Sri Lanka, increased funding of NGOs and strong links between NGOs 
and foreign donors. Subsequently, from 1991-3 an NGO Commission explored in 
detail the activities of NGOs, allegations of the misuse of NGO funds and the 
(potentially deleterious) effects of NGOs on issues of national interest, such as 
religion. Since the Commission, NGOs, whether faith-based or secular, have been 
subjected to intense, often unfair scrutiny and suspicion in Sri Lanka. Like churches, 
they form an integral part of discourses purporting ongoing Western imperialism in 
Sri Lanka, with Goonatilake (2006: 9; see also Gunasekara 2012) in particular arguing 
that ‘as the Cold War ended, there was a conscious policy change in the Western 
countries and through them in international agencies to sponsor non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in the developing world’. Such a change has captured the 
attention of Buddhists and (some) Christians, and is based on the presupposition that 
NGOs represent an informal extension of Western power over the postcolonial world: 
“if you take the US and some other countries in the West, they have Western interests. 
So when they can’t find it through the direct government level, they will use these 
kinds of channels. They will use NGOs, they will use this type of missionaries, and 
things like that” (Evangelical Parachurch, Colombo). NGOs and missionaries provide 
contemporary manifestations of past grievances, serving to reify the prevailing 
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Figure 24: The United Nations headquarters in Colombo under siege 
In July 2010 Sri Lanka’s Housing Minister, Wimal Weerawansa, led protests against 
the UN investigation of war crimes perpetrated during the civil war. The protests 
involved Weerawamsa participating in a much-publicised hunger strike, a seven-hour 
siege of the UN compound, and the burning of an effigy of Ban Ki-Moon (see The 
Telegraph 06.07.10). Surrounding Weerawamsa throughout his protest was a group 
of Buddhist monks. 
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Suspicion has been revived in recent years by allegations of unethical practice 
amongst the NGO community. Receiving widespread condemnation for allegedly 
perpetrating an ‘externally financed and NGO-fomented spate of forced and induced 
religious conversions [to Christianity]’ (Wanigaratne 1997: 225), such sentiment has 
been most pronounced in the immediate aftermath of the 2004 Asian tsunami, and 
since the end of the civil war in 2009. Allegations like these crystallise the linkages 
between NGOs and Christianity, which are perceived as being detrimental to Sri 
Lankan Buddhism: “most NGOs in Sri Lanka, most Western NGOs are Christian 
NGOs… whilst they portray themselves as independent, impartial, [with the] human 
rights label that they put, but in fact they are there to protect the Christian religion” 
(Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). The articulation of religious bias is compounded 
by a perceived lack of transparency and accountability. In this sense, the NGO 
conspiracy is based on the (apparent) inter-relationship between NGOs, Western 
donors and Christianity, and the anti-Buddhist agenda that such an inter-relationship 
foments: 
 
They [NGOs] are relying on Western funding, so they have to satisfy their 
master, so their agenda is there… I mean, the Western world is not funding 
these NGOs to do nothing, they have an agenda, I mean, they had an agenda 
centuries ago, they have an agenda today. America has an agenda, Britain has 
an agenda, I mean, they [NGOs] are not coming here for the love of Sri 
Lankans.  
Why do you say that? 
Well, they suppressed the Buddhists for centuries; they destroyed our temples, 
they destroyed our culture (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo).  
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The “agenda” of NGOs is articulated as an extension of Western power, which in turn 
is interpreted in a resolutely anti-Buddhist light. NGOs, whether secular or faith-
based, are all implicated in the broader discourse of Christian “threat”. The belief that 
“the Western world is not funding these NGOs to do nothing” highlights how 
perceptions of the past influence those of the present, with the “agenda” of the West 
remaining constant over time and rooted in the belief that “they are not coming here 
for the love of Sri Lankans”. In other words, past grievances are projected onto 
present-day ambitions, providing a source of suspicion that encapsulates not just 
religion, but development and international relations as well (see Olson 2008). Such 
suspicion plays an important part in constructing the Christian threat, but it also 
highlights Buddhist insecurity in the face of global forces.  
 
7.3.3 Buddhist insecurity in global perspective 
 
The constructions, depictions and associations discussed in the preceding sub-sections 
highlight the insecurity of Buddhist groups in Sri Lanka. Fear that Buddhist 
sovereignty is being compromised by the dictates of global forces has contributed to 
the construction of Buddhist nationalism and Christian globalism in oppositional 
terms. Whilst the former seeks to enforce the religious, ethnic and territorial 
boundaries that define the “nation”, the latter seeks to overcome such boundaries by 
baptising believers into a trans-ethnic, trans-territorial faith community. The 
competing ambitions of the two groups strengthen each in relation to the other, which 
increases the propensity for dogmatism and conflict. As Olzak (2011) shows, 
globalising forces often have a catalysing effect upon both nationalist sentiment and 
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conflict. On the one hand, nationalist movements around the world are often 
articulated in terms of a defensive response to the forces of globalisation, and a 
reaction against the increasingly globalist world system (see Spohn 2003; Rudnyckyj 
2010). On the other hand, arbiters of globalisation threaten nationalist individuals and 
groups, rendering them ‘ontologically insecure and existentially uncertain’ (Kinnvall 
2004: 741). Indeed, the insecurity of Sri Lanka’s Buddhist community is one 
characterised as “a majority group with a minority mindset” (Evangelical Parachurch, 
Colombo), a dynamic that runs contra to existing understandings of the inter-
relationship between religion, discrimination and violence.  
 
I emphasise here the irony that a minority, marginalised religious group is constructed 
as being discriminatory; the Buddhist right projects a (not unfounded) view of 
Christian belligerence, in that “the more they [Christians] can attack the Buddhists, 
they’re happy” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). Perceived discrimination acts as a 
‘warrant’ (Little 1991: xxi) that sanctions (often violent) retributive action to be taken 
against evangelical groups. A discourse is created and sustained whereby ‘difference 
is perceived in oppositional rather than pluralistic terms, and differences between 
cultures become fetishized at the same time as internal heterogeneities within each 
culture are effaced’ (King 1999a: 188). One interviewee (a Buddhist convert to 
Christianity, who now pastors an indigenous evangelical church in Colombo and also 
works for an international religious NGO) outlined the ensuing tension between 
oppositional (rather than pluralistic) forms of difference with perceptiveness: 
 
They [Buddhists] hate Christians because of the global village, globalisation. 
The Buddhism is nationalism, but the Christian is supporting globalisation. 
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We are one family, you and me; if you’re a Christian, I’m a brother, you are a 
brother to me. In any part of the world, the Christians are a brotherhood, they 
are supporting the global village, Christianity. The globalism is very against 
the nationalism. Nationalism looks at this global village concept as a threat. 
The Christian is more connected to the global: one God, one family, one kind. 
You can see the problem, Christianity is promoting the globalism. Can you 
understand why the Buddhist people hate the Christian people? Not just 
because of the religious thing, but because of the religious principle, the 
concept of God, no, no, this is against nationalism… We are proud to be Sri 
Lankan, we love motherland, everything is there, we submit to government, 
but the problem is that to the Buddhist, the Christian is the enemy. They want 
to promote a Buddhist Sinhala country. 
 
The interviewee constructs an accurate distinction between the globalist ambitions of 
Christianity, which transcend national boundaries and putative cultural, ethnic, and 
linguistic barriers (“one God, one family, one kind”), and the nationalist ambitions of 
Sri Lankan Buddhism, whereby “they want to promote a Buddhist Sinhala country”. 
Importantly, globalism and nationalism are also recognised as existing in a state of 
insurmountable tension with each other: “the problem is that to the Buddhist, the 
Christian is the enemy” (and, indeed, vice versa). Indeed, the globality of Christian 
groups as a discursive construct is self-evident in their ideology of salvation, and 
positions them in painful contrast to the domestic, steadfast practices of Sri Lankan 
Buddhism. International linkages provide funds, ideas and support, and fuel 
allegations of local dispossession. Fundamentally, Christianity enables converts to 
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reap the benefits of the global market of supply and demand, much to the chagrin of 
‘those who have been left behind’ (Kinnvall 2004: 742).  
 
In light of this, it is apparent that the NGO conspiracy is partly a response to the 
failure of Sri Lanka’s postcolonial project of independence, development and 
modernisation, and partly recognition of the need to attribute blame for such 
shortcomings. As Juergensmeyer (1996: 1) recognises in his original 
conceptualisation of religious nationalism, ‘politicized religious movements are the 
responses of those who feel desperate and desolate in the current geo-political crisis’. 
Whilst Juergensmeyer does not define what he means by the “current geo-political 
crisis”, his recognition of the desperation and desolation of religious nationalists is 
instructive. Being outside influences that represent the West in general and 
Christianity in particular, churches and NGOs provide suitable foci for such 
grievances. Altogether, in the context of Sri Lanka, the “geo-political crisis” of which 
Juergensmeyer speaks is the meeting of Christian globalism and Buddhist 
nationalism, the nexus of which exposes the failures of Buddhism to modernise in a 
way that is relevant and viable (which, to a large extent, reflects the failure of state-
led development throughout the postcolonial world – e.g. Collins 2007b; Rudnyckyj 
2010), and the precarious role of Christianity in injecting modernising influences into 
a context that is resistant to such interference. As a result, the paradoxical 
construction of Christianity as being a “threat” to Sri Lanka (and Sri Lankans) 
legitimises the discursive positioning of the Buddhist right as the “protectors” of the 
nation, and perpetuates their hegemonic power.  
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7.4 Buddhist protectionism and hegemony 
 
The carefully constructed Christian “threat” justifies the need for Buddhist 
protectionism. The Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill, for example, provides one 
indication of the typically inflated, and often disproportionate responses to the 
original “threat”. Not only that, but discourses surrounding the Bill also reveal the 
assumed vulnerability of the Buddhist masses, their inability to counter the threat 
themselves, and the ensuing need for Buddhist guardianship. The following sub-
sections develop three understandings that arise from the relationship between 
Buddhist protectionism and hegemony. The first explores the self-Orientalising frame 
that Buddhist elites use to control the Buddhist masses and subvert them to their 
authority. The second engages with some of the ideas raised in Chapter 5, by 
exploring the cultural intransigence that arises from the self-Orientalising frame, and 
focussing specifically on how discourses of ethnicity and language impact religious 
mobility. The final sub-section examines the violent outcomes of Buddhist hegemony: 
the symbolic violence of self-Orientalism, and the physical violence that is a by-
product of the relational model of competitiveness. 
 
7.4.1 The discursive formations of self-Orientalism 
 
Contemporary discourses surrounding the Buddhist self are, I argue, self-Orientalising 
in nature. They paint and glorify a picture of Buddhist culture that is immobile and 
restrictive, which serves ‘not only to distort the complexity of the subject matter but 
also remain in complicity with particular ideological agendas’ (King 1999a: 94). In 
this sense, Kinvall (2006: 4) correctly recognises that ‘any collective identity that can 
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provide… security is a potential pole of attraction’ with ‘paramount figures… seeking 
to rally people around simple, rather than complex, causes’. In addition to Kinnvall’s 
recognition of the “collective identity” in providing a “potential pole of attraction”, I 
take her argument a step further and suggest that, in the Sri Lankan case, such an 
identity is an amalgamation of historical glorification, the desire to reverse a position 
of perceived servitude, and often paradoxical systems, and interpretations of power. 
Through self-Orientalising dialogues, the Buddhist right (Kinnvall’s “paramount 
figures”) are positioning Sri Lankans, and those “at threat”, within a structure of 
marginality which serves to enforce the prevailing asymmetry between self and other, 
Buddhist and Christian, local and global (see Kinnvall 2004: 745-9). Such dialogues 
often serve a self-fulfilling purpose (King’s “particular ideological agendas”), and 
form the cornerstone of Sinhala-Buddhist identity mobilisation in Sri Lanka.  
 
Defining the national self in opposition to the colonial other is a common practice that 
gained traction during the latter stages of the colonial epoch. As Kinnvall (2004: 756; 
see also Said 1978) explains, with the shift to a postcolonial world system and 
concomitant rise of nationalist discourses, the national psyche is: 
 
Frequently loaded with affective images of what existed before the “rape of 
the nation” by the colonial masters. Such narratives are often deeply rooted in 
religious discourse, relating the present search for the nation to a glorified past 
prior to colonialization. Religious and cultural rituals and ritualistic 
observances of anniversaries can serve to sustain the trauma and feed into the 
continued demonization of the other while sacralizing the self. 
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Here, the synchronous relationship between the “glorified past” and the “present 
search for the nation” is highlighted as being one that further enforces the notion of 
the “sacraliz[ed]” Buddhist self and the “demoniz[ed]” Christian other. Yet there is 
another dimension to such discourses, one that projects the image of a “glorified past” 
onto the corruption of the present in unflattering, and often self-critical, ways. 
Speaking of unethical conversion, for example, a Kandy-based Buddhist monk told 
me how “our country’s [i.e. Sri Lankan] people are very innocent, Hindu and 
Buddhist [are] easy to convert”, whilst a Colombo-based Buddhist was more critical 
in his admission that “our poor common masses… they have no knowledge [of 
religion]”. Another representative of one of Sri Lanka’s Buddhist organisations 
readily criticised the lack of religious understanding amongst everyday Buddhists, 
which renders them susceptible to unethical activity:  
 
All the people are not intelligent about religion. There are poorish people, 
there are uneducated people, grassroots level, village level, community-based 
old women, young women: they don’t know anything about philosophy. So 
somebody can go and convert him… Likewise there are so many [Christian] 
groups, they’re trying to identify the innocent, young, those uneducated group 
and they give it [a “bribe” or inducement].  
 
Perhaps unwittingly, both sides of the unethical conversion debate are presented here: 
a gender-biased articulation of the religious ignorance and openness of the Buddhist 
masses (demand-side), coupled with the predatorial nature of evangelical groups 
(supply-side). In this instance, the debasement of the Buddhist self as “uneducated”, 
“not intelligent about religion” and “poorish” reflects a ‘culturally imposed 
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stupefaction of the people’ (Lele 1993: 59), and is in contradistinction to the 
debasement of the other that forms the prevailing wisdom regarding identity 
formation.  
 
In this sense, self-Orientalism is a discursive strategy that aims to legitimate the 
protectionist strategies of the Buddhist right, whilst restricting the possibilities for 
autonomous choice and, ultimately, religious freedom. The architects of a self-
Orientalising discourse are those that stand to gain from positioning Buddhism as 
weak and vulnerable within a global schema. It is a ‘rationalizing strategy to cover 
[the] deep rooted fears and anxieties of the Singhalese Buddhist majority’ (Korf 2006: 
284): portraying the self as weak and vulnerable circumvents the need to interrogate 
the failings of Buddhism and the attraction of Christianity. Conveniently, it is the self-
fulfilling relationship between ‘premodern ethnic ties and modern nationalism’ (Smith 
1996: 447) that provides the impetus for self-Orientalising discourses, especially 
when such discourses are constructed in relation to other, more globalising, forces. 
Whilst the Orientalising of the self presupposes an attempt at ‘retriev[ing], 
privileg[ing], and sanction[ing]’ (Marty and Appleby 1991: 816) past cultures, such a 
reading is idealised and, like more normative Orientalist discourses, can be far 
removed from the realities and ambitions of those it attempts to describe. Self-
Orientalism is an integral aspect of Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka (and likely 
elsewhere), and is part capitulation to normative Oriental discourse; part response to 
the cultural challenges posed by globalisation in general (and Christian globalism in 
particular); and part justification for virulent strategies of Buddhist protectionism.   
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For example, one of Sri Lanka’s foremost Buddhist Reformists during the colonial 
period, Anagarika Dharmapala (1907: 286), describes the ideal from which 
contemporary reactionaries take inspiration: ‘free from foreign influences, untainted 
by alien customs, with the word of Buddha as their guiding light, the Sinhalese people 
lived a joyously cheerful life’. One excerpt from a Kandy-based Buddhist clearly 
echoes such a self-reinforcing cultural trope, albeit within a more contemporary frame 
of reference. In doing so, he highlights the restrictiveness of the self-Orientalising 
discourse, and the privileged vantage point from which those who claim to represent 
them actually view the Buddhist masses: 
 
75-85% of the people in this country are farmers, and they’re not wealthy 
farmers like you find in Europe, they live at the peasant level. But they lead a 
good quality of life… they eat well, they dress well, they have clean homes 
and their lives are mostly farming. Now, once [they] get converted, I don’t 
think they like paddy farming because the [Christian] culture is such that 
paddy farming doesn’t go with the status, of that status [that comes with being 
a Christian], because you are supposed to be better educated. You are in better 
clothes, you are speaking broken English, you meet different types of people. 
Now when you go on Sunday to their [Christian] prayer centres, you find the 
English, white-skinned, Europeans are coming, because these people, they pat 
on the shoulders and say ‘hello my son’, and they [Sri Lankans] love a pat 
from a white-skinned man, that is the problem being under colonial rule, you 
see… And such a person who walks into that group finds that to get back into 
the mud and plough behind the buffaloes is something little. 
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The virtues of rural village life – eating well, dressing well and having clean homes – 
are presented here as failing to measure up to the standards of dress, education, 
language and social relations that are a corollary to Christian conversion. By 
presenting the Buddhist self in terms of a ‘cultural stereotype which [is then] used to 
subordinate, classify and dominate’ (King 1999b: 159), the architects of Buddhist 
protectionism are discursively stifling the progress and development of the masses 
and portraying such socio-economic intransigence as a force for the good of Sri 
Lanka. In abstract form, Christianity represents the ‘constant change and innovation 
of the modern world’, which is in contrast to Buddhist ‘attempt[s] to structure at least 
some parts of social life within it as unchanging and invariant’ (Hobsbawm 1983: 2). 
It is of little surprise, therefore, that as the benefits of modernisation become 
increasingly clustered and shared amongst a Colombo-based elite and their thinly 
spread networks of rural politicians, poverty is reproduced (especially in the Southern 
Province), and economic aspirations restricted (especially amongst the youth) (see 
Hettige 1998; Perera 2000; Uyangoda 2000). Indeed, the metropolitan elite that is 
plugged into, and maintains control over a large and disenfranchised rural population, 
forms the very basis of religious nationalism (Juergensmeyer 1993, 1996). As a result, 
not only are self-Orientalising discourses likely more prevalent than has currently 
been recognised, but they also have the effect of immobilising the Buddhist masses.  
   
7.4.2 Cultural intransigence and religious (im)mobility 
 
Self-Orientalism enforces a degree of cultural intransigence on the Buddhist masses, 
which in turn limits the potential for individual religious mobility. Religious mobility 
is the ability to convert out of an existing religion, and into a new one, and is 
	   295	  
predicated on the volitional agency of the individual. Religious immobility, on the 
other hand, occurs when such volitional agency is suppressed or restricted. Sri 
Lanka’s Buddhist right fear religious mobility, as conversion out of Buddhism serves 
to weaken their power base, and undermine the coherence of the national identity 
from which they gain strength. As a result, besides being an attempt to curtail 
Christian proselytism, the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill is also a strategy of 
protectionism that aims to restrict and control the religious mobility of the Buddhist 
masses:  
 
We don’t want anybody to be a Christian or to go to any other religion; we 
prevent it… 
So the role of [the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill] is to stop 
Buddhists from converting to Christianity? 
Definitely yes, firmly (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). 
 
Such sentiment reveals the often unspoken intentions behind the Bill. An interviewee 
from a different, albeit ideologically aligned organisation added a degree of 
justification by explaining the exalted role of Buddhism in Sri Lanka: “it’s not a mere 
religion for us, it’s our heritage, it’s our history, so we have an emotional link with 
Buddhism”. Indeed, Obeyesekere (2006: 151; see also Obeyesekere 1991) strongly 
refutes the conflation, rather than differentiation, of Buddhist doctrinal tradition and 
Buddhist history, as the latter is invented and subject to ongoing invention and 
corruption. He contends that the conflation of “Buddhist history” and Sinhala identity 
is erroneous (what he terms an ‘essentialized and primordialized axiomatic identity’) 
and a primary source of inter- and intra-group tension. Not only that, but such 
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conflation also creates an inviolable tension between the religious rights of the nation, 
and the religious freedom of the individual. 
 
Whilst the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill is widely viewed as presenting a 
legislative infringement upon the rights of the individual (Owens 2007), such an 
infringement is often obfuscated by the demobilising effect of culture on religious 
choice. As discussed in Chapter 5, culture is an important arbiter of religious 
immobility; it obfuscates the ethics of religious freedom, and forms the structural 
underpinnings of Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka. The triumvirate of cultural 
belonging collapses elements of religion (Buddhism), ethnicity (Sinhalese) and 
language (Sinhala) into a single grouping that determines behaviours, attitudes and 
choices. This has precipitated a cultural transformation of the universalist Buddhist 
tradition in Sri Lanka, as it has done with Hinduism in India and Islam in Pakistan 
(see van der Veer 1996b, 2001). Thus whilst religion ‘is seen as optional rather than 
inherent’, in the Sri Lankan context it is conflated with ethnicity to the extent that 
‘both these attributes are desirable for all people at all times’ (Rogers 1994: 15). The 
cultural context greatly restricts the possibilities for individual religious mobility, as 
religion is tied to ethnicity, and ethnicity cannot be changed:  
 
The government, I mean the [Buddhist] kings also, they fostered this idea… 
that if you are Sinhala you are part of the culture, and Buddhism is part of this 
culture. So people, there are a lot of customs that go with Buddhism… You 
are within a certain frame where the religion and the race are very, very 
close… [As a result] people feel that if you are a Sinhalese you have got to be 
a Buddhist, it goes with the culture, the customs of the land, so they feel that if 
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you are giving up your religion [i.e. convert] it’s a slur… If you’re Sinhala 
you have got to be a Buddhist, there’s a strong feeling that the saviours of 
Buddhism are in this country. So the Buddhists, so the people are not very 
religious, it’s part of their culture, they feel it’s part of being a Sinhalese. So 
anyone leaving the temple and coming to the church is an insult to the Sinhala 
people, the Sinhala race (Evangelical Church, Galle). 
 
Ethnicity is an immutable anchor of identity that, in Sri Lanka, is inextricably 
associated with religion, thus restricting the possibilities for religious experimentation 
and change. Such a “frame” of understanding is most pronounced in the Southern 
Province, where assumptions of ethnic belonging render Buddhism the de facto 
religious “choice”: “when it comes to down South, it’s totally Sinhalese, so it’s a bit 
hard for me to say ‘I’m a Christian’” (Evangelical Church, Colombo). That being 
said, whilst ethnicity is immutable and religion inviolable, language provides a facet 
of cultural belonging that can be changed, presenting a channel through which 
religious (and, indeed, socio-economic) mobility can begin.  
 
Since the Sinhala Only Act of 1956, which established Sinhala as the official 
language of Sri Lanka, language has played an integral role in Sri Lankan identity 
politics (Tambiah 1986). The strategies of evangelism employed by many Christian 
groups galvanise such politics. English-language instruction, whether via 
Montessori’s or adult education classes, is a common means by which evangelical 
Christian groups reach out to non-Christians, to the consternation of the Buddhist 
right: 
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We have our own traditions and historical values, and our historical values 
should not be diluted. Should not be diluted, the main thing, definitely, we are 
not allowing anybody to do that… we should not allow people, our babies, to 
study English (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo) 
 
As this excerpt suggests, in Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalism is not just about the 
‘fulfilment of identity’ (Anderson 1992: 205), but the imposition and policing of it as 
well. Disallowing “our babies to study English” reveals an attempt at safeguarding the 
Sinhala language, and more deep-rooted suspicions surrounding the effects of 
Christian-sponsored language instruction on individual mobility. Such suspicion is 
warranted, given that English-language instruction is often little more than a pretext 
for evangelism; it helps to erode cultural barriers to conversion, and provides a 
captive audience to whom Christian groups can propagate their beliefs. In this sense, 
the paradox of which Juergensmeyer (2002) speaks (whereby Islamic nationalists are 
accountable to both nationalist identities and the transnational umma29) is recast in a 
different light, as religion (which Christians see as universal) and cultural belonging 
(which is place-specific) are divorced from each other, rather than mutually 
constitutive: “religion, or belief, supersedes culture; culture can be wrong, bible can 
never be wrong… if you look at the bible, God liberates you [from culture]” 
(Evangelical Church, Kandy). The need to “liberate” Sri Lankans (specifically the 
Sinhalese) from the cultural frame within which they are bound is a guiding principle 
of Christian evangelisation, as doing so will remove (or, at least, reduce) a significant 
barrier to religious mobility:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The umma is the Islamic nation. It is a collective term that encompasses territorially dispersed 
Muslims around the world.  
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[Christians] ask all the poor people to send their youngest, youngsters, babies 
to [their] Montessori… then they will learn, teach them English. Then the poor 
girl, they go and say ‘mummy goodnight’ when they are going to bed… then 
that poor mummy thinks ‘nice, my girl can speak English, I have to send her 
[to the Christian Montessori]’, she encourage: we oppose that (Buddhist 
Organisation, Colombo). 
 
Opposing the sending of children to Christian Montessori’s reflects a willingness to 
not only restrict the linguistic (and by extension, religious) mobility of the individual, 
but their socio-economic advancement as well (given that English language 
proficiency is typically equated with better employment prospects). The fear is that 
“as a child, they don’t know Buddhism, their parents, they don’t know, they only 
want English” (Buddhist Organisation, Kandy). Putting religion before perceived 
individual betterment (“they only want English”) brings to light the deleterious effects 
of Buddhist hegemony, not just on those they oppose (i.e. Christians), but those they 
claim to represent as well. The ensuing structure of marginality enforced by the 
Buddhist right appears to promote national fortitude at the expense of individual 
advancement. Such promotion is, as Tambiah (1986: 92) argues, symptomatic of the 
fact that hegemonic impulses have rendered the Sinhala-Buddhist identity as ‘militant, 
populist, fetishized’, and as bastardising the traditions upon which it is based. Taken 
to the extreme, such an identity can sanction violence against those that are alien or 
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7.4.3 The violent outcomes of Buddhist hegemony 
 
Whilst 2009 marked the end of the decades-long civil war in Sri Lanka, Buddhist 
hegemony continues to orchestrate violent outcomes against the Christian other, and 
the Buddhist self as well. Understanding the motivations for such violence is 
especially important given that the transition to ‘a more equitable ‘post-war Sri 
Lanka’ depends not just on territorial securitization of the island’s geography, but also 
on forging dissident and dynamic space for debate and dialog around the composition 
of the contemporary Sri Lankan national’ (Jazeel and Ruwanpura 2009: 385). 
Currently, the persistence of Buddhist hegemony stunts the “forging” of “dissident 
and dynamic space for debate and dialog” in favour of a more uncompromising 
“composition of the contemporary Sri Lankan national” instead. Such 
uncompromising compositions serve to strengthen the grip of Buddhist hegemony, yet 
undermine the possibilities for individual emancipation and religious pluralism. To 
this end, the ensuing discussion explores two inter-related modalities of violence that 
are outcomes of Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka: the symbolic violence of self-
Orientalism, and the physical violence associated with the relational model of 
competitiveness.  
 
In the first instance, self-Orientalism is a form of symbolic violence that seeks to 
restrict the mobility, advancement and autonomy of the Buddhist masses. Such 
restrictions are deemed necessary given the construction of Christian “threat”, and the 
necessity of hegemonic “protection”. The discourse of threat and protection becomes 
more pronounced when interpreted in a global schema. Indeed, whilst the prevailing 
assumption is that globalisation can cause the individual to feel ‘bereft and alone in a 
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world in which she or he lacks the psychological support and the sense of security 
provided by more traditional settings’ (Giddens 1991: 33), anomie also catalyses 
religious mobility and change. Thus whilst self-Orientalising devices like the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill reflect the “psychological support and 
security” of tradition, the ensuing religious immobility enforces a position of 
marginality that does little more than strengthen the bondage between masses and 
elites. Evangelical Christianity, on the other hand, is simultaneously a product of 
global forces, and often better suited to alleviate their negative consequences. Rather 
than the self-Orientalising emphasis on stalling, even reversing the effects of 
modernisation (see Pathak 1998), Christian groups embrace and fulfil the needs 
associated with modernisation (e.g. education, wealth, individual realisation, group 
solidarity) instead of condemning their effect (see Heuser 2009).  
 
The meeting of modern need exposes the structural inequality and immobility 
associated with self-Orientalism, serving to enforce the differences between the 
Buddhist self and Christian other. Evangelical groups provide the networks and 
possibilities that are needed to begin the process of upward socio-economic mobility, 
which adds ballast to Haynes’ (1994: 31; see also Juergensmeyer 1990; Fox 2000: 
437; Spohn 2003) argument that ‘the arrival and consolidation of contemporary 
religious militancy is rooted in the failed promise of modernity’. The promises of 
Christianity offer a stark and immediate reminder of such failures, and, as a result, are 
reframed by the Buddhist right in terms of “unethical” conversion and religious 
imperialism. Paradoxically, therefore, whilst Buddhist elites lament the neo-
colonising tendencies of evangelical Christian groups, it is this same group that are 
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colonising and exploiting the imagination of the rural masses as Orientalism is, 
fundamentally, an imperialistic endeavour (Said 1978).  
 
Such colonisation and exploitation not only reflects the symbolic violence being 
perpetrated against the Buddhist self, but also entrenches the need for physical 
violence as a form of protection against the constructed Christian “threat”. As 
Springer (2011: 91) notes in the context of economic neoliberalisation: ‘because of 
the performative nature of Orientalism, an exasperated populace may follow their 
‘scripted’ roles and resort to violent means in their attempts to cope with the festering 
poverty and mounting inequality wrought by their stat[e]’. Such “scripted” responses 
are evident in the willingness to preserve Buddhist heritage in Sri Lanka: “I am a 
Buddhist, I know something of Buddhism, but I know it is my heritage… We have to 
fight, we have to preserve, we have to safeguard” (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). 
Constructing a monolithic, out of touch populace that is disconnected and alienated 
from the processes of modernisation encourages violent recourse to external “threat”. 
Such tendencies are fuelled by the self-Orientalising discourse, which at once 
provides a reason to defend Buddhism, and a reason to convert out of it.  
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Figure 25: Military personnel in front of a Buddhist statue, Colombo 
The securitisation of religion in Sri Lanka has become increasingly belligerent, 
although acts of violence are often informal, rather than state-sanctioned. 
 
In the second instance, it is evident that relational forms of competition (previously 
explained in Chapter 4) beget relational forms of regulation; regulating the informal 
economy is the prerogative of civil society, not the state. Such a dynamic is brought to 
life by Korf’s (2006: 280; after Derrida 2005) understanding of roguishness, which ‘is 
about the question who holds discursive power over law and justice: those who hold 
power define the law and decide who stands outside the law’. The primordial power 
structures that control Sri Lankan society hold “discursive power over law and 
justice”, meaning the holders of power – the temple and Buddhist hierarchy – are able 
to condemn the actions of Christian groups; the metaphorical “rogues” that are 
constructed as being a threat to public order. As Korf argues, the “rogue other” is 
needed to both legitimise an extra-legal state of exception (i.e. to legitimise violence 
perpetrated against rogues), and to consolidate existing, often hegemonic, structures 
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of power and control. Compounding this is the fact that persecution can serve to 
‘embolden the actions of social, political, and religious groups that learn how to work 
within the system’ (Grim and Finke 2007: 637). The fact that Christian groups operate 
in relational ways in order to remain competitive can not only exacerbate the violence 
meted against them, but can “embolden” their evangelical resolve as well.  
 
As a result, the competitive actions of evangelical groups simultaneously erode the 
numerical dominance of Buddhism, whilst contributing to the realisation of an 
increasingly punitive form of Buddhist hegemony. Correspondingly, there is an 
expansion of regulation, from formal (i.e. top-down, state-led, legal) patterns of 
control, to more informal (i.e. bottom-up, violent, reactive) patterns of persecution 
(see U.S. Department of State 2010 for a report on religious freedom – or lack thereof 
– in Sri Lanka). For example, the competitive value of the house church has to be 
tempered in relation to the more informal types of resistance perpetrated against it. 
Somewhat ironically, it is because of the intransigence of the legislative system to 
deal with house churches that has led to more bottom-up forms of persecution. A 
representative of a Buddhist organisation told me that the “sheds and all that of the 
evangelicals” are believed to “invite natural attacks”; people “get organised and 
threaten them [the house churches], attack them, or set fire to these places” because it 
is believed to be the most effective way of suppressing their growth. Such sentiment 
was echoed by a Colombo-based leader of one of the country’s largest evangelical 
denominations, who commented that “all the small churches, they are crushed, 
persecuted”. More importantly, such antagonism is legitimised on the grounds that 
“they [Buddhists] found they can’t rely on the established system, because the 
established system is with the powerful side, not with the weaker side” (Buddhist 
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Organisation, Colombo). Whilst the reversal of positions is a clear articulation of 
Buddhist insecurity, how such insecurity manifests itself is a cause of growing 
concern in the post-war epoch as Buddhist reactionaries stake ever-greater claims to 
people and territory, and play an ever-greater role in the regulation of religious 
minorities. 
 
That said, whereas Grim and Finke (2010) argue that the restriction of religious 
freedom by the state results in violent forms of persecution, it is also apparent that the 
competitive actions of minority groups accentuate the persecution meted against 
them. In this sense regulation, competition and conflict should not be seen in unitary 
terms as the actions of one group against another, but as outcomes of dynamic 
processes of interaction. The competitive desire of both majority and minority players 
perpetuates Christian resilience and Buddhist persecution, causing each to strengthen 
in relation to the other (see Bouma 2007; also Gramsci 1973). Indeed, the 
strengthening of the Christian “threat” plays an important role in hiding elements of 
roguishness within the self (Korf 2006: 286), meaning processes of evangelism and 
proselytism (the “threat) serves to legitimise the acts of violence that are perpetrated 
against them. In light of this, it is evident that resolving the competitive deadlock 
between Christian and Buddhist groups is not just a matter of religious concern, but 
one that requires consideration of a number of historical and developmental 
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7.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has situated the growth of evangelical Christianity in Sri Lanka within 
broader discourses of Buddhist nationalism and hegemony at the domestic level, and 
Western imperialism at the international level. In the first section, I focussed on the 
destabilisation of primordial powers structures that are a common outcome of 
evangelical Christian growth. I explained that the effects of such destabilisation are 
especially pronounced in the village setting, where moral upliftment is equated with 
the strength and pervasiveness of Buddhism. The fact that monks are conceived as the 
judicial authority of the village means that they often hold undue influence over 
village opinions and behaviours, and can easily mobilise the village in response to a 
perceived Christian “threat”.  
 
In the second section, I examined the construction of the Christian “threat”. In 
particular, I explained how postcolonial discourse plays an important role in the 
development and justification of Buddhist hegemony. Christianity is commonly 
constructed as a symptom of the (neo-) colonising West, with the colonial 
antecedence of Christianity providing an important conceptual bridge that is used by 
the Buddhist right to mobilise society against Christian groups. I also explained how 
NGOs are depicted as an informal extension of Western power over the postcolonial 
world, serving to undermine the sovereignty and interests of Sri Lankan Buddhism, 
and causing insecurity amongst the Buddhist right.  
 
In the third and final section, I critically explored three interconnected outcomes of 
the relationship between Buddhist protectionism and hegemony. First, I examined the 
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development of a self-Orientalising discourse that casts the Buddhist masses as 
vulnerable, and therefore in need of protection. The assumption of vulnerability 
positions the Buddhist masses within a structure of marginality that subverts them to 
the authority of elites whilst providing justification for Buddhist hegemony. Second, I 
argued that self-Orientalism causes cultural intransigence, which in turn restricts the 
possibilities for religious mobility and freedom. Third, I examined the violent 
outcomes of Buddhist hegemony, focussing specifically on the symbolic violence of 
self-Orientalism, and the physical violence perpetrated against Christian groups. 
Importantly, I argued that the violent rebuttal of Christianity is often the outcome of a 
dynamic process of interaction, with both groups competing aggressively for the 
affections of the Buddhist layperson.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
  
In this thesis I have considered various theoretical standpoints, empirical insights and 
interdisciplinary analyses, the aim being to develop a new understanding of 
evangelical Christian growth. Such an understanding is most applicable to 
environments that are generally hostile to Christian expansionism, such as Sri Lanka. 
By exploring the expressions, patterns and politics of evangelical agency in Sri 
Lanka, I have shown that there exists a recursive relationship between Buddhist 
power and Christian resilience, with both strengthening in relation to each other. This 
relationship causes inter-religious antagonisms to become more pronounced and 
entrenched. Most importantly, the role of space in effecting strategies of evangelical 
growth and resistance is a recurrent theme, and draws attention to the importance and 
value of geography in helping to understand and explain patterns of religious change. 
This concluding chapter summarises the arguments and findings of each preceding 
chapter, and identifies the key contributions and limitations of the thesis; directions 
for future research are indicated throughout.  
 
8.1 Chapter summaries 
 
The thesis has been divided into eight chapters, the first of which framed the research 
problem and introduced the research aims. I explained that the growth of evangelical 
Christianity has been restricted in much of postcolonial Asia, where the prevalence of 
religious nationalisms contributes to broad-based anti-Christian sentiment. Such 
sentiment prevails in Sri Lanka, a “geo-religious” space that shares a number of 
similarities with other countries in Asia and beyond. Following that, I argued that not 
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only are geographical perspectives on religious growth needed, but engagement with 
discourses of religious growth beyond geography will contribute to a wide(r)-ranging 
geography of religion. Three overarching research aims – to explore strategies of 
Christian growth, Buddhist resistance, and to evaluate the relative success of each – 
were also introduced.  
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the extant literature surrounding religious growth, and introduced 
the conceptual framework. I started by drawing a distinction between the structural 
determinants of religious change (e.g. modernisation, relative deprivation, the 
regulatory environment of religious economy theory), and human agency approaches 
to religious conversion. In particular, I explained the important and unique role of the 
evangelical organisation as an arbiter of religious change. Following that, I showed 
how a swathe of territory known as the 10/40 Window has proven to be generally 
resistant to evangelical praxis, and highlights the geographical limitations of existing 
understandings (which focus on territories in which growth is pronounced). As a 
result of such limitations, I explained the value of interpreting Christian growth in a 
spatial framework. Finally, the three axes of my conceptual framework were 
explained. Drawing on Giddens’ theory of structuration, I identified the structural 
mosaic as an enabler of religious growth, the spatial modalities of the structural 
mosaic, and one of the most pervasive spatial formations of the structural mosaic – 
the house church. More specifically, I suggested that leveraging the structural mosaic 
enables otherwise marginalised religious groups to exert religious agency in more 
subtle ways – by using non-religious spaces for religious purposes, for example. A 
focus on the house church reveals how evangelical space can be produced in 
networked (as opposed to place-bound) terms: this enables churches to form, disband 
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and move with ease; to occupy a variety of non-religious spaces and localities; and to 
catalyse Christian growth in a number of (hitherto under-appreciated) ways. 
 
Chapter 3 outlined the empirical context and methodology. To begin, I discussed the 
rise of religious protectionism in Sri Lanka since the colonial epoch, specifically the 
emergence of the Buddhist right and, most recently, the Jathika Hela Urumaya’s 
proposed Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill. I also articulated the distinction 
between Sri Lanka’s formal and informal religious economies, explaining how 
evangelical Christian groups fit into the latter category as they are not formerly 
recognised by the state and often operate outside of more formal regulatory 
frameworks. The second part of the chapter provided an overview of the critical 
ethnographic approach that was employed, and a discussion of cross-cultural research 
ethics. Deviating from existing, quantitative-based understandings of religious 
growth, I argued that the qualitative methods employed – in-depth interviews and 
observations – could elicit new perspectives. Finally, the research sites were 
introduced and locational nuances explained.  
 
Chapter 4 was the first empirical chapter, and explored how Christian groups realise 
their evangelical agency within the structurally hostile environment of Sri Lanka. I 
started by explaining the transcendental motivations of evangelical groups – inspired 
by The Great Commission – and the dissident geopolitics that result. I then introduced 
the relational model of Christian competitiveness, which shows how regulation 
determines the type of competition (not the outcome), with increased regulation 
resulting in more informal strategies of evangelical engagement. Expounding this 
further, I explained how evangelical groups overcome boundaries to growth by 
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working in ways that are secretive and encourage subterfuge (shown by the 
invisibility of Christian presence, the mobilisation of the laity, and strategies of spatial 
diffusion), the (sometimes deleterious) role of foreign catalysts in generating growth, 
and the strategic extra- and intra-group networks of influence that are a source of 
strength for evangelical groups. Finally, I identified two ways in which leveraging the 
structural mosaic can contribute to Christian growth. One, the focus of evangelical 
groups on social ministries is a source of social agency that can lead to religious 
acceptance: a process of Christian co-optation (e.g. evangelical responses to the 2004 
tsunami). Two, once such acceptance has been attained, social ministries are often 
used to generate more evangelically motivated outcomes: a process of Christian 
influencing (e.g. the involvement of Christian NGOs in post-war reconstruction 
projects in the north).  
 
Chapter 5 explored different locations of evangelical praxis in Sri Lanka. I started by 
introducing the concept of locational hierophanies, showing how divine prophecies 
encourage Christians to commit to a particular location. Following that I explored 
spaces of evangelism, focussing on the rural-urban, and public-private paradoxes in 
turn. In the first instance, I highlighted the importance of urban nodes as engines of 
evangelical growth, before explicating the differences between rural and urban supply 
of, and demand for Christianity. Whereas in rural areas people are typically easier to 
engage yet harder to convert, in urban areas they are harder to engage but easier to 
convert. In the second instance, I explained how the public domain is often the 
preserve of formal (i.e. recognised) religious groups, whereas the private domain is 
the preserve of informal (e.g. evangelical) groups. Following that, I explored three 
spaces of youth evangelism: the proximate space of the youth club, the detached 
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space of the youth camp, and the non-Christian space of the university campus. 
Finally, I showed how evangelical space is often obfuscated using the structural 
mosaic. First, I highlighted the tendency for Christian groups to establish social 
ministries in Buddhist temples, the aim being to create a space of subordination that 
enables the encroachment of Christian influence into the confines of Buddhist space. 
Second, I argued that the house church is a space of subversion, as the appropriation 
of the ostensibly secular space of the house serves to deflect anti-Christian suspicion, 
whilst simultaneously contributing to Christian growth.  
 
Chapter 6 explored the politics of evangelical Christian growth. I started by exploring 
the place-bound politics of growth, focussing specifically on how formal churches 
(i.e. those that are registered and have a fixed presence) are subjected to strategies of 
spatial buffering, whilst informal churches (i.e. those that are unregistered and have 
no fixed presence) are subjected to a politics of gaining the permission needed to 
establish a formal presence. Following that I examined the politics of converting 
houses into churches. I showed how the politics of place(lessness) contributes to 
church fission and encourages house church attendees to adopt dualistic religious 
behaviours that encompass both “old” and “new” religious practices and beliefs. A 
section on the politics of converting people followed, in which I focussed on how the 
market mentality of evangelical pastors (and laity) foregrounds the strong emphasis 
on converting people; how discourses surrounding the Prohibition of Forcible 
Conversion Bill have caused evangelical groups to privilege private over public 
spaces of evangelical outreach (a situation that, ironically, further antagonises the 
Buddhist right); and how leveraging the structural mosaic can easily (if unwittingly) 
encourage pastors to act in a manner that can be (mis)interpreted as “unethical”. 
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Finally, I presented Christian understandings of “unethical” conversion, the aim being 
to reframe the discourse within a Christian worldview. In doing so, I highlighted some 
of the contradictions that are embedded within the accusation of “unethical” activity, 
such as the curtailment of religious freedom that is an invariable outcome of the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill. 
 
Chapter 7 was the final empirical chapter, and explored how evangelical Christian 
growth has contributed to the development of, and justification for Buddhist 
hegemony in Sri Lanka. I started by showing how strategies of Christian evangelism 
weaken primordial structures of Buddhist power and control by encouraging society 
to question the traditions they have been born into (and often unthinkingly accept). 
Such encouragement causes a rupture in society, and threatens the traditional 
authority of the Buddhist hierarchy. Following that, I explained how and why right-
wing Buddhist groups construct the Christian “threat” as being foreign, colonial, 
aggressive and incompatible with Sri Lankan Buddhism. I also explained that such 
exaggerations reveal the insecurity of the Buddhist right, and help to legitimise the 
need for protective measures that are disproportionate to the actual “threat”. Such 
measures reveal a self-Orientalising construction of the Buddhist masses as 
vulnerable, with the assumption of vulnerability serving to restrict individual religious 
mobility and freedom. Finally, I argued that the violence perpetrated against Christian 
groups in Sri Lanka is an outcome of the competitive actions of both Christian and 
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8.2 Key contributions and relevance for future research 
 
Existing theories of Christian growth tend to focus on either the structural drivers of 
religious change, or the agency of evangelical organisations. In this thesis, I have 
overcome such theoretical dualism by arguing that structure and agency are co-
constitutive in influencing the strategies and outcomes of evangelism. Such co-
constitution is most important (and most pronounced) in contexts like Sri Lanka, 
where Christian groups face structural opposition to growth. By applying Giddens’ 
(1984) structuration theory to the religious sphere, I have shown how the recursive 
relationship between structure and agency reveals how the actions of agents are often 
guided by the conditions of structure. Such a relationship foregrounds the relational 
model of competitiveness, and has been further developed along the lines of the 
structural mosaic. The structural mosaic provides an analytical framework that 
recognises the heterogeneity of structure, which in turn sensitises discourse to the 
possibilities for agents to engage with society in a variety of (often non-religious) 
ways. Leveraging the structural mosaic through the use of social ministries enables 
otherwise marginalised Christian groups to establish a presence in seemingly hostile 
localities, to reframe Christianity in a more positive light, and to grow, despite 
resistance. The structural mosaic does, however, also encourage meanings, intentions 
and boundaries to become confused, and causes “unethical” behaviours to flourish.  
 
The tension that arises from expressing evangelical agency in and through different 
categories of structural understanding, and the ethical ambiguity surrounding such 
expressions, is often enhanced by the spatial practices of evangelical groups. The 
structural mosaic presupposes multiple layers of spatial ordering that obfuscate the 
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distinction between structure and agency. In doing so, it creates niches that enable 
marginalised religious groups to establish a foothold in a locality and flourish. As a 
result, spaces of evangelism are necessarily complex and multi-layered in order to 
overcome the stifling prohibitiveness of a hostile structural context. Outward symbols 
of Christianity are often eschewed in order to downplay signs of alterity. To this end, 
sensitivity to the spatial practices of evangelical groups reveals the agentic role of 
space in disguising difference and suppressing the true extent of evangelical presence, 
as shown by the establishment of social ministries within temple boundaries, and the 
widespread networks of house churches that exist throughout Sri Lanka. Indeed, the 
structural mosaic contributes to the emergence of ambiguous spaces that integrate 
both religious and secular, or different religious identities and meanings in one site. 
The most successful evangelical groups are defined by multifaceted productions of 
space, and the production of new spatial metaphors. As a result, the production of 
evangelical space is often defined by conflated meanings, flexible uses, and an 
overarching commitment to Christian growth.  
 
Building upon this, the thesis advances three more specific contributions. The first 
pertains to the spatial approach to evangelical Christian growth. Such an approach 
provides recourse to the inability of existing models to explain Christian growth in 
hostile environments around the world. The second is my conceptualisation of 
network-based sacred space. Such a conceptualisation provides a significant departure 
from existing, place-bound moulds, and presents a new theoretical direction in which 
the geographies of religion can advance. The third is more holistic in nature, and 
identifies the fact that this thesis contributes to a more extrospective geography of 
religion. It not only tackles an issue that has animated the broader social sciences for a 
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long time (religious growth), but also engages with, and advances ostensibly 
sociological theories (e.g. structuration theory) through geographical reasoning. I 
elaborate on each contribution below, as well as its relevance for future research 
agendas.  
  
8.2.1 A spatial understanding of evangelical Christian growth 
 
More than anything else, this thesis has furthered a spatial understanding of 
evangelical Christian growth. Integrating understandings of structuration theory and 
space, and applying the resultant formation – the spatial modalities of the structural 
mosaic – to the religious sphere has advanced a new approach to evangelical Christian 
growth. Indeed, the example of evangelical groups using social ministries to establish 
themselves on temple grounds provides potent indication of the ‘spatial possibilities 
[of marginal groups] that vie for ascendancy’ (Knott 2005b: 165). It is these 
possibilities that serve to disrupt normative conceptions of religious structure and 
tradition, with space playing an integral role in the ‘ever-shifting social geometry of 
power and signification in which the material and ideological are co-constitutive’ 
(Jazeel and Brun 2009: 4). How evangelical groups are able to shift the “social 
geometry of power and signification” in their favour is through the manipulation of 
people’s frame of socio-spatial reference, which is achieved by collapsing different 
expressions of agency into one workable, albeit contentious, form. The structural 
mosaic involves a conflation of religious and secular goals that problematise the 
regulation and surveillance of minority groups. It complicates attempts to resolve 
inter-religious tension at the administrative level, and can inform contemporary (and 
alternative) strategies of religious regulation and control.  
	   317	  
 
Recognising the spatial variability of evangelical Christian praxis renders the utility of 
legislative solutions to the problem of “unethical” conversion questionable. It appears 
that the current unethical conversion discourse (i.e. that which focuses on acts of 
force, fraud, or allurement, as defined by the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill) 
is merely addressing the symptoms of Christian growth. In many respects it neglects 
the drivers of “unethical” activity, that is, the strategies of growth that are enacted by 
leveraging the structural mosaic. Whilst the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill is 
designed to restrict unabated expressions of Christian agency, it does nothing to 
address the structurally nuanced patterns of evangelism that foreground Christian 
“recalcitrance” in Sri Lanka. The implications of this for the various stakeholders 
involved in the structural mosaic (i.e. religious organisations, NGOs, policymakers) 
present a challenge that future research on religious growth, regulation, and decline, 
would do well to address.    
 
8.2.2 Network-based sacred space  
 
The second contribution is a corollary of the first: the construction of network-based – 
as opposed to place-based – sacred spaces that enable Christian growth. Decoupling 
religious space from place opens discourse to new possibilities and understandings of 
the sacred, which are built on the possibilities that arise from movement, 
impermanence and change. As the case of the Sri Lankan house church movement 
attests, fidelity to place is substituted (or not) by fidelity to the sacred networks that 
are self-generated by a group of religious observers – an ideal that, although 
problematic, has the potential to radically alter existing understandings of the 
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production and contestation of sacred space. In particular, sacred networks provide a 
viable analytical tool that can further the study of religious movements (and not just 
place-bound institutions). Such movements traverse scales, and it is the dialectical 
relationship between macro-scale ideology and micro-scale praxis that brings the 
politics and potential of sacred networks to life. Thus whilst the thesis accords with 
broader moves to inject a sense of spatial dynamism into the geographies of religion 
(and complements calls for a similar sense of temporal dynamism – see Pred 1984; 
Brace et al. 2006), there is a similar need to study the scalar dynamism of religious 
groups.  
 
Exploring the scalar mobility of different groups will take research beyond scale as a 
fixed analytical category (e.g. global, national, regional, local, bodily – see Kong 
2001), and towards a treatment of scale as a form of agency that enables connection, 
movement, subversion and negotiation. On the one hand, scaling up the discourse will 
draw attention to the scalar implications of networked space for global religious 
movements (such as global Christendom and Islamic jihad) that are founded on 
network principles. As Augé (1995) recognises, non-place is particularly embraced by 
those whose aim is to retain or conquer territory, resulting in paradoxically placeless 
assertions of territoriality. Given the subversive nature of religious placelessness, the 
fault lines that emerge when territorial conquest materialises in more visible forms 
can, potentially, be explosive, as evinced by the attacks perpetrated against house 
church in Sri Lanka and around the world. On the other hand, scaling down the 
discourse will see a focus on how people are absorbed into sacred networks, and 
requires sensitivity to the role of the body in the ‘affective making of sacred space’ 
(Holloway 2003: 1962, see also 2006). How the body is implicated in the production 
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and maintenance of sacred networks at various scales of analysis, from the embodied 
(e.g. inspirited worship), to the congregational (e.g. collective effervescence), and the 
transcendental (e.g. spiritual healing and exorcism) is needed in order to connect the 
micro-scale practices of the body with more broad-based assertions of spiritual 
authority. 
 
8.2.3 Towards a more extrospective geography of religion 
 
Whilst the preceding two contributions are specific in nature, they are both implicated 
in the third, more general contribution. From the topic of study, to the 
interdisciplinary nature of the theoretical framework and analysis, this thesis has 
made headway in the advancement of a more extrospective geography of religion. 
Such a shift towards extrospection is nascent, but overdue. As Kong (2010: 770) 
recognises in her most recent review of the field: ‘geographical insights have not yet 
significantly influenced religious scholarship in other disciplines’. In light of this, the 
findings of the thesis have not only contributed to, but also furthered critical debates 
being rehearsed in the broader social sciences. Notably, my application of 
structuration theory to the religious sphere, and consideration of the spatial modalities 
of the structural mosaic (the outcomes of such application), highlights the value to be 
gained from blending sociological and geographical theorising. In addition, whilst my 
use of religious economy theorisations has remained purely sociological in scope, the 
insights to be gained from exploring the spaces of the religious economy will provide 
another step to further consolidating the role of geography in the social scientific 
study of religion.  
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To that end, whilst the past two decades have seen the geographies of religion forging 
an identity and gaining a sense of legitimacy within the wider geographical enterprise, 
it is now time to start exploring outside of our disciplinary boundaries in a more 
sustained and systematic manner. The current trend towards introspection is 
perceptible, and self-restricting; the geographies of religion should be viewed not in 
exclusory terms, but as a transgressive lens that can be focused upon any field of 
social scientific inquiry, geographical or otherwise. Not only that, but geographical 
contributions are needed, given that ‘the social scientific study of religion is a 
legitimate endeavor, but even today an endeavor that struggles relative to other 
disciplines’ (Cornwall 2011: ii; see also Paulson 2011; Cornwall 2012). Scaling-up 
our contributions, and proving the wide(r)-ranging theoretical and empirical value of 
geography, will not only consolidate the viability of geographical approaches to 
religion, but will contribute to the ongoing legitimation of the social scientific study 
of religion as well.   
 
8.3 Autocritique and final comments 
 
The outcomes of a research project of this scale and duration are a result of the 
choices presented and decisions made throughout the research process. Some choices 
and decisions have – for better or worse – invariably affected the research outcomes. 
Two limitations, both pertaining to the types of people and organisation included in 
the research, have altered the scope of the thesis. The first limitation is general: the 
privileging of “elites” (often clergy) at the expense of the layperson. Whilst such 
privileging enabled an insight into the organisational strategies of evangelism that 
drive growth, greater consideration of layperson perspectives would garner a closer 
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appreciation of the efficacy of such strategies, especially in terms of the fraught 
process of translating evangelical intentions into (desired) outcomes. The structural 
mosaic provides multiple (often non-religious) possibilities for engaging the 
layperson, but it also complicates the process of conversion and, as recognised 
throughout the empirical analysis, is subject to exploitation by both Christians and 
non-Christians alike. Layperson narratives of evangelical engagement would reveal 
more specific insights into the politics of the structural mosaic, how converts 
negotiate the prohibitions accorded by the cultural context, and how national 
belonging affects religious alterity.  
 
The second limitation is more specific, and pertains to the relatively restricted types 
of organisations and religions included in the research. In terms of organisation, I only 
conducted a minimal number of interviews with explicitly transnational Christian 
organisations (and their international representatives). Indeed, a key limitation of this 
thesis has been the assessment of the transnational drivers of evangelical growth, 
especially with regards to the physical, cultural and economic disconnects between 
donor communities in the West (and other developed countries, notably Singapore 
and South Korea), and recipients in countries like Sri Lanka. How such a disconnect 
frames and distorts sponsorship and fundraising schemes presents a necessary field of 
future research, not least because of the broader implications of foreign involvement 
in domestic affairs, as discussed in Chapter 7. In terms of religion, only two 
interviews were conducted with representatives of Hindu organisations; no Muslim 
groups or individuals were interviewed. That is not to say that Hindu and Muslim 
actors are not important. On the contrary, the strong influence of Hindu nationalism in 
neighbouring India and the draw and influence of the transnational umma suggest 
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that, as the arrival of the post-war epoch signals a period of consolidation and change 
in Sri Lanka, factors like these will play an increasingly important role in the structure 
and workings of the religious marketplace. In the face of such developments, 
continued exploration of how evangelical Christian groups jostle not just with 
Buddhists, but Hindus and Muslims as well, will provide further theoretical nuance 
and empirical richness to the findings currently presented. 
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AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR PROHIBITIONS OF CONVERSION FROM ONE
RELIGION TO ANOTHER BY USE OF FORCE OR ALLUREMENT OR BY
FRAUDULENT MEANS AND FOR MATTERS INCIDENTAL THERE WITH OR
INCIDENTAL THERETO.
WHEREAS, Buddhism being the foremost religion professed
and practiced by the majority of people of Sri Lanka, due to
the introduction by great Tathagatha, the Sambuddha in the
8th Month after he had attained Buddhahood on his visit to
Mahiyangana in Sri Lanka and due to the complete
realisation after the arrival of Arahat Mahinda Thero in the
3rd Century B.E
AND WHEREAS, the State has a duty to protect and foster
the Buddha Sasana while assuring to all religions the rights
granted by Article 10 and 14(1) (e) of the Constitution of the
Republic of Sri Lanka :
AND WHEREAS, the Buddhist and non Buddhist are now
under serious threat of forcible conversions and proselyzing
by coercion or by allurement or by fraudulent means :
AND WHEREAS, the Mahasanga and other religious leaders
realising the need to protect and promote religious harmony
among all religions, historically enjoyed by the people of Sri
Lanka :
BE it enacted by the Parliament of the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka as follows :—
1. This Act may be cited as the Prohibition of Forcible
Conversion of Religion  Act, No. of 2004
2. No person shall convert or attempt to convert, either
directly or otherwise, any person from one religion to another
by the use of force or by allurement or by any fraudulent
means nor shall any person aid or abet any such conversion.
3. (a) Whoever adopts a religion from one religion to
another shall within such period as may be prescribed by the
Minister, send an intimation to that effect to the Divisional
Secretary of the area in which such adoption took place.30
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(b) Whoever converts any person from one religion to
another either by performing any ceremony by himself for
such conversion as a facilitator or by taking part directly or
indirectly in such ceremony shall within such period as may
be prescribed by the Minister, send in an intimation to that
effect to the Divisional Secretary of the area in which such
adoption took place.
 4. (a) Notwithstanding contrary to any provision in the
Code of Criminal Procedure Act, whoever contravenes the
provisions of section 2 above shall, without prejudice to any
civil liability, shall be guilty of any offence and on conviction
before a magistrate be liable to be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may not exceeding five years
and also be liable to a fine not exceeding Rupees one hundred
and fifty thousaned :
Provided that whoever contravenes the provisions of
section 2 above in respect of a minor, a woman or a person
referred to in schedule 1 hereof, shall on conviction before a
Magistrate be punished with imprisonment for a term not
exceeding seven years and also be liable to a fine not
exceeding rupees five hundred thousand.
(b) Whoever fails, without sufficient cause, to comply
with the provisions of section 3 (a) and (b) above shall on
conviction before a Magistrate be punished with imprisonment
for a term not exceeding five years or with a fine, not
exceeding rupees one hundred and fifty thousand;
5. Proceedings before a Magistrate may be instituted in
one of the following ways :—
(a) by the Divisional Secretary of the area or an officer
authorised by him for the purpose ;
(b) by the Police in terms of Section 136 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of 1979, upon a
complaint made to the Police by a person aggrieved
Institutional
Proceedings.
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by the offence or in the case of a Minor, by his or her
father or mother or a lawful Guardian or any other
interested person who has reasons to believe that
the provisions of the act has been violated, acting
in the public interest ;
(c) by a person aggrieved by the offence ;
(d) by an Attorney-at-Law ;
(e) by any person authorised by the Minister.
6. The Minister for the time being in charge of Justice
may make rules and regulations for the enforcing and carrying
out the provisions of this act and all such rules and regulations
so made shall be published in the Government Gazette and
shall be placed before the Parliament for approval.
7. In the event of any inconsistency between the Sinhala
and Tamil texts of this Act, the Sinhala text shall prevail.
8. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires —
(a) “allurement” means offer of any temptation in the
form of —
(i) any gift or gratification whether in cash or
kind ;
(ii) grant of any material benefit, whether monetary
or otherwise ;
(iii) grant of employment or grant of promotion in
employment.
(b) “convert” means to make one person to renounce











4 Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of
Religion
(c) “force” shall include a show of force including a
threat or harm or injury of any kind or threat of
religious displeasure or condemnation of any
religion or religious faith ;
(d) “fraudulent” means includes misinterpretation or
any other fraudulent contrivance ;
(e) “minor” means a person under eighteen years of
age.
SCHEDULE 1
1. Those persons classified as samurdy beneficiaries
2. Prison inmates
3. Inmates of rehabilitation centres
4. Inmates of detention centres
5. Physically or mentally disabled
6. Employees of an organisation
7. Members of the armed forces or police
8. Students
9. Inmates of hospitals and or places of healing
10. Inmates of refugee camps
11. Any other category as may be prescribed by the minister by
regulations.
5
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APPENDIX 2: Interview Schedule  
Interview schedule for “elite” Christian research subjects (i.e. leaders of 
Christian church and parachurch organisations) 
 
1 Warm-up/background information 
 
• Religious and family background 
 
• Background and role(s) working with the organisation  
o Length of service 
o Job scope within the organisation 
 
2 Organisational characteristics 
 
• Characteristics 
o Number of pastors/staff 
o Contextual characteristics (e.g. ethnic/religious composition of 
community; notable changes in community over time) 
o For churches: size and composition of congregation (changes over 
time?); key activities, etc. 
o For parachurch organisations: nature of work; measures of “success” 
(e.g. number of churches planted), etc. 
 
• Origins and growth 
o Inception (i.e. how did the church come about) 
o Spatial development (e.g. building upgrades/expansion) 
o Where organisation is located (site/situation – include both permanent 
and temporary locations) 
o Growth milestones over time 
 
• Transnational linkages 
o Number and nature of linkages 
o Type and degree of dependency (if any) 
o Effect on organisational operations, strategies and outcomes 
 
3 Strategies and spaces of evangelism 
 
• Key factors affecting the development and implementation of strategies of 
evangelism 
o What strategies are commonly used? 
o Efficacy of different strategies; why are some strategies used and not 
others? 
o Explore tension (if any) between strategies of evangelism and context 
(i.e. demand, other religious agencies, etc.) 
 
• Spaces of evangelism 
o Characteristics of spaces commonly used 
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o Efficacy of different spaces; why are some used and not others? 
o Explore how space is used to reflect and reproduce evangelical 
Christianity  
 
• Intersections of strategy and space 
o To what extent are strategies of evangelism place-specific? 
o How is space used to implement different strategies, and how is 
evangelical strategy influenced by space (if at all)?   
 
4 Resistance to evangelism 
 
• Key sources and forms of resistance 
o Where does resistance come from (i.e. which religious/ethnic/social 
groups) and who do they target (i.e. physical buildings, symbols, or 
persons)? 
o Probe spatial dimensions of resistance 
o Explore the effect of resistance on strategies and outcomes of 
resistance 
 
• Reciprocal/mitigating responses from evangelicals 
o How do evangelicals (i.e. organisations, clergy and laity) respond to 
resistance? 
o Explore the idea that the relationship between evangelical strategy and 
context is reciprocal, and in a constant state of (re)negotiation 
o Explore how the use of space is a means/outcome of 
resistance/counter-resistance 
 
5 Evangelism in Sri Lanka 
 
• Key challenges facing evangelical organisations in Sri Lanka/locality 
• Implications of the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill, if passed 
• Other regulatory constraints that affect the practice or outcomes of evangelism 
• Understanding of the position of non-evangelical groups and possible options for 
tolerance in the future 
